Are Credences Thoughts about Probability? A Reply to the Inscrutable Evidence Argument.
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| Title: | Are Credences Thoughts about Probability? A Reply to the Inscrutable Evidence Argument. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Lennertz, Benjamin1 (AUTHOR) belennertz@gmail.com |
| Source: | Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 2025, Vol. 12, p1-21. 21p. |
| Database: | Academic Search Ultimate |
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| FullText | Links: – Type: pdflink Text: Availability: 1 |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.3998/ergo.7971 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 21 StartPage: 1 Titles: – TitleFull: Are Credences Thoughts about Probability? A Reply to the Inscrutable Evidence Argument. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Lennertz, Benjamin IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 01 Text: 2025 Type: published Y: 2025 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 23304014 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 12 Titles: – TitleFull: Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Type: main |
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