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Are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions? Field evidence from multistage tournaments.

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Title: Are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions? Field evidence from multistage tournaments.
Authors: Lackner, Mario1 (AUTHOR), Stracke, Rudi2 (AUTHOR), Sunde, Uwe1,2,3,4 (AUTHOR) uwe.sunde@lmu.de, Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf1,5 (AUTHOR)
Source: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Nov2020, Vol. 179, p544-565. 22p.
Subjects: Tournaments, Basketball tournaments, Evidence
Abstract: This paper investigates whether decision makers are forward looking in dynamic strategic interactions and incorporate variations of continuation values in their choices. Using data from professional and semi-professional basketball tournaments, we find that the expected relative strength of a team in future interactions indeed affects behavior in the present. The results also show that the response to changes in the continuation value is stronger if the structure of prizes is convex across stages, if the players are in a decisive game and if the prevalence of free riding within a team is low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Engineering Source
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  Availability: 0
Header DbId: egs
DbLabel: Engineering Source
An: 146657235
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
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  Data: Are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions? Field evidence from multistage tournaments.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Lackner%2C+Mario%22">Lackner, Mario</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Stracke%2C+Rudi%22">Stracke, Rudi</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Sunde%2C+Uwe%22">Sunde, Uwe</searchLink><relatesTo>1,2,3,4</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> uwe.sunde@lmu.de</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Winter-Ebmer%2C+Rudolf%22">Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf</searchLink><relatesTo>1,5</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Journal+of+Economic+Behavior+%26+Organization%22">Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</searchLink>. Nov2020, Vol. 179, p544-565. 22p.
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– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
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  Data: This paper investigates whether decision makers are forward looking in dynamic strategic interactions and incorporate variations of continuation values in their choices. Using data from professional and semi-professional basketball tournaments, we find that the expected relative strength of a team in future interactions indeed affects behavior in the present. The results also show that the response to changes in the continuation value is stronger if the structure of prizes is convex across stages, if the players are in a decisive game and if the prevalence of free riding within a team is low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
  Label:
  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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RecordInfo BibRecord:
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      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.012
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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        PageCount: 22
        StartPage: 544
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Tournaments
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Basketball tournaments
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Evidence
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions? Field evidence from multistage tournaments.
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            NameFull: Lackner, Mario
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            NameFull: Stracke, Rudi
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            NameFull: Sunde, Uwe
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            NameFull: Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf
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              Text: Nov2020
              Type: published
              Y: 2020
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              Value: 179
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            – TitleFull: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
              Type: main
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