MPC‐Facilitated Adaptive Security Framework for BFT Protocols.
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| Title: | MPC‐Facilitated Adaptive Security Framework for BFT Protocols. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Niu, Jie1 (AUTHOR), Wang, Baocang1 (AUTHOR) bcwang@xidian.edu.cn, Wang, Qichun1 (AUTHOR) qcwang@fudan.edu.cn |
| Source: | IET Information Security (Wiley-Blackwell). 6/3/2026, Vol. 2026, p1-24. 24p. |
| Subjects: | Blockchains, Fault-tolerant computing, Data encryption, Distributed computing, Encryption protocols |
| Abstract: | The growing use of blockchain and distributed systems requires Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) protocols that remain secure under dynamic adversaries. However, existing BFT protocols often rely on static assumptions and lack clear mechanisms to detect and remove malicious or denial‐of‐service (DoS) nodes during execution. We present MBFT, a BFT framework that combines secure multi‐party computation (MPC) with protocol‐level node verification. MBFT integrates ElGamal threshold encryption with an SPDZ‐style preprocessing phase and uses MAC‐based checks to detect inconsistent behavior. It also adopts a hybrid timestamp oracle with off‐chain aggregation and on‐chain validation to support time‐bounded decisions. We specify its trust assumptions and analyze its failure cases within the protocol. Our analysis shows that MBFT maintains safety and liveness under adaptive adversaries, including censorship, internal Byzantine faults, and DoS attacks. Experimental results show that, for a network with n = 32 nodes, MBFT achieves an average per‐round latency of about 0.5 s on desktop platforms, which is comparable to Dumbo BFT under the same setting. The additional cost introduced by node verification remains small, contributing less than 5% of the total latency. In terms of communication, MBFT incurs approximately 27.2 kB total traffic per round, reducing communication overhead by about 50% compared to HoneyBadger BFT and remaining within 4%–6% of Dumbo BFT. These results indicate that MBFT preserves the efficiency of asynchronous BFT protocols while providing explicit support for node accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of IET Information Security (Wiley-Blackwell) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Engineering Source |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Header | DbId: egs DbLabel: Engineering Source An: 194259972 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: MPC‐Facilitated Adaptive Security Framework for BFT Protocols. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Niu%2C+Jie%22">Niu, Jie</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Wang%2C+Baocang%22">Wang, Baocang</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> bcwang@xidian.edu.cn</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Wang%2C+Qichun%22">Wang, Qichun</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> qcwang@fudan.edu.cn</i> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22IET+Information+Security+%28Wiley-Blackwell%29%22">IET Information Security (Wiley-Blackwell)</searchLink>. 6/3/2026, Vol. 2026, p1-24. 24p. – Name: Subject Label: Subjects Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Blockchains%22">Blockchains</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Fault-tolerant+computing%22">Fault-tolerant computing</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Data+encryption%22">Data encryption</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Distributed+computing%22">Distributed computing</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Encryption+protocols%22">Encryption protocols</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: The growing use of blockchain and distributed systems requires Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) protocols that remain secure under dynamic adversaries. However, existing BFT protocols often rely on static assumptions and lack clear mechanisms to detect and remove malicious or denial‐of‐service (DoS) nodes during execution. We present MBFT, a BFT framework that combines secure multi‐party computation (MPC) with protocol‐level node verification. MBFT integrates ElGamal threshold encryption with an SPDZ‐style preprocessing phase and uses MAC‐based checks to detect inconsistent behavior. It also adopts a hybrid timestamp oracle with off‐chain aggregation and on‐chain validation to support time‐bounded decisions. We specify its trust assumptions and analyze its failure cases within the protocol. Our analysis shows that MBFT maintains safety and liveness under adaptive adversaries, including censorship, internal Byzantine faults, and DoS attacks. Experimental results show that, for a network with n = 32 nodes, MBFT achieves an average per‐round latency of about 0.5 s on desktop platforms, which is comparable to Dumbo BFT under the same setting. The additional cost introduced by node verification remains small, contributing less than 5% of the total latency. In terms of communication, MBFT incurs approximately 27.2 kB total traffic per round, reducing communication overhead by about 50% compared to HoneyBadger BFT and remaining within 4%–6% of Dumbo BFT. These results indicate that MBFT preserves the efficiency of asynchronous BFT protocols while providing explicit support for node accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of IET Information Security (Wiley-Blackwell) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1049/ise2/7043746 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 24 StartPage: 1 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Blockchains Type: general – SubjectFull: Fault-tolerant computing Type: general – SubjectFull: Data encryption Type: general – SubjectFull: Distributed computing Type: general – SubjectFull: Encryption protocols Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: MPC‐Facilitated Adaptive Security Framework for BFT Protocols. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Niu, Jie – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Wang, Baocang – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Wang, Qichun IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 03 M: 06 Text: 6/3/2026 Type: published Y: 2026 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 17518709 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 2026 Titles: – TitleFull: IET Information Security (Wiley-Blackwell) Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |
