View in EDS HTML Full Text PDF Full Text

Fighting Software Piracy: Some Global Conditional Policy Instruments.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Fighting Software Piracy: Some Global Conditional Policy Instruments.
Authors: Asongu, Simplice A.1,2 simplice.anutechia.asongu-2014@brookes.ac.uk, asongusimplice@yahoo.com, Singh, Pritam1 psingh@brookes.ac.uk, Le Roux, Sara1 sle-roux@brookes.ac.uk
Source: Journal of Business Ethics. Sep2018, Vol. 152 Issue 1, p175-189. 15p. 5 Charts.
Subject Terms: *Intellectual property, *International cooperation, Prevention of software piracy, Panel analysis, Quantile regression, Gross domestic product, Per capita
Abstract: This study examines the efficiency of tools for fighting software piracy in the conditional distributions of software piracy. Our paper examines software piracy in 99 countries over the period 1994-2010, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. The intuition for modelling distributions contingent on existing levels of software piracy is that the effectiveness of tools against piracy may consistently decrease or increase simultaneously with the increasing levels of software piracy. Hence, blanket policies against software piracy are unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of software piracy and tailored differently across countries with low, medium and high levels of software piracy. Our findings indicate that GDP per capita, research and development expenditure, main intellectual property laws, multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, World Intellectual Property Organisation treaties, money supply and respect for the rule of law have negative effects on software piracy. Equitably distributed wealth reduces software piracy, and the tendency not to indulge in software piracy because of equitably distributed wealth increases with the increasing software piracy levels. Hence, the negative degree of responsiveness of software piracy to changes in income levels is an increasing function of software piracy. Moreover, the relationships between policy instruments and software piracy display various patterns: U-shape, Kuznets-shape, S-shape and negative thresholds. A negative threshold represents negative estimates with the increasing negative magnitude throughout the conditional distributions of software piracy. We also discuss the policy implications of our study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Journal of Business Ethics is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Education Research Complete
Full text is not displayed to guests.
FullText Links:
  – Type: pdflink
Text:
  Availability: 1
Header DbId: ehh
DbLabel: Education Research Complete
An: 131752442
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Fighting Software Piracy: Some Global Conditional Policy Instruments.
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Asongu%2C+Simplice+A%2E%22">Asongu, Simplice A.</searchLink><relatesTo>1,2</relatesTo><i> simplice.anutechia.asongu-2014@brookes.ac.uk, asongusimplice@yahoo.com</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Singh%2C+Pritam%22">Singh, Pritam</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo><i> psingh@brookes.ac.uk</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Le+Roux%2C+Sara%22">Le Roux, Sara</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo><i> sle-roux@brookes.ac.uk</i>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Journal+of+Business+Ethics%22">Journal of Business Ethics</searchLink>. Sep2018, Vol. 152 Issue 1, p175-189. 15p. 5 Charts.
– Name: Subject
  Label: Subject Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Intellectual+property%22">Intellectual property</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22International+cooperation%22">International cooperation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Prevention+of+software+piracy%22">Prevention of software piracy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Panel+analysis%22">Panel analysis</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Quantile+regression%22">Quantile regression</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Gross+domestic+product%22">Gross domestic product</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Per+capita%22">Per capita</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: This study examines the efficiency of tools for fighting software piracy in the conditional distributions of software piracy. Our paper examines software piracy in 99 countries over the period 1994-2010, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. The intuition for modelling distributions contingent on existing levels of software piracy is that the effectiveness of tools against piracy may consistently decrease or increase simultaneously with the increasing levels of software piracy. Hence, blanket policies against software piracy are unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of software piracy and tailored differently across countries with low, medium and high levels of software piracy. Our findings indicate that GDP per capita, research and development expenditure, main intellectual property laws, multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, World Intellectual Property Organisation treaties, money supply and respect for the rule of law have negative effects on software piracy. Equitably distributed wealth reduces software piracy, and the tendency not to indulge in software piracy because of equitably distributed wealth increases with the increasing software piracy levels. Hence, the negative degree of responsiveness of software piracy to changes in income levels is an increasing function of software piracy. Moreover, the relationships between policy instruments and software piracy display various patterns: U-shape, Kuznets-shape, S-shape and negative thresholds. A negative threshold represents negative estimates with the increasing negative magnitude throughout the conditional distributions of software piracy. We also discuss the policy implications of our study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
  Label:
  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of Journal of Business Ethics is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=ehh&AN=131752442
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1007/s10551-016-3291-7
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 15
        StartPage: 175
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Intellectual property
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: International cooperation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Prevention of software piracy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Panel analysis
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Quantile regression
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Gross domestic product
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Per capita
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Fighting Software Piracy: Some Global Conditional Policy Instruments.
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Asongu, Simplice A.
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Singh, Pritam
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Le Roux, Sara
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 28
              M: 09
              Text: Sep2018
              Type: published
              Y: 2018
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 01674544
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 152
            – Type: issue
              Value: 1
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Journal of Business Ethics
              Type: main
ResultId 1