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The culture of objectivity: Quantification, uncertainty, and the evaluation of risk at NASA.

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Title: The culture of objectivity: Quantification, uncertainty, and the evaluation of risk at NASA.
Authors: Feldman, Steven P.1 spf@case.edu
Source: Human Relations. Jun2004, Vol. 57 Issue 6, p691-718. 28p.
Subject Terms: *Authors, Space vehicle accidents, Aeronautics, Literature
Geographic Terms: United States
Company/Entity: United States. National Aeronautics & Space Administration
Abstract: For over three decades social studies of science have investigated 'objectivity' as a central, socially constructed assumption in scientific and engineering work. This literature has seldom been utilized in the study of organizations despite the fact that knowledge production and knowledge use in scientific and engineering organizations are presumed to be objective or independent of individual and social influences. In this article, the social studies of science literature as it conceptualizes and understands objectivity is reviewed. An analysis of the data on decision-making at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) during the years preceding the explosion of Challenger is carried out using concepts from this literature. Data on decision-making at NASA during the years preceding the explosion of Columbia are also analyzed. It is shown that the culture of objectivity at NASA interacted with time pressures to produce a misunderstanding of flight risk. This misunderstanding resulted from two general aspects of NASA's culture: (i) an over-confidence in quantitative data went hand-in-hand with a marginalization of nonquantifiable data, leading to an insensitivity to uncertainty and a loss of organizational memory; and (ii) problem definition and solution creation were constructed as if they were independent of organizational goals, resulting in an inaccurate estimation of risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Human Relations is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Education Research Complete
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  Data: For over three decades social studies of science have investigated 'objectivity' as a central, socially constructed assumption in scientific and engineering work. This literature has seldom been utilized in the study of organizations despite the fact that knowledge production and knowledge use in scientific and engineering organizations are presumed to be objective or independent of individual and social influences. In this article, the social studies of science literature as it conceptualizes and understands objectivity is reviewed. An analysis of the data on decision-making at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) during the years preceding the explosion of Challenger is carried out using concepts from this literature. Data on decision-making at NASA during the years preceding the explosion of Columbia are also analyzed. It is shown that the culture of objectivity at NASA interacted with time pressures to produce a misunderstanding of flight risk. This misunderstanding resulted from two general aspects of NASA's culture: (i) an over-confidence in quantitative data went hand-in-hand with a marginalization of nonquantifiable data, leading to an insensitivity to uncertainty and a loss of organizational memory; and (ii) problem definition and solution creation were constructed as if they were independent of organizational goals, resulting in an inaccurate estimation of risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Human Relations is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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