College as a Marriage Market. EdWorkingPaper No. 25-1199
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| Title: | College as a Marriage Market. EdWorkingPaper No. 25-1199 |
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| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Lars Kirkeboen, Edwin Leuven, Magne Mogstad, Jack Mountjoy, Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University |
| Source: | Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University. 2025. |
| Availability: | Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University. Brown University Box 1985, Providence, RI 02912. Tel: 401-863-7990; Fax: 401-863-1290; e-mail: annenberg@brown.edu; Web site: https://annenberg.brown.edu/ |
| Peer Reviewed: | N |
| Page Count: | 62 |
| Publication Date: | 2025 |
| Sponsoring Agency: | Research Council of Norway University of Chicago, Booth School of Business |
| Document Type: | Reports - Research |
| Education Level: | Higher Education Postsecondary Education |
| Descriptors: | Interpersonal Attraction, Marriage, College Programs, School Choice, College Role, Foreign Countries, Interpersonal Relationship, Intellectual Disciplines, College Attendance, Wages, Gender Differences, Birth Rate, Institutional Characteristics, College Graduates, College Admission, Family Income |
| Geographic Terms: | Norway |
| Abstract: | College graduates tend to marry each other. We use detailed Norwegian data to show that strong assortativity further arises by institution and field of study, especially among high earners from elite programs. Admission discontinuities reveal that enrollment itself, rather than selection, primarily drives matching by institution and field among the college-educated, and that these matches can be economically consequential. Elite professional programs, in particular, propel marginally admitted women into elite household formation: they earn substantially more themselves and match with higher-earning elite partners, becoming much more likely to join the top percentiles of household earnings while also reducing fertility. Marginal elite admission for men yields no change in partner earnings or fertility. College match-making effects are concentrated among students who attend the same institution at the same time, and are larger when opposite-sex peers are more abundant, indicating search costs in the marriage market. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Entry Date: | 2025 |
| Accession Number: | ED674081 |
| Database: | ERIC |
| Abstract: | College graduates tend to marry each other. We use detailed Norwegian data to show that strong assortativity further arises by institution and field of study, especially among high earners from elite programs. Admission discontinuities reveal that enrollment itself, rather than selection, primarily drives matching by institution and field among the college-educated, and that these matches can be economically consequential. Elite professional programs, in particular, propel marginally admitted women into elite household formation: they earn substantially more themselves and match with higher-earning elite partners, becoming much more likely to join the top percentiles of household earnings while also reducing fertility. Marginal elite admission for men yields no change in partner earnings or fertility. College match-making effects are concentrated among students who attend the same institution at the same time, and are larger when opposite-sex peers are more abundant, indicating search costs in the marriage market. |
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