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Command and Can't Control: Assessing Centralized Accountability in the Public Sector. Policy Research Working Paper 11200

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Bibliographic Details
Title: Command and Can't Control: Assessing Centralized Accountability in the Public Sector. Policy Research Working Paper 11200
Language: English
Authors: Saad Gulzar, Juan Felipe Ladino, Muhammad Zia Mehmood, Daniel Rogger, World Bank
Source: World Bank. 2025.
Availability: World Bank Publications. 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Tel: 202-458-4500; Fax: 202-552-1500; Web site: http://www.worldbank.org/
Peer Reviewed: N
Page Count: 71
Publication Date: 2025
Document Type: Reports - Research
Descriptors: Public Sector, Accountability, Decision Making, Foreign Countries, Vertical Organization, Educational Administration, Models, Government (Administrative Body), Outcomes of Education, Administrative Organization, Public Education
Geographic Terms: Pakistan
Abstract: A long-established and widely used approach to management in government has been the transmission of information up a hierarchy, and centralized decision-making and oversight; colloquially known as 'command and control'. This paper examines accountability in such a system implemented at scale in Punjab, Pakistan. Using random variation in the intensity of accountability of the scheme, the paper shows that the corresponding de facto punishments had a negligible impact on school or student outcomes. It uses detailed data on the education production function to show that this fundamental component of command-and-control approaches does not induce bureaucratic action towards improvements in government performance. [Additional funding provided by the Blavatnik School of Government/Education Commission DeliverEd.]
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2026
Accession Number: ED679765
Database: ERIC
Description
Abstract:A long-established and widely used approach to management in government has been the transmission of information up a hierarchy, and centralized decision-making and oversight; colloquially known as 'command and control'. This paper examines accountability in such a system implemented at scale in Punjab, Pakistan. Using random variation in the intensity of accountability of the scheme, the paper shows that the corresponding de facto punishments had a negligible impact on school or student outcomes. It uses detailed data on the education production function to show that this fundamental component of command-and-control approaches does not induce bureaucratic action towards improvements in government performance. [Additional funding provided by the Blavatnik School of Government/Education Commission DeliverEd.]