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Why There Is No Education Ethics without Principles

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Title: Why There Is No Education Ethics without Principles
Language: English
Authors: Krek, Janez, Zabel, Blaž
Source: Educational Philosophy and Theory. 2017 49(3):284-293.
Availability: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 10
Publication Date: 2017
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Evaluative
Descriptors: Ethical Instruction, Values Education, Moral Values, Caring, Educational Theories, Reflection, Misconceptions, Ethics, Language Role, Discourse Analysis
DOI: 10.1080/00131857.2016.1217188
ISSN: 0013-1857
Abstract: Moral education and ethical reflection are always dependent on the content of the internalized norms, principles and values of the individual. As we demonstrate, this also means that there is no instance of "feeling," "emotion," "spontaneity," or "care" that can be independent of norms, rules, and values outside human discourse. In light of this, Noddings' theory of the ethic of care is a contentious theory of child education, as it is linked with the presupposition that we can turn a blind eye to the symbolic field, to the network of rules/principles and their values, when we educate. Education that is derived only from caring, without being derived from reflection on education's specific values, can lead to education that supports, for instance, racist ideology and racist education. This is not, of course, something that the ethic of care would advocate; however, as an educational theory, it is flawed in that, due to the rejection of reflection through principles in general, it fails to provide the educator with a conceptual apparatus through which he/she could analyze and reflect upon--could understand--what he/she is doing with regard to the norms of his/her culture. Society and educators cannot tacitly allow or be benevolent toward such fundamental mistakes in moral education.
Abstractor: As Provided
Number of References: 37
Entry Date: 2017
Accession Number: EJ1130050
Database: ERIC
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  Value: <anid>AN0121255564;54l01mar.17;2019Feb13.17:11;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0121255564-1">Why there is no education ethics without principles. </title> <p>Moral education and ethical reflection are always dependent on the content of the internalized norms, principles and values of the individual. As we demonstrate, this also means that there is no instance of feeling, emotion, spontaneity, or care that can be independent of norms, rules, and values outside human discourse. In light of this, Noddings' theory of the ethic of care is a contentious theory of child education, as it is linked with the presupposition that we can turn a blind eye to the symbolic field, to the network of rules/principles and their values, when we educate. Education that is derived only from caring, without being derived from reflection on education's specific values, can lead to education that supports, for instance, racist ideology and racist education. This is not, of course, something that the ethic of care would advocate; however, as an educational theory, it is flawed in that, due to the rejection of reflection through principles in general, it fails to provide the educator with a conceptual apparatus through which he/she could analyze and reflect upon—could understand—what he/she is doing with regard to the norms of his/her culture. Society and educators cannot tacitly allow or be benevolent toward such fundamental mistakes in moral education.</p> <p>Keywords: The ethic of care; ethical reflection; moral education; psychoanalysis; Nel Noddings</p> <hd id="AN0121255564-2">1. Introduction: The ethic of care and care for ethics in education</hd> <p>In certain educational theories, we encounter suppositions, values, or fundamental hypotheses that not only introduce specific errors into education but establish it on entirely incorrect points of departure. As one of the recognized theoreticians of education put it, they are 'getting it wrong from the beginning' (Egan, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref1">6</reflink>]).[<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref2">1</reflink>] One such hypothesis is found in variants of so-called care theory: that general principles in education ethics are superfluous, and that it is unnecessary to reflect upon them as we have sufficient support for our behaviors in our spontaneous care for the other.[<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref3">2</reflink>] Such theories are wrong in suggesting that we can turn a blind eye to the symbolic field, or, in other words, to the network of rules and values when we educate. They are a controversial recommendation for education, as moral reflection and decisions are always dependent on the content of the internalized rules, norms, and values of the individual. Two questions thus need special consideration: Is education without general principles and without reflection possible at all? Is such education advisable in contemporary value-plural society?</p> <p>The psychoanalytical theory of Freud and his French successor Jacques Lacan has demonstrated that the fundamental personality structure of a human being is formed with the entry into language and, as cultural anthropology argues, through the symbolic patterns of culture. According to Lacan, <emph>comprehension</emph>, <emph>feeling</emph>, <emph>perception</emph>, <emph>emotions</emph>, etc. are all formed through <emph>the Other</emph> as discourse. This means that oppositions such as 'feeling' versus 'reason', as conceived by Noddings, for instance, are too limited (e.g. Nelsen, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref4">25</reflink>]). Furthermore, the effect of early childhood education is a specific structure of the subject that shapes the person's capacities for <emph>ethical reflection</emph>, insofar as it can be distinguished from the purely intellectual capabilities of reason. We argue that the initial position of the child is overlooked in the theory of care. Through the limitations of its concept of care as a theory of ethics, Noddings' ethic of care overlooks how early childhood education conditions the human being precisely as an <emph>ethical</emph> reflective subject.</p> <p>As Kant ([<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref5">14</reflink>]) wrote, unlike animals, 'man needs a reason of his own. Having no instinct, he has to work out a plan of conduct for himself' (p. 2). As thinking beings, we thus have an obligation to know our suppositions, points of departure, values, principles, and norms; in short, to know the basic framework of education. This is especially true in view of the paternalistic obligations of adults toward children (Schapiro, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref6">35</reflink>]). Adults have special obligations toward children, all of which—protection, nurture, discipline, and education—presuppose regard for ethics. This has consequences for both the individual and society.</p> <p>Proponents of the ethic of care—including Nel Noddings, whose theory of care we are reconsidering here—do not deny the need for moral thinking; it is the form that moral thinking and behavior take—or should take—that is in dispute. We argue that, in human discourse, reflection through universal discursive forms, such as generally conceived rules and principles in ethics, is unavoidable for human beings. But if this is anyway a fact, why it is so important to take principles and reflection into account in education and its ethics?</p> <p>Here, we can only indicate a few reasons. In all countries that have signed international documents on human rights, these rights, together with their corresponding duties, establish the value basis of moral education, and because these rights take the form of general principles, moral education presupposes reflection on these general principles (Bynum, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref7">3</reflink>]; Donnelly, [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref8">5</reflink>]; Osler & Starkey, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref9">33</reflink>]). The recommendation of the ethic of care—that general principles in education ethics are superfluous, and that it is unnecessary to reflect upon them as we have sufficient support for our behaviors in our spontaneous care for the other—is in contradiction to the very form of moral education in all of these countries. The recommendation that, in this context, education should be based only on emotions and spontaneity, means, in the best case, that these principles and the fundamental values of civilization associated with them need not be taken seriously.</p> <p>The consequences can, however, be more far reaching. The fact that certain feelings are real or spontaneous does not tell us anything about the content of these emotions, and this cares for others in light of general civilizational norms and values. An inevitable consequence of the point of departure that moral education proceeds in such a way that we educate without reference to principles and reflection is that moral education (albeit unintentionally) slips into complete relativism of values. This is an unacceptable and inappropriate concept for moral education in public or 'common' schools, where all children or pupils are educated together in one institution regardless of differentiating characteristics, such as religious, ethnic, or cultural background. A similar view is advocated by authors such as McLaughlin ([<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref10">20</reflink>]), who do not substantiate such education directly from the concept of human rights. According to McLaughlin, since the institutions in question are intended to serve the population as a whole, they have 'to offer a common form of moral education' (McLaughlin, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref11">20</reflink>], p. 24) and he demonstrates that the value basis of such education is grounded in certain principles and procedural values (McLaughlin, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref12">20</reflink>], pp. 19–33). He goes on to claim that moral education in such institutions should differentiate between fundamental values and those in relation to which significant disagreement exists in a particular society. In a liberal society, 'the school does not present the fundamental values in question as negotiable or in doubt' (McLaughlin, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref13">20</reflink>], p. 25). Opposition to moral education offered on the basis of fundamental values 'could only come from those who want selfishness, sadism, genocide and racial hatred to be transmitted to the next generation' (McLaughlin, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref14">20</reflink>], p. 25). Such a school must, however, reflect on highly controversial values, views, etc.; where competing views exist in society, it is inappropriate for a public institution 'to present any one view as authoritative' (McLaughlin, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref15">20</reflink>], p. 26). From his argument, it is clear that moral education in public kindergartens and schools cannot take place without principles and reflection.</p> <p>Nevertheless, we do not suggest that the ethic of care advocates absolute moral relativism in education. In his account of the ethic of care, Haydon concludes, that 'in that kind of thinking, as they [Noddings or Gillian] conceive of it, implicit principles seem to be operating, even if unacknowledged' (Haydon, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref16">11</reflink>], p. 33). Even if the flaw in the theory of care is merely a certain lack of understanding of how moral thinking operates, this is a fatal mistake, as it leads to unacceptable consequences for moral education. In the words of another author: 'If we believe that anything goes so long as we are sincere, then we are on the road toward condoning Nazism and apartheid' (Pybus, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref17">34</reflink>], p. 9).</p> <p>In light of the growing racist tendencies in the USA, Europe and elsewhere,[<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref18">3</reflink>] we argue in the present paper that education derived <emph>only</emph> from 'natural,' 'spontaneous'[<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref19">4</reflink>] care, without awareness of and reflection on the <emph>specific</emph> rules, norms, and values from which it derives, can lead to education that forms, for instance, a racist subject. We demonstrate that emotions such as racism or racial hatred are of a discursive nature, as well. Constructing an example, we illustrate that education based on theories such as care theory can turn a blind eye even to racism, if it conforms with the educationalist's web of care. This means that such educational approaches fail to detect the formation of unwanted personality structures.</p> <p>If we take a 'detour past principles' as the basis of education, we lose the <emph>content</emph> foundation of ethics and reflection on what is right and what is wrong, as we have already indicated. We maintain that reflection on the basis of principles (universalized assertions) is a necessary, indispensible part of human discourse. It is thus essential that education should reflect on norms, values, and principles, allowing for detection of unwanted educational outcomes and personality structures. Promoting education that does not consider norms, values, and principles while educating is erroneous, and is therefore wrong and unacceptable from the perspective of each individual child as well as from the perspective of society as a whole.</p> <hd id="AN0121255564-3">2. The role of language and discourse in the formation of the personality structure, ethical...</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0121255564-4">2.1. There are no actions and no ethics outside discourse</hd> <p>Following from Freud, Lacan emphasizes in his psychoanalytical theory (Lacan, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref20">18</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref21">19</reflink>]) that the child, prior to entering language, establishes an <emph>imaginary</emph> relationship to the <emph>other</emph>, who is most frequently represented by the mother. In this pre-Oedipal relationship, as Freud identified, lies the essence of the child's narcissistic character. Freud ([<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref22">9</reflink>]), Freud, Strachey, and Richards ([<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref23">8</reflink>]) established the child's primary narcissism as a state in which the child takes him/herself, his/her own Ego, as a love-object, which also corresponds to the child's belief in the omnipotence of his/her own thoughts (the imaginary relation is that of the child's <emph>Ego</emph> as his/her object to <emph>another Ego</emph> as an object). On the one hand, the child perceives him/herself as a kind of 'omnipotent' being who sets the other an absolute Demand that must be satisfied; on the other hand, in accordance with the logic of 'omnipotence', he/she also perceives the 'maternal' other as someone who can and must satisfy the established Demand. In this imaginary relationship to the other, the logic of mirroring operates, that is, a mirror relationship in which the young child perceives each instance of the other as his/her own 'other ego'. If the Demand is not satisfied, the child is unable to establish him/herself in a position that is anything other than antagonistic in relation to the other. He/she immediately senses the other as an opponent or an 'enemy'. As Lacan emphasizes in his lecture 'Three Phases of Oedipus', in this imaginary relation to the mother, the mother's desire or the 'maternal law'—'the maternal law is nothing other than the fact that the mother is a speaking being'—is, for the child, 'a kind of uncontrolled law' that 'is entirely located in the subject, that supports him/her, so to say, in the good or bad will of the mother, in the good or bad mother' (Lacan, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref24">18</reflink>], p. 188). For the child, the maternal pre-Oedipal 'law' is not the symbolic law—which will only be able to be established through language and its universality—but rather it is the 'law' of arbitrariness or caprice. One of the meanings of <emph>caring</emph> or <emph>care about</emph> is <emph>to be concerned about what happens to someone, because you like or love them</emph>. When, in moral education, we develop the concept of care in relation to the child, psychoanalytical theory points out that, in the initial, imaginary perspective of the child, the care shown to him/her by the other is not, for the child, symbolically conditioned. From the perspective of the child, there is no meaning that could, in his/her understanding, be a discursive <emph>reason</emph> for care. There is, therefore, no '<emph>because</emph> (...)'; in the child's perspective, care has an unconditional character.</p> <p>When the child enters language, the <emph>ability</emph> to speak, to learn language and to acquire cognitive capacities through language is undoubtedly a natural part of growing up. Psychoanalytical theory emphasizes that language, as a symbolic structure imposed on the child by adults, is not something natural for the child (Fink, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref25">7</reflink>]). According to Lacan, the process in which the child learns language is at first a process of alienation: <emph>alienation also in language</emph>. As demonstrated by cognitive science, which also empirically studies the process of learning language, these processes begin in the child when it is still in the womb and continue immediately after birth (Anderson, Morgan, & White, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref26">1</reflink>]; Gómez et al., [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref27">10</reflink>]; Mehler et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref28">22</reflink>]; Moon, Lagercrantz, & Kuhl, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref29">24</reflink>]). When, prior to expressing him/herself through language, the child expresses his/her feelings—discomfort, hunger, cold, etc., or pleasure—through crying or with satisfaction, for instance with a smile, parents interpret these feelings in language, through <emph>speech</emph> to the child or to themselves. Although speech is in fact <emph>individually</emph> utilized and functioning discourse, an expression of the individuality, identity and unconscious of the individual, as discourse it nonetheless has a social (or cultural), universal and abstract dimension. The emotions and feelings of adults are always <emph>already</emph> formed through discourse. Prior to acquiring language to the stage that allows the child to express him/herself through it, his/her feelings and demands are therefore not appropriately labeled with concepts that are linked with language as a symbolic, social, and, from the initial perspective of the child, entirely external network of meanings: that, for instance, the child <emph>knows</emph> that he/she is expressing the will of 'anger' or 'happiness', etc. (he/she expresses 'something' that the parents understand and therefore interpret 'for the child' as <emph>anger</emph>, <emph>happiness</emph>, etc.), or that he/she senses the <emph>meaning</emph> of the demand that he/she is expressing by crying, etc. Every meaning is, in the initial phase, beyond the child's comprehension. When he/she begins to speak and to articulate and express his/her 'own' emotions and will through language, the child is able to express this <emph>in language</emph> only with the signifiers of meaning and in the way that is taught and enabled by language as discourse: discourse in the sense of the socially, culturally authorized formal structure of rules <emph>and</emph> content, that is, the network of meanings, sub-senses, and contexts, which are associated with cultural patterns, socially accepted behaviors, etc. In this sense, parents and others are, according to Lacan, not only initially the <emph>imaginary</emph> others described above, but from the very beginning represent discourse that is the <emph>symbolic</emph> Other, <emph>the Other of language</emph> or <emph>the Other as language</emph>.</p> <p>When discourse in the child—for the child, or better 'from within', but as a kind of uninvited intruder—begins to articulate the child's emotions and feelings, a <emph>desire</emph> takes shape that is able to articulate only those longings that are comprehensible and socially acceptable in discourse, in the Other, and in principle only in a way that is comprehensible and socially acceptable. The feeling of pain will be attributed the <emph>signifier</emph> pain ('word': 'pain'), which, in the discourse of each individual culture, is associated with complex semantic contexts and, as is demonstrated again and again by cultural anthropology, with specific patterns of culture, including <emph>behaviors</emph>, which are (and this cannot be emphasized enough) an inseparable part of discourse, <emph>the Other as discourse</emph>, which the Other either allows or does not allow. The division between the permitted and the prohibited, between the external and internal, which is <emph>within</emph> discourse, is also the socio-cultural foundation of the fundamental assumption of Freud's theory that the human personality is divided into the conscious and the unconscious.[<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref30">5</reflink>]</p> <p>The contents of the unconscious can be a result of pure coincidence, a kind of residue of what has been heard or experienced that unexpectedly enters speech, in which there is precisely no logic of the intellect as rationality, or which, bypassing consciousness—as an unconscious demand of the Superego, for instance—guides behaviors. To put it schematically, the structure of the personality always operates in the division in ego/self discourse, that is, conscious, intentional discourse. At the same time, through moral education and socialization, the unconscious is formed as the part of the personality that Lacan defines as <emph>the Other's discourse</emph>, which is an unintentional <emph>other discourse</emph> (Fink, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref31">7</reflink>], p. 7). Nor is 'care for the other', irrespective of who the caregiver is, exempt from these processes. 'Caring' and the 'web of care' of the caregiver can be one when it is a case of the conscious intention of <emph>ego</emph> discourse; at the same time, both the <emph>understanding</emph>—'what is care for the other'—and, even more importantly, the <emph>actions</emph> of the caregiver—not necessarily just the intentional actions—are also guided by unconscious thought processes, <emph>the Other's</emph> discourse. The paradox of the unconscious is that this division, this inconsistency, 'the truth of the unconscious' in behaviors (including those behaviors that we understand as acts of <emph>care</emph>) is often more clearly perceived by everyone else than by the bearer.</p> <p>The unconscious is led by thought processes that are different from those leading the conscious, but these are also processes that operate within language. The fact that language and the symbolic patterns of culture shape human emotional life is, of course, a longstanding and frequently confirmed thesis of cultural anthropology (e.g. Benedict, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref32">2</reflink>]; Mead, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref33">21</reflink>]). Lacan's point, which in this respect attempts to follow the original Freudian theory, is that not only is our <emph>understanding</emph> of self—or ego discourse—conditioned within the framework established by language, with its symbolic structuration, but that the unconscious itself works only through language, as expressed by Lacan's infamous term that <emph>the unconscious is structured like a language,</emph> that it is the discourse of the Other (Lacan, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref34">17</reflink>], pp. 149, 203). Analysis of the unconscious processes of a particular individual also reveals the emotional life; we can, for instance, determine the anger that is expressed by a particular unconscious desire. Thus, the emotional life <emph>is</emph> expressed in the unconscious, but always only through linguistic or symbolic structures. It is therefore true not only for the emotions and feelings that we express consciously and intentionally, but also for those that in discourse—in whatever form of discourse, not only in the language of words—are an expression of the unconscious, that are formed in the unconscious through processes such as suppression, that there is absolutely nothing direct in them. They are not an unmediated expression of a person's inner being, because they are constantly formed through linguistic symbolic structures. The unconscious is not comprised of feelings, but rather of linguistic structures within which feelings and emotions are formed.</p> <p>We do not doubt that it is justifiable to define a particular series of actions as <emph>spontaneous</emph> actions, both in everyday language and in more specific discourses, such as law, philosophy, or education. However, if conscious thought processes have less influence on a spontaneous action, if the individual is barely aware or completely unaware of the reasons for the action, or even if the reasons for a particular decision or behavior are unconscious in the strictly Freudian sense, this does not mean that the action is the result of certain processes outside thinking and that it has arisen outside discourse. Every ethical reflection and action of a person, including spontaneous actions, is formed by thought processes through discourse. Acts of care, which, within the framework of the ethic of care, are characterized by Noddings as spontaneous, and which are supposed to be guided primarily by emotions—when a person acts without 'consulting principles', as Noddings puts it—are nevertheless typically guided by specific symbolic rules or civilizational norms that have a universal validity <emph>in discourse</emph>. Let us take the case when Noddings refers to Mencius' example of 'the response of observers to the plight of a child about to fall into a well' and interprets it as a reaction of the people 'directly to perceived need. They do not consult principles, nor do they refer to formal relationships; they leap to save the child' (Noddings, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref35">29</reflink>], p. 516). Faced with the image of a child in the same situation, a person brought up in contemporary discourse would probably be shocked, would feel fear for the child as well as compassion or commiseration, just as Mencius wrote in some other culture more than two millennia before our time (Mencius, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref36">23</reflink>], p. 73). However, the conclusion that the child is <emph>in danger</emph> is the result of a particular cognitive process (an assessment of the situation of the child by the well), and the emergence of care as an emotion, or the unclear thought that precedes an actual action, is the result of the prior internalization of a <emph>rule</emph> in relation to the child—for instance, 'it is necessary to help a child in danger'—which, being a rule, is <emph>abstract</emph>, and which <emph>in the discourse</emph> of a particular culture, as well as through numerous more concrete patterns of culture, functions as a <emph>universal</emph> rule. Although cultural norms, such as that illustrated by the example above, are not philosophical principles, they are universalized in the moral educational discourse in general in two ways: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref37">1</reflink>) they are formulated in statements aimed at general validity ('it is necessary to help a child in danger') and (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref38">2</reflink>) they are expressed in a universal way in moral educational messages, as moral education largely takes place in such a way that adults explicitly or implicitly convey the message to the child that one <emph>always</emph> behaves according to the norm.</p> <p>The discourse of Noddings' ethic of care is directed against Kant's conception of ethical reflection through principles. Let us suppose that in ethics we depart from specifically Kantian rules of the ethical, as well as from the demand that we must decide by forming <emph>a maxim</emph> (principle) that must have the consent <emph>of all</emph>. Let us suppose that norms, rules or values can be ethical even if they do not have the <emph>consent of all</emph>. Their discursive reference, <emph>the Other</emph>, which legitimizes them, is therefore more limited; for instance, the norms, rules or values can be regarded as ethical, but only in a particular society or a particular culture, or that agreement exists only within the limits of particular group of people, such as an ethnic or religious community, a particular feminist group, etc. Even within these groups, however, the condition referred to above is generally true: within these limits, the norms, rules or values function in discourse as universalized ethical rules. In defense of Kantian ethics, Johnston can therefore find that these kinds of considered actions, through introducing the verification of the possibility of the universal validity of a particular rule, occur 'only occasionally, as the existing stock of rules is already in operation...' (Johnston, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref39">12</reflink>], pp. 233, 245). However, it does not follow from the legitimacy of opposing Kantian ethics, as proposed by the ethic of care, that we can also depart from rules, which are always already part of discourse. Is it possible to conclude from Mencius' example that the actions referred to by the ethic of care are not guided by <emph>rules</emph> that are part of some existing discourse? As we have seen, this is certainly not the case. The actions referred to by Noddings in the ethic of care are also typically guided by some <emph>rule</emph> established by a specific discourse. The ethic of care turns a blind eye to this fact. Is it possible for any ethical theory in contemporary society to absolve itself <emph>in general</emph> from the demand that it is necessary to reflect upon and justify the discourse and rules that guide actions simply by taking recourse to the fact that we engage in numerous actions spontaneously, without thorough conscious reflection, or that a given action is based on a specific relationship to a particular person? Rules (or norms of culture, or memories as the basis of the web of care in the individual) are facts that are based on human discourse as a symbolic structure in which the rules are <emph>universalized</emph> and <emph>abstracted</emph>. We can, therefore, use rules in various contexts, we can doubt them, refute them and justify them, through the centuries and millennia we can pass them on from generation to generation, and, as stated above, we typically undertake moral education through universally expressed norms and rules. Opposition to Kantian ethics, Rawlsian ethics, utilitarian ethics, or any other ethics based on principles, does not mean that we have discovered ethical actions that would in any way absolve the ethic of care from the demand to reflect upon and justify the guidelines, rules, norms or values of an action in ethics and in education.</p> <hd id="AN0121255564-5">2.2. Caring, spontaneity and ethical reflection</hd> <p>Noddings distinguishes between natural caring and ethical caring. <emph>Natural</emph> caring arises in a spontaneous relationship between the one-caring and the cared-for. In this case, the needs of the other are in fact the 'I must' of ourselves, they are our desire and inclination, and not, as in Kant, our duty. In <emph>Moral Education</emph>, however, Noddings specifically states that such a relationship is possible insofar as 'no inner conflict occurs' (Noddings, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref40">31</reflink>], p. 13). When such a conflict does occur, when we are unable to care in a particular situation, we cannot respond as natural carers, instead having to respond as <emph>ethical</emph> carers. For Noddings, ethical caring is an effort made in particular situations or relationships where natural caring is not possible. In order to remain ethical beings, we have to 'draw upon an ethical ideal—a set of memories of caring and being cared for that we regard as manifestations of our best selves and relations' (ibid.). The ethical ideal of ourselves as carers draws from memories of caring relations we have experienced, and it is this ideal that is the source necessary for the same motivational impulse that we experience in natural caring. For Noddings, following from sentimentalism (cf. Johnston, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref41">13</reflink>]), natural caring is the main source of motivation for moral action, and is thus above ethical caring, the latter being 'instrumental in establishing and restoring natural caring' (Noddings, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref42">27</reflink>], p. 20).</p> <p>Noddings' conception conceives emotions and rationality as an opposition. It would thus seem that what Noddings is proposing is an ethical theory based on feeling rather than rationality. Her concept of caring is based on an open non-intellectual, non-cognitive empathy toward and feeling for the other, on the perceiving of his/her feelings. Although Noddings recognizes the role of cognitive elements in moral dilemmas, or what she calls ethical caring, she clearly states that in natural caring 'there is no need for continual analysis and assessment' since 'most evaluation is almost automatic' (Noddings, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref43">31</reflink>], p. 168), that 'natural caring is clearly emotion-based' (ibid., p. 170), that, although reason is involved in both natural and ethical caring, 'I do not need to refer to a principle or ask what my community expects of me in this situation', and that 'the whole process will be colored by what I feel' (ibid., p. 171). According to Noddings, emotions are the driving force of the caring relationship, as well as being the driving force of moral actions.</p> <p>It is precisely this ethical position that needs to be analyzed further. The ethic of care does not simply claim that reflections and norms/values are not necessary <emph>at all</emph> in ethics and education; it states that we can make decisions and perform behaviors <emph>without having to</emph> reflect <emph>through rules/principles</emph> and <emph>through norms/values</emph>. What is more, the ethic of care advocates that by behaving through the emotions and feeling of the other, we behave <emph>past</emph> norms and principles, and that only such behavior is genuine moral behavior. In moral decision-making in Noddings' ethic of care, the individual does not, therefore, turn to norms and principles; the guidance for moral decision-making is 'primarily' his/her <emph>care</emph> for the other, while the essence of care is above all <emph>feeling</emph>. When a person behaves from care, he/she decides 'primarily' on the basis of feeling the emotions of the other, and feeling (but not understanding) the other's reality. In Noddings' opinion, only the individual who feels the 'reality' of the other will also desire 'the well-being of the cared-for' and will, in his/her behavior, be motivated 'to promote that well-being'.</p> <p>We have to point out that the reality of <emph>caring</emph> is always the reality <emph>of discourse, of the Other.</emph> Furthermore, <emph>natural caring</emph> is always that which is comprehended by parents through their knowledge, through social norms, through their emotional life, as is enabled by the discursive nature of the human being, by the social and economic environment in which parents are located, etc.</p> <p>Let us illustrate our argument with a practical example. Noddings and Slote ([<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref44">32</reflink>]) refer to an example by Williams ([<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref45">37</reflink>]) regarding a man who, faced with a choice between saving his drowning wife or a stranger, decides that in such circumstances one is permitted (or obliged) to save one's wife. They quote Williams, who states that if the man in this predicament refers to a principle, he 'has one thought too many', and continue:</p> <p>surely we would agree that in this situation the interposition of (or conscientious attention to) a presumably valid moral principle between a man and his action on behalf of his spouse is unnatural and unattractive, because it shows less connection to, less feeling for, his spouse than his spouse (or any spouse) would hope for (Noddings & Slote, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref46">32</reflink>], pp. 344–345).</p> <p>Let us suppose that a white child is growing up in a deeply racist white family that provides the child with all of the care and the caring education that Noddings proposes. That child grows into a man and finds himself faced with two drowning people, as in the situation referred to above. Instead of a wife and a stranger, however, this man has to decide between a white-skinned stranger and a black-skinned stranger. How would he decide? Following Noddings' theory of care, we could argue that care is so primordial and universal that every person could care for the other; however, in view of Noddings' interpretation of Williams' example, this seems highly unlikely. Noddings argues that a person should not devote a 'single thought' to deciding whom to save from drowning, but should rather unreflectively refer to his/her <emph>web of care</emph> without consulting any principles. As such, we believe that the man would decide to save the white stranger. To take the argument a bit further, should the white-skinned stranger, having been raised in a similarly racist family, not suppose that referring to <emph>a rule</emph> (which is in fact a principle of racist education) that he is <emph>obliged to save the white</emph>-<emph>skinned man</emph> is unnatural, unattractive and shows less feeling?</p> <p>Furthermore, suppose that the same man was raised in a web of care where he was morally educated in a racist family but he also learned to help <emph>children</emph> first, and then adults as well. He finds himself in the situation of having to decide whether to help either an adult stranger who is white or a stranger who is a child but non-white? Of course, his racist education could result in him not even perceiving 'the existence' of the child since he/she is 'black'. However, is it not also possible that this situation would initiate in him a <emph>moral dilemma</emph> between the two different norms, between what are in fact two different <emph>principles</emph> of his web of care? This is not necessarily the case, but it is possible. In this example, it becomes even clearer that the man's feelings and emotions toward the white-skinned adult and the black-skinned child, as educated through a caring family relationship, are in fact based on norms, rules and principles. Feelings, emotions and even spontaneous acts are always based on certain principles and values, due to the fact that the personality structure is formed through the Other as discourse. The result is thus a moral dilemma that occurs because of the opposition between the two internalized principles, that is, the racist principle <emph>to save the white</emph>-<emph>skinned man</emph>, and the principle <emph>to help children first</emph>. As we can see in this modification of Williams' example, a person deciding to save a white or black stranger, a white or black adult <emph>or</emph> child, always decides and acts within his/her own discursive network. This dilemma thus includes the logic of <emph>universality</emph> and the possibility of inference on the basis of the <emph>principles</emph> and personally adopted (internalized, social and individual, individualized) norms and values of society.</p> <p>It is obvious that racism, sexism and other ethically unacceptable ideologies continue to exist in today's world. In view of this fact, how are we to understand the claim: 'I do not need to refer to a principle or ask what my community expects of me in this situation'? Within the framework of the overall theory of the ethic of care, we cannot understand the statement other than as conveying the message that the individual has <emph>the right</emph> to determine autonomously—that he/she has the <emph>right</emph> to decide—when he/she will respect the values of the community. We have demonstrated that <emph>every</emph> web of care includes principles and <emph>every</emph> web of care presupposes and includes social norms. It is impossible for ethical decision-making not to include general principles, and it is impossible—even under the condition that we decide completely autonomously as individuals—for us not to decide on the basis of norms and values whose framework is established by the Other, by society. Due to the fact that it excludes principles from ethical decision-making, the aforementioned statement is erroneous, as well as being ethnically unacceptable (cf. De Lissovoy, [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref47">4</reflink>]; Thompson, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref48">36</reflink>]). In moral education, there is in general no possible detour past the content of knowledge and past reflection on the value-normative matrix from which education is derived (Krek, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref49">16</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0121255564-6">3. Conclusion</hd> <p>As we have demonstrated, the theory of care establishes emotion in opposition to principles, which is a peculiar and false reversal of the Kantian dilemma. Due to the fact that a human being is a being of culture, who lives in language and through culturally defined discourse, through which emotions and feelings develop and are established, the ethic of care's emphasized opposition to reflection is not simply anti-intellectual, it is theoretically erroneous. It has to be stressed that not only feelings and emotions, but moral education as well is based on principles and values. As such, it is of the outmost importance that every theory of education should promote reflection on the principles and norms that it is itself transferring.</p> <p>The effect of the care theory is not simply an opposition to the development of reflection through universal norms (which it asserts); its educational recommendations can encourage the development of a specific undesirable structure of the subject and a way of ethical reflection associated with it. This is linked with a further difficulty derived from the recommendations: the idea that, in a certain way, we can turn a blind eye to the symbolic field, and therefore also to the network of values, when we educate. Education that is derived only from care, without being derived from reflection on specific values, can lead to education that supports, for instance, racist education, which is unacceptable from the perspective of the values and norms of the majority of contemporary societies or states.</p> <p>This is one reason why society should be very reluctant to accept theories with fundamental mistakes in moral education, theories that can result in unacceptable values, beliefs, feelings, principles, etc. This is the case even if theories such as the ethic of care enable such unacceptable education due to their benevolence or their lack of understanding of how moral thinking operates.</p> <hd id="AN0121255564-7">Notes on contributors</hd> <p> <bold> <emph>Janez Krek</emph> </bold> is associate professor and the dean of the Faculty of Education at the University of Ljubljana. His research interests focus on philosophy of education, citizenship education and educational policies, German classical philosophy, psychoanalysis, and cultural anthropology. Current research projects include theory of the act in education, educational concept of public schools, and values and social cohesion in education.</p> <p> <bold> <emph>Blaž Zabel</emph> </bold> is a graduate student at the University of Cambridge, Faculty of Classics. Previously, he was a researcher at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Education. His research interests are in Homeric scholarship, world literature, psychoanalysis, educational philosophy. Current research projects include Greek archaic poetry in the global perspective, values and social cohesion in education, France Stele and world art studies.</p> <hd id="AN0121255564-8">Disclosure statement</hd> <p>No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.</p> <ref id="AN0121255564-9"> <title> Notes </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref2" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> For a systematic analysis of such errors in the ideas of educational reform, see also Kauffman, [15].</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref3" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Nel Noddings' theory of the ethic of care positions itself in opposition to Kant's moral theory with the assertion that feeling or emotion in moral behavior has priority over reason. This stance is also evident from, for instance, the thesis that 'natural caring' has priority over 'ethical caring'. Noddings first defined the concept of caring in <emph>Caring</emph> ([26]), but has since continued revising and upgrading the analysis of care in, for example, <emph>Starting at Home</emph> ([28]), <emph>Educating Moral People</emph> ([27]), <emph>The Maternal Factor</emph> ([31]), and Moral education in an age of globalization ([30]).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref7" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> We need only recall the events in supposedly tolerant Scandinavia in 2011, when, based on clearly racist motives, Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 and wounded 241 people, or the most recent particularly savage case of the slaying of nine African-Americans in a Charleston church in June 2015, for which an avowed white supremacist has been charged with murder.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib4" idref="ref19" type="bt">4</bibl> <bibtext> Spontaneous and natural care are used as synonyms, as proposed in the paper by Noddings and Slote ([32]).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib5" idref="ref8" type="bt">5</bibl> <bibtext> This dimension of the division between the conscious and the unconscious is also expressed in Lacan's notion of the Real as a lack in the Other and, at the same time, of the Real as a kind of residue in the Other, which constantly hinders the Other.</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <ref id="AN0121255564-10"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibtext> Anderson, J. 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  Data: Why There Is No Education Ethics without Principles
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Krek%2C+Janez%22">Krek, Janez</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Zabel%2C+Blaž%22">Zabel, Blaž</searchLink>
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Educational+Philosophy+and+Theory%22"><i>Educational Philosophy and Theory</i></searchLink>. 2017 49(3):284-293.
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  Data: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
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  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Evaluative
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Ethical+Instruction%22">Ethical Instruction</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Values+Education%22">Values Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Moral+Values%22">Moral Values</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Caring%22">Caring</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Theories%22">Educational Theories</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Reflection%22">Reflection</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Misconceptions%22">Misconceptions</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Ethics%22">Ethics</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Language+Role%22">Language Role</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Discourse+Analysis%22">Discourse Analysis</searchLink>
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  Data: 10.1080/00131857.2016.1217188
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  Data: 0013-1857
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  Data: Moral education and ethical reflection are always dependent on the content of the internalized norms, principles and values of the individual. As we demonstrate, this also means that there is no instance of "feeling," "emotion," "spontaneity," or "care" that can be independent of norms, rules, and values outside human discourse. In light of this, Noddings' theory of the ethic of care is a contentious theory of child education, as it is linked with the presupposition that we can turn a blind eye to the symbolic field, to the network of rules/principles and their values, when we educate. Education that is derived only from caring, without being derived from reflection on education's specific values, can lead to education that supports, for instance, racist ideology and racist education. This is not, of course, something that the ethic of care would advocate; however, as an educational theory, it is flawed in that, due to the rejection of reflection through principles in general, it fails to provide the educator with a conceptual apparatus through which he/she could analyze and reflect upon--could understand--what he/she is doing with regard to the norms of his/her culture. Society and educators cannot tacitly allow or be benevolent toward such fundamental mistakes in moral education.
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        Value: 10.1080/00131857.2016.1217188
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        PageCount: 10
        StartPage: 284
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Ethical Instruction
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Values Education
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Moral Values
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Caring
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Educational Theories
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Reflection
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Misconceptions
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Ethics
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Language Role
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Discourse Analysis
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Why There Is No Education Ethics without Principles
        Type: main
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      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Krek, Janez
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            NameFull: Zabel, Blaž
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          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2017
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 0013-1857
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              Value: 49
            – Type: issue
              Value: 3
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Educational Philosophy and Theory
              Type: main
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