View in EDS HTML Full Text PDF Full Text

Characteristics of Personally Important Episodic Memories, Counterfactual Thoughts, and Future Projections across Age and Culture

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Characteristics of Personally Important Episodic Memories, Counterfactual Thoughts, and Future Projections across Age and Culture
Language: English
Authors: Özbek, Müge (ORCID 0000-0003-0845-3242), Bohn, Annette, Berntsen, Dorthe
Source: Applied Cognitive Psychology. Sep-Oct 2020 34(5):1020-1033.
Availability: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 14
Publication Date: 2020
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Evaluative
Descriptors: Memory, Age Differences, Foreign Countries, Emotional Response, Cognitive Processes, Phenomenology, Cultural Differences, Individual Differences
Geographic Terms: Turkey, United States
DOI: 10.1002/acp.3681
ISSN: 0888-4080
Abstract: We have limited knowledge as to whether the phenomenological differences between episodic memories, counterfactuals, and future projections show the same pattern across age groups and diverse samples. Here we compared the characteristics of these mental events, reported by younger and older participants in a Turkish (Study 1) and in an American sample (Study 2). In both studies, memories contained more sensory-perceptual-spatial details, were easier to bring to mind, and more specific. Future projections were the most positive, whereas counterfactuals were the least emotionally intense. In Study 1, older participants rated the events more positively and experienced them with more perceptual detail, whereas younger participants reported the future to be more voluntarily rehearsed, important, and central. These age differences did not replicate in Study 2. Overall, phenomenological differences between the events are robust and replicate across diverse samples. However, age differences are more sensitive to cultural or individual differences.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2020
Accession Number: EJ1265935
Database: ERIC
Full text is not displayed to guests.
FullText Links:
  – Type: pdflink
    Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwF69KRW6ooHU9M_r922q4BeAAAA4zCB4AYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHSMIHPAgEAMIHJBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDDx9TsSUt8AVnTXGDQIBEICBm_0hReXGIUwaATr9_jOYf80FVATwpzyyreeDpU8bhKZR6CaDRSvPikDEVtVc98FKq4ch0PVdoBH5v18wUFyke6qH_yqSk9bNAR6qhhFPQ8gNZXlfp6fg21DysBYijMJzKJRt8DqKuOAW0PJwnTzyQoB26LLP7KbivBTYgDTDvVz8ROk4_xe38Ghy87s_hK-bLXR7GB6qz_3HOVjg
Text:
  Availability: 1
  Value: <anid>AN0145489195;bu801sep.20;2020Sep07.03:56;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0145489195-1">Characteristics of personally important episodic memories, counterfactual thoughts, and future projections across age and culture </title> <p>Summary We have limited knowledge as to whether the phenomenological differences between episodic memories, counterfactuals, and future projections show the same pattern across age groups and diverse samples. Here we compared the characteristics of these mental events, reported by younger and older participants in a Turkish (Study 1) and in an American sample (Study 2). In both studies, memories contained more sensory‐perceptual‐spatial details, were easier to bring to mind, and more specific. Future projections were the most positive, whereas counterfactuals were the least emotionally intense. In Study 1, older participants rated the events more positively and experienced them with more perceptual detail, whereas younger participants reported the future to be more voluntarily rehearsed, important, and central. These age differences did not replicate in Study 2. Overall, phenomenological differences between the events are robust and replicate across diverse samples. However, age differences are more sensitive to cultural or individual differences.</p> <p>Keywords: aging; episodic counterfactual thinking; episodic memory; future thinking; past/future; phenomenology</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-2">INTRODUCTION</hd> <p>Mental time travel is the ability to mentally travel back in time to reexperience an event from the personal past and to project oneself into the future to preexperience an event (e.g., Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Tulving, 1985). Similarities and differences between remembering the past and imagining the future have been investigated extensively (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D'Argembeau, 2012; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013), and recent years have witnessed attempts to connect these processes with mental simulation of alternatives to personal events in the past (e.g., De Brigard, 2014; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; Özbek, Bohn, & Berntsen, 2017, 2018). These simulations focus on personal events that did not occur in reality, but could have occurred—referred to as episodic counterfactual thinking (Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard, & Szpunar, 2015).</p> <p>On the one hand, converging evidence from neurocognitive, neuropsychological, and behavioral studies has pointed to the similarities between episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking (e.g., Addis et al., 2008; D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; De Brigard, Addis, Ford, Schacter, & Giovanello, 2013; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002). On the other hand, many studies have documented systematic differences between these three event types (e.g., Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; De Brigard, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2013; Özbek et al., 2017; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013). Empirical evidence has shown that episodic counterfactual thoughts are distinctive from episodic memories, future projections, and semantic forms of counterfactual statements based on general knowledge (De Brigard & Parikh, 2019).</p> <p>Yet, we still have limited knowledge as to whether the differences between these three event types show the same pattern across age groups and demographically diverse samples. In order to address this, we conducted two studies where we compared the characteristics of episodic memories, counterfactual thoughts, and future projections of younger and older participants in a Turkish (Study 1) and in an American sample (Study 2). Below we first summarize the relevant literature on the similarities and differences between these three event types derived from neuroimaging and behavioral studies, then we briefly touch upon the important role age plays in terms of event phenomenology and emotional processing, and finally we present the rationale for the present studies.</p> <p>Previous studies have documented consistent overlap in neural activity during the construction and elaboration of past and future events (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007). The episodic richness of past and future event constructions have been shown to deteriorate similarly in healthy aging (e.g., Addis et al., 2008; Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010) and in case of brain injury and executive dysfunction (e.g., Klein et al., 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2014; Tulving, 1985; but see Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2016). Neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies focusing on episodic counterfactual thoughts in comparison to episodic memories and future projections have corroborated these findings (e.g., Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Mullally & Maguire, 2014). For instance, researchers recorded similar kinds of brain activities in the core regions of the default network (e.g., the medial prefrontal cortex and the medial temporal lobes) (a) when participants recalled their memories based on the memory details they had provided prior to brain scanning and (b) when they imagined past (counterfactual) or future events based on experimentally recombined memory details (Addis et al., 2009). In the same vein, patients with hippocampal damage and amnesia that showed impairments in remembering the past and imagining the future also showed impairments in their ability to construct and maintain counterfactual thoughts requiring the generation of internal spatial representations (Mullally & Maguire, 2014).</p> <p>Recent behavioral studies comparing characteristics of episodic memories, counterfactual thoughts, and future projections found all three event types to be similar regarding their content and to serve similar functions in everyday life (Özbek et al., 2017, 2018). More specifically, cultural life script events, which refer to culturally normative and important events that are expected to happen in a prototypical individual's life course (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003), were on average equally frequently mentioned across these events (Özbek et al., 2017). Additionally, the frequency of perceived reflective (i.e., everyday use with a focus on self and own behavior) and social (i.e., everyday use with a focus on social interactions and relationships) functions of all these events was similarly high (Özbek et al., 2018).</p> <p>Notwithstanding the importance of these similarities, research has also consistently reported systematic differences between the subjective experiences reported for remembering the past and imagining the future, which can be summarized as follows: Future projections are more positive and idyllic, harder to associate with negative emotions, and more personally significant than episodic memories. Further, they are guided more by schematized knowledge and contain fewer sensory details (e.g., Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Kane, Van Boven, & McGraw, 2012; Newby‐Clark & Ross, 2003; Özbek et al., 2017; Rubin, 2014; Szpunar, Addis, & Schacter, 2012).</p> <p>Studies focusing on the subjective experiences reported for episodic counterfactual thoughts have shown that counterfactual thoughts do not show a positivity bias similar to future projections, have lower phenomenological quality than episodic memories, and have consistently lower emotional intensity than both episodic memories and future projections (De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; Özbek et al., 2017, 2018). De Brigard, Szpunar, and Schacter (2013) have also shown that, with repeated mental simulation, the level of perceived plausibility decreased for episodic counterfactual thoughts, but increased for future projections, irrespective of increased levels of ease of simulation, detail, and emotional valence for both event types. One key question we wish to pursue in the present studies is whether these characteristics generalize across age groups. This question is motivated by earlier work suggesting age differences in motivation and emotion regulation, possibly reflecting changes in temporal perspective (e.g., Charles & Carstensen, 2010).</p> <p>So far, only two studies have investigated the phenomenological characteristics of episodic memories, counterfactual thoughts, and future projections in younger and older adults (De Brigard et al., 2016; De Brigard, Rodriguez, & Montañés, 2017). These studies reported that older adults provided higher sensory (e.g., clarity, visual detail, vividness), composition (e.g., clarity of location, objects, people), and emotion (e.g., emotional intensity) ratings than younger adults, irrespective of event type (De Brigard et al., 2016; De Brigard et al., 2017). There were also significant event‐type effects, such that sensory and composition ratings were higher for episodic memories in both age groups than for other events. There were no event‐type differences in emotion ratings in general (De Brigard et al., 2017), except that episodic memories received higher emotional intensity ratings than other events in De Brigard et al. (2016).</p> <p>De Brigard et al. (2016, 2017) argued that the explanation of age group effects could be the differences in how younger and older adults use self‐rating scales. More specifically, the higher ratings of older adults could be due to emotional reappraisal of the events (e.g., Boals, Hayslip Jr, & Banks, 2014). Alternatively, older adults might rehearse events more frequently, which would lead to stronger phenomenology, or select events that are more central to their life story and identity (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), which would make the selected events less subject to age‐related declines in episodicity (e.g., Luchetti & Sutin, 2018). Previous research on centrality of event has indeed shown that older adults in the US considered the positive events in their lives to be more central to their life story and identity than the negative events (Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 2011). This was replicated with adults over 40 years of age in China, Denmark, Greenland, and Mexico (Zaragoza Scherman, Salgado, Shao, & Berntsen, 2015). However, these studies did not include a comparison group of younger adults.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-3">THE PRESENT STUDIES</hd> <p>Surprisingly, no studies have yet put the abovementioned potential explanations directly to test to assess the reliability of event‐type differences across age groups and culturally diverse samples. We aimed to address this by conducting two studies to assess the reliability of event‐type (episodic memories vs. counterfactual thoughts vs. future projections) and age group (younger vs. older adults) differences in event phenomenology and emotional processing in a Turkish sample (Study 1) and in an American sample (Study 2).</p> <p>First, we expected episodic memories to have more sensory and contextual details than other events, whereas we expected episodic future projections to be more positive, more important, more voluntarily rehearsed and more central to one's life story and identity based on the earlier findings (Özbek et al., 2017, 2018). Additionally, we expected episodic counterfactual thoughts to have the lowest emotional intensity ratings (e.g., De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; Özbek et al., 2017, 2018).</p> <p>Second, we assessed the component processes (e.g., vividness, visual imagery, auditory imagery) and the metacognitive judgments (e.g., reliving) as indicators of event phenomenology, alongside emotion, following Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg's (2003) theory of components of autobiographical memory. We expected older adults to show an overall emotional positivity effect and have higher phenomenology ratings for the sensory and contextual characteristics of events (e.g., vividness, visual imagery, spatial imagery) (e.g., Comblain, D'Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2005; De Brigard et al., 2016, 2017; Luchetti & Sutin, 2018; Rubin & Berntsen, 2009; Rubin & Schulkind, 1997).</p> <p>Third, we assessed the potential differences in reported properties (e.g., importance, in/voluntary rehearsal, specificity) and centrality of events in both samples (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Rubin et al., 2003; Tekcan et al., 2015). The purpose was to examine how these ratings would relate to the ratings of component processes in different age groups. We expected older adults to rate these properties higher than younger adults, parallel to their higher ratings of phenomenology and emotion in general (e.g., Luchetti & Sutin, 2018).</p> <p>Lastly, we aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 (obtained from a Turkish sample) in Study 2 (in an American sample) to assess the robustness of effects across culturally diverse samples (Hofstede, 2001; Rubin, Schrauf, Gulgoz, & Naka, 2007; Sahin & Mebert, 2013) as well as across different testing conditions (experimenter present versus online survey). The two earlier studies comparing episodic counterfactual thoughts in younger and older participants have been conducted by using slightly different methods with American (De Brigard et al., 2016) and Colombian participants (De Brigard et al., 2017). Here, we directly compared younger and older participants in two cultures by using the same method to test the robustness of effects across diverse samples.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-4">STUDY 1</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0145489195-5">Method</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0145489195-6">Participants</hd> <p>Seventy‐two younger (47 women) and 41 older Turkish adults (21 women) participated in Study 1 (see Table 1 for demographics). Their educational levels were comparable (<emph>t</emph>[46.59] = 1.74, <emph>p</emph> =.088). We assessed the cognitive functioning and geriatric depression levels of older participants with the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975; Güngen, Ertan, Eker, Yaşar, & Engin, 2002) and the short version of the Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS; Yesavage & Sheikh, 1986). Inclusion criteria in the sample were a score of more than 24[<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref1">1</reflink>] out of 30 on the MMSE and a score of less than 10 out of 15 on the GDS. These scores ensured that the older participants had good cognitive functioning according to Turkish standards (Güngen et al., 2002) and showed no signs of severe geriatric depression (Greenberg, 2012). We recruited the younger participants through sign‐up sheets at their university and they received course credit for participation. Trained student assistants recruited the older participants through convenience sampling. The Institutional Review Board for Research with Human Subjects at Boğaziçi University approved the study.</p> <p>1 TABLEDemographics for Study 1 and Study 2</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th align="left" /><th align="left">Study 1 (Turkish sample)</th><th align="left">Study 2 (American sample)</th></tr><tr><th align="left">Younger (N = 72)</th><th align="left">Older (N = 41)</th><th align="left">Younger (N = 32)</th><th align="left">Older (N = 34)</th></tr><tr><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th><th align="left">Range</th><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th><th align="left">Range</th><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th><th align="left">Range</th><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th><th align="left">Range</th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td>Age</td><td>20.15</td><td>1.94</td><td>18–31</td><td>65.10</td><td>5.62</td><td>59–82</td><td>26.50</td><td>3.14</td><td>19–34</td><td>63.88</td><td>4.44</td><td>57–76</td></tr><tr><td>Education in years</td><td>14.55</td><td>1.34</td><td>12–19</td><td>13.55</td><td>3.55</td><td>5–20</td><td>15.59</td><td>2.51</td><td>12–25</td><td>15.48</td><td>2.82</td><td>12–25</td></tr><tr><td>GDS* (out of 15)</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>2.02</td><td>2.09</td><td>0–8</td><td>3.62</td><td>2.70</td><td>0–9</td><td>1.76</td><td>2.65</td><td>0–9</td></tr><tr><td>MMSE** (out of 30)</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>27.88</td><td>1.66</td><td>25–30</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>Shipley*** (out of 40)</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>28.59</td><td>11.25</td><td>1–40</td><td>35.41</td><td>3.90</td><td>24–40</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>1 <emph>Note:</emph> *Geriatric depression scale, **Mini mental state examination, ***Shipley's vocabulary test.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-7">Materials</hd> <p>Following the instructions of Özbek et al. (2017), participants were asked to write down "a memory of an important event from your life" (episodic memory), "an important imagined event that could have happened, but did not happen in your life" (episodic counterfactual thought), and "an important imagined future event that might happen in your life" (episodic future projection). We sampled events from 1 month ago/into the future, 1 year ago/into the future, and 5+ years ago/into the future; thus, these intervals acted as retrieval cues (see Özbek et al., 2017; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2014, 2016). Each participant received 1 out of 6 possible study booklets, where the order of the events was counterbalanced and the order of the retrieval intervals was fixed. Participants reported starting from the most recent event to the most remote event. They reported in total 9 events with brief descriptions and short titles.</p> <p>Participants answered the phenomenology questions after each event description. Further questions measured the component processes, the metacognitive judgments, and the reported qualities of events on 7‐point Likert scales (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Özbek et al., 2017; Rubin et al., 2003): <emph>Vividness</emph>, <emph>p/reliving</emph>, <emph>visual imagery</emph>, <emph>auditory imagery</emph>, <emph>spatial imagery</emph>, <emph>emotional valence</emph>, <emph>emotional intensity</emph>, <emph>importance</emph>, <emph>perspective</emph>, <emph>voluntary rehearsal</emph>, <emph>involuntary rehearsal</emph>, <emph>difficulty of remembering/imagining</emph>, and <emph>specificity</emph>. Table 2 shows the questions answered for episodic memories. We modified the wording of these questions, so that all three event types were clearly distinguishable. The Appendix shows the modified questions for episodic counterfactual thoughts and future projections.</p> <p>2 TABLEPhenomenology questions answered for episodic memories</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><tbody valign="top"><tr><td>(Vividness) This memory is vivid. (1 = not at all, 7 = to a very high degree).</td></tr><tr><td>(Reliving) As I remember the memory, I feel as though I am reliving the original event. (1 = not at all, 7 = as clearly as if it were happening now).</td></tr><tr><td>(Visual imagery) As I remember the memory, I can see it in my mind. (1 = not at all, 7 = as clearly as if it were happening now).</td></tr><tr><td>(Auditory imagery) As I remember the memory, I can hear it in my mind. (1 = not at all, 7 = as clearly as if it were happening now).</td></tr><tr><td>(Spatial imagery) As I remember the memory, I know the location of people/objects in the place where it occurred—spatial layout. (1 = not at all, 7 = as clearly as if it were happening now).</td></tr><tr><td>(Emotional valence) The emotions I have when I recall the memory are (−3 = very negative, +3 = very positive).</td></tr><tr><td>(Emotional intensity) The emotions I have when I recall the memory are intense. (1 = not at all, 7 = to a very high degree).</td></tr><tr><td>(Importance) The memory is important to my life. (1 = not at all, 7 = to a very high degree).</td></tr><tr><td>(Perspective) When I recall the memory, I primarily see what happened from a perspective as seen through (1 = my own eyes, 7 = an observer's eyes).</td></tr><tr><td>(Voluntary rehearsal) Since it happened, I have willfully thought back to this event in my mind and thought about it or talked about it. (1 = not at all, 7 = very often).</td></tr><tr><td>(Involuntary rehearsal) Has the memory of the event suddenly popped up in your thoughts by itself—that is, without your having attempted to remember it? (1 = not at all, 7 = very often).</td></tr><tr><td>(Difficulty of remembering) Remembering this memory was (1 = very easy, 7 = very difficult).</td></tr><tr><td>(Specificity) This memory was specific in the sense that it happened at a specific time and place, and its duration did not exceed a full day—24 hours. (1 = not at all, 7 = very specific).</td></tr><tr><td>(Date) How long ago did this event occur? (weeks/months/years ago).</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>Participants also filled in the short 7‐item version of the Centrality of Event Scale (CES, Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) for each event. This scale measures the extent to which life events are evaluated as central to one's life story and identity (e.g., "I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story"; "This event permanently changed my life"). Participants indicated to what degree they agreed or disagreed with each of the statements on a 5‐point Likert scale from 1 = "Totally disagree" to 5 = "Totally agree." For episodic memories, the standard instructions of the CES were used (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). For episodic counterfactual thoughts and episodic future projections, these instructions were modified slightly. For episodic counterfactual thoughts, the instructions were "When answering the following seven questions, think about how you would have felt if the imagined event had actually happened. Please place yourself in the situation that the imagined event had actually taken place and then answer the following questions in an honest and sincere way by choosing a number from 1 to 5." For episodic future projections, the instructions were "When answering the following seven questions, think about how you would feel if the imagined event happened. Please place yourself in the situation that the imagined event has taken place in the future and then answer the following questions in an honest and sincere way by choosing a number from 1 to 5." The scale was highly reliable across event types (Cronbach's <emph>α</emph> =.90–.93).</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-8">Procedure</hd> <p>The younger participants were tested in groups of 15–20, whereas the older participants were tested individually by trained student assistants. Participants gave informed consent and received the study booklet, which contained the following information and instructions:</p> <p>"Dear participant, this is a study about memories and imagined events. On the following pages, you will be asked to remember important memories from your life. You will also be asked to imagine important events, which might happen in your future or might have happened in your past, but did not occur. Please read the instructions on each page carefully and write down specific memories/imagined events. This means that memories/imagined events you write should belong to a specific time and a specific place, and their duration should not exceed a full day—24 hours. Please write a few sentences for each memory/imagined event. After you finish writing each memory/imagined event, please provide a brief title and answer a number of questions about it. All of your answers will remain confidential."</p> <p>Throughout the booklet, the participants focused on events at different retrieval intervals one at a time and answered the questions about phenomenology and centrality of event. The last page of the booklet consisted of demographic information questions (e.g., gender, years of education, marital status). Administration of the MMSE and GDS followed the completion of the study booklet for older participants. All questions were in Turkish. At the end of the testing sessions, the participants were thanked and debriefed.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-9">Results</hd> <p>Consistent with the analytic strategies used in previous studies (e.g., Addis et al., 2008; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2014, 2016), we collapsed the ratings across retrieval intervals and conducted a series of 3 (Event Type: episodic memory, episodic counterfactual thought, episodic future projection) × 2 (Age Group: younger vs. older) mixed‐design ANOVAs. We created a new dependent variable named <emph>sensory‐imagery</emph> by averaging the ratings of vividness, p/reliving, visual imagery, and auditory imagery items before the analyses (see Berntsen & Bohn, 2010 and Özbek et al., 2017 for a similar procedure). The ratings of these variables reliably grouped together, with a Cronbach's <emph>α</emph> ranging between.81 and.93 for different event types. In the following, we provide a detailed description of the findings and the statistical analyses.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-10">Main effects of event type</hd> <p>As Table 3 displays, there was a significant main effect of event type on all study variables, except importance. Bonferroni‐corrected post hoc tests showed that episodic memories contained more sensory‐perceptual details (<emph>p</emph>s < .001), were easier to bring to mind (<emph>p</emph>s ≤ .004), and were more specific (<emph>p</emph>s < .001) than episodic counterfactual thoughts and episodic future projections, which did not differ from each other. Episodic memories were also scored higher on spatial imagery than episodic counterfactual thoughts, which in turn were scored higher than episodic future projections (<emph>p</emph>s < .001). Episodic memories were recalled more from a first‐person perspective than episodic future projections (<emph>p</emph> =.026) and were involuntarily rehearsed more frequently than episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> =.003), whereas no other comparisons were significant.</p> <p>3 TABLEMeans (M) and standard deviations (SD) of study variables separated by event type, and ANOVA results for Study 1</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th align="left">Study variables</th><th align="left">Memory</th><th align="left">Counterfactual</th><th align="left">Future</th><th align="left"><italic>F</italic></th><th align="left">df</th><th align="left"><italic>η</italic><sup>2</sup><sub>p</sub></th></tr><tr><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td>Sensory imagery</td><td>5.93<sub>a</sub></td><td>.92</td><td>5.26<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.24</td><td>5.36<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.01</td><td>20.67***</td><td>(2,194)</td><td>.176</td></tr><tr><td>Spatial imagery</td><td>5.81<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.14</td><td>5.05<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.37</td><td>4.24<sub>c</sub></td><td>1.56</td><td>49.28***</td><td>(2,200)</td><td>.330</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional valence</td><td>.52<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.61</td><td>−.36<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.61</td><td>2.11<sub>c</sub></td><td>.98</td><td>76.47***</td><td>(2,200)</td><td>.433</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional intensity</td><td>5.74<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.11</td><td>4.82<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.31</td><td>5.74<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.02</td><td>34.79***</td><td>(2,200)</td><td>.258</td></tr><tr><td>Importance</td><td>5.46<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.14</td><td>5.38<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.11</td><td>5.72<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.09</td><td>2.03</td><td>(2,198)</td><td>.020</td></tr><tr><td>Perspective</td><td>2.68<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.72</td><td>2.89<sub>a,b</sub></td><td>1.59</td><td>3.36<sub>b</sub></td><td>2.06</td><td>4.59*</td><td>(2,194)</td><td>.045</td></tr><tr><td>Voluntary rehearsal</td><td>4.68<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.34</td><td>4.34<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.38</td><td>5.01<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.41</td><td>10.33***</td><td>(2,200)</td><td>.094</td></tr><tr><td>Involuntary rehearsal</td><td>4.16<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.56</td><td>3.81<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.34</td><td>4.05<sub>a,b</sub></td><td>1.52</td><td>5.03**</td><td>(2,198)</td><td>.048</td></tr><tr><td>Difficulty of remembering</td><td>2.03<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.22</td><td>2.50<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.23</td><td>2.47<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.40</td><td>7.61**</td><td>(2,200)</td><td>.071</td></tr><tr><td>Specificity</td><td>6.02<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.15</td><td>4.89<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.60</td><td>5.06<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.50</td><td>29.60***</td><td>(2,192)</td><td>.236</td></tr><tr><td>Average CES score</td><td>2.99<sub>a</sub></td><td>.95</td><td>2.83<sub>b</sub></td><td>.86</td><td>3.17<sub>a</sub></td><td>.87</td><td>5.14**</td><td>(2,188)</td><td>.052</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>2 <emph>Note: *p</emph> < .05, **<emph>p</emph> < .01, ***<emph>p</emph> < .001.</item> <item>3 <emph>Note:</emph> Means on the same row that share the same subscript are not significantly different from each other at <emph>p</emph> < .05.</item> <item>4 <emph>Note:</emph> Average CES score refers to the mean of 7 items in the Centrality of Event Scale for each event.</item> </ulist> <p>Further, episodic future projections were more positive than episodic memories (<emph>p</emph> < .001), which were more positive than episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> =.001). Episodic memories and episodic future projections were rated higher than episodic counterfactual thoughts, but did not differ from each other, on centrality to life story and identity (<emph>p</emph>s ≤ .039) and voluntary rehearsal (<emph>p</emph>s ≤ .005). Finally, the ratings of emotional intensity were the lowest for episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph>s < .001), whereas episodic memories and episodic future projections did not differ from each other.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-11">Main effects of age group</hd> <p>Table 4 displays the means and standard deviations of the study variables separated by age group and the <emph>F</emph>‐values for the effects of age group on the study variables. The older participants had higher ratings of emotional valence (<emph>p</emph> =.012), sensory‐imagery (<emph>p</emph> =.001), and involuntary rehearsal (<emph>p</emph> =.033) than the younger participants. The younger participants had lower ratings of perspective than the older participants (<emph>p</emph> =.012), indicating the use of more of a first‐person perspective. The younger participants also found the task of remembering/imagining events easier than the older participants (<emph>p</emph> =.002).</p> <p>4 TABLEMeans (M) and standard deviations (SD) of study variables separated by age group, and ANOVA results for Study 1</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th align="left">Study variables</th><th align="left">Younger</th><th align="left">Older</th><th align="left"><italic>F</italic></th><th align="left">df</th><th align="left"><italic>η</italic><sup>2</sup><sub>p</sub></th></tr><tr><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td>Sensory imagery</td><td>5.33</td><td>.87</td><td>5.93</td><td>.69</td><td>11.44**</td><td>(1,97)</td><td>.105</td></tr><tr><td>Spatial imagery</td><td>4.96</td><td>1.02</td><td>5.19</td><td>1.00</td><td>1.10</td><td>(1,100)</td><td>.011</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional valence</td><td>.59</td><td>.92</td><td>1.11</td><td>1.04</td><td>6.51*</td><td>(1,100)</td><td>.061</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional intensity</td><td>5.32</td><td>.96</td><td>5.66</td><td>.69</td><td>3.31</td><td>(1,100)</td><td>.032</td></tr><tr><td>Importance</td><td>5.52</td><td>.82</td><td>5.52</td><td>.71</td><td>.00</td><td>(1,99)</td><td>.000</td></tr><tr><td>Perspective</td><td>2.73</td><td>1.31</td><td>3.51</td><td>1.59</td><td>6.56*</td><td>(1,97)</td><td>.063</td></tr><tr><td>Voluntary rehearsal</td><td>4.56</td><td>1.05</td><td>4.90</td><td>.91</td><td>2.54</td><td>(1,100)</td><td>.025</td></tr><tr><td>Involuntary rehearsal</td><td>3.83</td><td>1.24</td><td>4.37</td><td>1.04</td><td>4.68*</td><td>(1,99)</td><td>.045</td></tr><tr><td>Difficulty of remembering</td><td>2.11</td><td>.73</td><td>2.79</td><td>1.40</td><td>10.16**</td><td>(1,100)</td><td>.092</td></tr><tr><td>Specificity</td><td>5.40</td><td>1.19</td><td>5.15</td><td>1.05</td><td>.96</td><td>(1,96)</td><td>.010</td></tr><tr><td>Average CES score</td><td>3.03</td><td>.67</td><td>2.93</td><td>.75</td><td>.40</td><td>(1,94)</td><td>.004</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>5 <emph>Note: *p</emph> < .05, **<emph>p</emph> < .01.</item> <item>6 <emph>Note:</emph> Average CES score refers to the mean of 7 items in the Centrality of Event Scale for each event.</item> </ulist> <hd id="AN0145489195-12">Interactions between event type and age group</hd> <p>First, as depicted in Figure 1, there was a significant event type x age group interaction on importance ratings (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref2">2</reflink>,<reflink idref="bib198" id="ref3">198</reflink>] = 3.62, <emph>p</emph> =.029, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups><subs>p</subs> =.035). Simple effects analyses for event type within age group showed that, in the younger group, episodic future projections were more important than episodic memories and episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> =.008 and <emph>p</emph> =.049, respectively), which did not differ from each other. In the older group, different event types were equally important. Simple effects analyses for age group within event type did not show any significant differences.</p> <p> <img src="https://imageserver.ebscohost.com/img/embimages/rdk/BU8/01sep20/acp3681-fig-0001.jpg?ephost1=dGJyMMvl7ESepq84yOvsOLCmsE6epq5Srqa4SK6WxWXS" alt="acp3681-fig-0001.jpg" title="1 Mean ratings of variables that showed significant event type x age group interactions in Study 1. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means" /> </p> <p></p> <p>Second, there was a significant event type x age group interaction on voluntary rehearsal ratings (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref4">2</reflink>,<reflink idref="bib200" id="ref5">200</reflink>] = 3.49, <emph>p</emph> =.032, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups><subs>p</subs> =.034). Simple effects analyses for event type within age group showed that the younger group voluntarily rehearsed episodic future projections more frequently than episodic memories and episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> =.05 and <emph>p</emph> =.021, respectively), which did not differ from each other. In the older group, episodic memories and episodic future projections were not different from each other, but both were voluntarily rehearsed more frequently than episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> =.001 and <emph>p</emph> =.003, respectively). Further, simple effects analyses for age group within event type showed that the older group reported more frequent voluntary rehearsal of their episodic memories than the younger group (<emph>p</emph> =.005), whereas no significant age differences were found for other events.</p> <p>Third, the event type x age group interaction on involuntary rehearsal ratings was also significant (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref6">2</reflink>,<reflink idref="bib198" id="ref7">198</reflink>] = 3.23, <emph>p</emph> =.042, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups><subs>p</subs> =.032). Simple effects analyses for event type within age group showed that the younger group involuntarily rehearsed the events to the same extent, whereas the older group involuntarily rehearsed memories more often than episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> =.001). No other comparisons were significant. Further, simple effects analyses for age group within event type showed that the older group reported more frequent involuntary rehearsal of their episodic memories than the younger group (<emph>p</emph> =.007), whereas no age differences were significant for other events.</p> <p>Lastly, there was a significant event type x age group interaction on centrality to life story and identity ratings (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref8">2</reflink>,<reflink idref="bib188" id="ref9">188</reflink>] = 3.15, <emph>p</emph> =.045, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups><subs>p</subs> =.032). Simple effects analyses for event type within age group showed that the younger group rated episodic future projections as more central to life story and identity than episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> =.007). No other comparisons were significant. In the older group, memories were rated as more central to life story and identity than episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> =.014). Again, no other comparisons were significant. Simple effects analyses for age group within event type did not yield any significant differences.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-14">Discussion</hd> <p>In this study, we found support for our first hypothesis as indicated by the robust replication of event‐type effects across age groups. In line with the idea that past versus future temporal direction and real versus imagined events engage different cognitive and motivational processes (Özbek et al., 2017), we have shown that (a) episodic memories are characterized by a high degree of sensory and perceptual details, and specificity, (b) episodic future projections are characterized by positive emotions, and (c) episodic counterfactual thoughts are characterized by low levels of emotional intensity.</p> <p>We also found significant interactions between event type and age group that qualified some of these event‐type effects for variables, such as importance, in/voluntary rehearsal, and centrality of events. Taken together, the findings suggest that the older participants to a lesser extent than the younger participants viewed their future as central to their identity, and also more frequently thought about the remembered past events than the younger participants. This may have two potential, but not mutually exclusive, explanations. First, the frequency of strategic rehearsal of future events declines with age, and older adults project themselves further back into the past than ahead into the future (e.g., Berntsen, Rubin, & Salgado, 2015; Spreng & Levine, 2006). This might be associated with the motivation to focus on the past to cherish experiences that are more relevant for self and identity in older adults. Second, episodic future thinking might be more relevant for older adults to keep track of the practical goals that they aim to achieve in the near future rather than to idealize potential life experiences. For instance, previous research has shown that although younger adults in general outperform older adults in prospective memory tasks, older adults significantly benefit from future thinking in relation to prospective memory performance and plan enactment (Altgassen et al., 2015).</p> <p>Additionally, we had a number of age group differences regarding emotion and phenomenology ratings. More specifically, in support of our second hypothesis, the older participants showed an emotional positivity effect and they had higher phenomenology ratings for the sensory, but not contextual (as measured by spatial imagery), characteristics of events overall. It should be noted, however, that the difference in the mean ratings of spatial imagery was in the expected direction, showing higher ratings for the older participants. Contrary to our third hypothesis, the older participants did not rate the events as more important, more specific, and more central to their life story and identity than the younger participants. Although interactions were seen for some of these variables, they reflected that the younger participants rated future events higher than past events, whereas similar effects were absent in the older participants. Therefore, it is unlikely that the overall higher ratings of the older participants for sensory detail or emotion were guided by the selection of highly significant events for self and identity. However, the older participants had higher voluntary and involuntary rehearsal ratings than the younger participants. The difference in voluntary rehearsal was in the expected direction, but did not reach statistical significance.[<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref10">2</reflink>]</p> <p>Since this was the first study to assess the reported properties and centrality of event of episodic memories, counterfactual thoughts, and future projections in younger and older Turkish adults, we aimed to replicate the findings in another sample than Turkish. Additionally, one major limitation of Study 1 was the lack of cognitive functioning and depression scores from the younger group. This could call into question especially the emotional positivity effect observed in the older group, as one could instead argue for an emotional negativity effect in the younger group. Based on this background, we conducted Study 2, which we describe in detail below.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-15">STUDY 2</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0145489195-16">Method</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0145489195-17">Participants</hd> <p>We recruited participants through TurkPrime Panels (https://<ulink href="http://www.turkprime.com/">www.turkprime.com/</ulink>) using Amazon's Mechanical Turk workers (MTurk; https://<ulink href="http://www.mturk.com/">www.mturk.com/</ulink>). The participants took an online questionnaire prepared in the survey tool Qualtrics (https://<ulink href="http://www.qualtrics.com">www.qualtrics.com</ulink>). The sample initially consisted of 32 younger (17 women) and 38 older American adults (20 women); however, data from 4 men in the older group could not be used due to the fact that these participants reported nonsensical events. Thus, the final sample consisted of 32 younger (17 women) and 34 older American adults (20 women) (see Table 1 for demographics). The educational levels of the groups were comparable (<emph>t</emph>[<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref11">63</reflink>] =.164, <emph>p</emph> > .05). Cognitive functioning and depression symptoms were assessed in both age groups.</p> <p>Since we were unable to administer the MMSE online, we used cognitive functioning tests focusing on vocabulary and verbal fluency abilities in line with earlier studies (e.g., Berntsen, Rasmussen, Miles, Nielsen, & Ramsgaard, 2017). Both age groups completed Shipley's (1940) vocabulary test and the older group performed significantly better than the younger group (<emph>M</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 28.60, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 11.25; <emph>M</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 35.41, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 3.90; <emph>t</emph>[<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref12">64</reflink>] = −3.328, <emph>p</emph> =.001). Participants also completed two verbal fluency tasks (Salthouse, 1993), generating words beginning with "s" and generating words ending with "ay." There were no significant differences for both tasks between the younger and the older groups ("s" task: <emph>M</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 17.40, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 6.36; <emph>M</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 15.79, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 4.68; <emph>t</emph>(<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref13">64</reflink>) = 1.177, <emph>p</emph> =.244; "ay" task: <emph>M</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 10.06, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 5.90; <emph>M</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 11.15, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 5.40; <emph>t</emph>(<reflink idref="bib68" id="ref14">68</reflink>) = −.779, <emph>p</emph> =.439). We used the same depression measure as in Study 1, that is, the short version of the GDS (Yesavage & Sheikh, 1986). Both age groups scored low on the measure, but the older group had significantly lower depression scores than the younger group (<emph>M</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 3.62, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 2.70; <emph>M</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 1.76, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 2.65; <emph>t</emph>(<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref15">64</reflink>) = 2.825, <emph>p</emph> =.006). Participants received 6 USD for their participation.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-18">Materials and procedure</hd> <p>We used an online English version of the questionnaire employed in Study 1 and followed the same procedure. Thus, participants reported 3 episodic memories, 3 episodic counterfactual thoughts, and 3 episodic future projections sampled from 1 month ago/into the future, 1 year ago/into the future, and 5+ years ago/into the future. Since the order of the events was counterbalanced, participants were randomly presented 1 of 6 different online questionnaires. Upon recording each event, participants answered the same questions assessing the phenomenological characteristics and centrality of event (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Özbek et al., 2017; Rubin et al., 2003) as in Study 1. The Centrality of Event Scale (CES) again showed high reliability across events (Cronbach's <emph>α</emph> =.89–.95).</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-19">Results</hd> <p>Consistent with Study 1, we collapsed the ratings across retrieval intervals and conducted a series of 3 (Event Type: episodic memory, episodic counterfactual thought, episodic future projection) x 2 (Age Group: younger vs. older) mixed‐design ANOVAs. Further, we created again a dependent variable named <emph>sensory‐imagery</emph> by averaging the ratings of vividness, p/reliving, visual imagery, and auditory imagery items before the analyses. The ratings of these variables reliably grouped together, that is, Cronbach's <emph>α</emph> ranged between.89 and.95 across events.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-20">Main effects of event type</hd> <p>As seen in Table 5, there was a significant main effect of event type on all study variables, except importance and perspective, replicating the event type differences in Study 1 almost entirely. Bonferroni‐corrected post hoc tests showed that episodic memories contained more sensory‐perceptual details (<emph>p</emph>s < .001), had clearer spatial layout (<emph>p</emph>s < .001), were easier to bring to mind (<emph>p</emph>s ≤ .002), and were more specific (<emph>p</emph>s ≤ .003) than episodic counterfactual thoughts and episodic future projections, which did not differ from each other. Episodic memories were also involuntarily rehearsed more often than episodic future projections (<emph>p</emph> =.031), which in turn were involuntarily rehearsed more so than episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> =.009).</p> <p>5 TABLEMeans (M) and standard deviations (SD) of study variables separated by event type, and ANOVA results for Study 2</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th align="left">Study variables</th><th align="left">Memory</th><th align="left">Counterfactual</th><th align="left">Future</th><th align="left"><italic>F</italic></th><th align="left">df</th><th align="left"><italic>η</italic><sup>2</sup><sub>p</sub></th></tr><tr><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td>Sensory imagery</td><td>5.81<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.01</td><td>4.92<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.41</td><td>5.14<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.21</td><td>28.25***</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.306</td></tr><tr><td>Spatial imagery</td><td>6.12<sub>a</sub></td><td>.91</td><td>4.90<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.60</td><td>4.70<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.50</td><td>47.13***</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.424</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional valence</td><td>1.18<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.48</td><td>−.005<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.52</td><td>1.81<sub>c</sub></td><td>1.12</td><td>29.24***</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.314</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional intensity</td><td>5.32<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.28</td><td>4.64<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.42</td><td>5.06<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.32</td><td>12.26***</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.161</td></tr><tr><td>Importance</td><td>5.84<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.00</td><td>5.84<sub>a</sub></td><td>.98</td><td>5.84<sub>a</sub></td><td>.99</td><td>.002</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.000</td></tr><tr><td>Perspective</td><td>2.65<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.66</td><td>2.74<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.60</td><td>2.51<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.66</td><td>.73</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.011</td></tr><tr><td>Voluntary rehearsal</td><td>5.08<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.25</td><td>3.99<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.48</td><td>4.77<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.46</td><td>17.05***</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.210</td></tr><tr><td>Involuntary rehearsal</td><td>4.63<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.44</td><td>3.71<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.50</td><td>4.22<sub>c</sub></td><td>1.51</td><td>15.20***</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.192</td></tr><tr><td>Difficulty of remembering</td><td>2.10<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.26</td><td>2.68<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.24</td><td>2.63<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.24</td><td>7.63**</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.107</td></tr><tr><td>Specificity</td><td>5.87<sub>a</sub></td><td>1.23</td><td>5.32<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.50</td><td>4.99<sub>b</sub></td><td>1.49</td><td>14.33***</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.183</td></tr><tr><td>Average CES score</td><td>3.55<sub>a</sub></td><td>.84</td><td>2.90<sub>b</sub></td><td>.90</td><td>3.41<sub>a</sub></td><td>.76</td><td>20.44***</td><td>(2,128)</td><td>.242</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>7 <emph>Note: *p</emph> < .05, **<emph>p</emph> < .01, ***<emph>p</emph> < .001.</item> <item>8 <emph>Note:</emph> Means on the same row that share the same subscript are not significantly different from each other at <emph>p</emph> < .05.</item> <item>9 <emph>Note:</emph> Average CES score refers to the mean of 7 items in the Centrality of Event Scale for each event.</item> </ulist> <p>Further, episodic future projections were more positive than both episodic memories (<emph>p</emph> =.018) and episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> < .001), and episodic memories were more positive than episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>p</emph> < .001).</p> <p>Finally, as in Study 1, emotional intensity, voluntary rehearsal, and centrality to life story and identity were lowest for episodic counterfactual thoughts (all <emph>p</emph>s ≤ .002), whereas episodic memories and episodic future projections did not differ from each other on these variables.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-21">Main effects of age group</hd> <p>As seen in Table 6, there were no significant differences between age groups in Study 2, except for perspective. Contrary to Study 1, the older participants had lower ratings of perspective than the younger participants (<emph>p</emph> =.027), indicating the use of more of a first‐person perspective.</p> <p>6 TABLEMeans (M) and standard deviations (SD) of study variables separated by age group, and ANOVA results for Study 2</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th align="left">Study variables</th><th align="left">Younger</th><th align="left">Older</th><th align="left"><italic>F</italic></th><th align="left">df</th><th align="left"><italic>η</italic><sup>2</sup><sub>p</sub></th></tr><tr><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>M</italic></th><th align="left"><italic>SD</italic></th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td>Sensory imagery</td><td>5.27</td><td>1.04</td><td>5.31</td><td>1.11</td><td>.033</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.001</td></tr><tr><td>Spatial imagery</td><td>5.14</td><td>1.21</td><td>5.34</td><td>1.09</td><td>.453</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.007</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional valence</td><td>1.03</td><td>.68</td><td>.97</td><td>.91</td><td>.072</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.001</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional intensity</td><td>4.84</td><td>1.22</td><td>5.16</td><td>1.13</td><td>1.247</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.019</td></tr><tr><td>Importance</td><td>5.71</td><td>.92</td><td>5.96</td><td>.57</td><td>1.746</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.027</td></tr><tr><td>Perspective</td><td>3.02</td><td>1.33</td><td>2.27</td><td>1.35</td><td>5.134*</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.074</td></tr><tr><td>Voluntary rehearsal</td><td>4.53</td><td>1.11</td><td>4.69</td><td>1.04</td><td>.401</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.006</td></tr><tr><td>Involuntary rehearsal</td><td>4.19</td><td>1.27</td><td>4.18</td><td>1.27</td><td>.000</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.000</td></tr><tr><td>Difficulty of remembering</td><td>2.70</td><td>1.15</td><td>2.24</td><td>.83</td><td>3.388</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.050</td></tr><tr><td>Specificity</td><td>5.47</td><td>1.11</td><td>5.31</td><td>1.24</td><td>.298</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.005</td></tr><tr><td>Average CES score</td><td>3.41</td><td>.70</td><td>3.17</td><td>.63</td><td>2.055</td><td>(1,64)</td><td>.031</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>10 <emph>Note: *p</emph> < .05, **<emph>p</emph> < .01.</item> <item>11 <emph>Note:</emph> Average CES score refers to the mean of 7 items in the Centrality of Event Scale for each event.</item> </ulist> <hd id="AN0145489195-22">Interactions between event type and age group</hd> <p>The only significant interactions between event type and age group were on the ratings of spatial imagery (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref16">2</reflink>,<reflink idref="bib128" id="ref17">128</reflink>] = 4.08, <emph>p</emph> =.019, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups><subs>p</subs> =.060) and specificity (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref18">2</reflink>,<reflink idref="bib128" id="ref19">128</reflink>] = 5.07, <emph>p</emph> =.008, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups><subs>p</subs> =.073). For spatial imagery, simple effects analyses showed that the younger group had lower spatial imagery ratings of episodic memories than the older group (<emph>M</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 5.87, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 1.00; <emph>M</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 6.35, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> =.74, <emph>p</emph> =.031). There were no such age group differences for episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>M</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 4.68, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 1.67; <emph>M</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 5.10, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 1.52) and future projections (<emph>M</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 4.87, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>younger</emph></subs> = 1.46; <emph>M</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 4.55, <emph>SD</emph><subs><emph>older</emph></subs> = 1.55).</p> <p>Simple effects analyses showed that the younger group had more specific episodic memories (<emph>M</emph> = 5.91, <emph>SD</emph> = 1.10) than episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>M</emph> = 5.16, <emph>SD</emph> = 1.50) and future projections (<emph>M</emph> = 5.36, <emph>SD</emph> = 1.22) (<emph>p</emph> =.005 and <emph>p</emph> =.043, respectively), which did not differ from each other. In the older group, episodic future projections (<emph>M</emph> = 4.65, <emph>SD </emph>= 1.65) were less specific than episodic memories (<emph>M</emph> = 5.83, <emph>SD </emph>= 1.36) and episodic counterfactual thoughts (<emph>M</emph> = 5.47, <emph>SD </emph>= 1.51) (both <emph>p</emph>s ≤.005), which were not different from each other.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-23">Discussion</hd> <p>We found further support for our first hypothesis as indicated by the robust replication of event type effects in Study 1 across age groups in an American sample. The event‐type differences mirrored the ones in Study 1, except that episodic memories were recalled more from a first‐person perspective in Study 1, whereas the ratings of perspective were similar across different event types in the present study. Surprisingly, a significant age difference in perspective ratings was the only age group effect observed in the present study, displaying a reverse pattern compared to Study 1. Significant interaction effects between event type and age group were found only for spatial imagery and specificity, indicating that the older participants had a clearer image of people and objects in their episodic memories, but perceived their future projections as less specific compared to the younger participants. None of these interaction effects were present in Study 1.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-24">GENERAL DISCUSSION</hd> <p>We compared episodic memories, counterfactual thoughts, and future projections in younger and older adults in a Turkish sample (Study 1) and in an American sample (Study 2) to examine whether the event‐type differences observed in earlier research follow the same pattern across age groups (e.g., Özbek et al., 2017, 2018) and to test the generalizability of the findings to demographically diverse samples.</p> <p>Across both studies, we found systematic differences between the three different event types. Consistent with our first hypothesis, episodic memories were scored higher than other events on sensory and contextual event characteristics, such as sensory and spatial imagery, and they were considered as more specific and easier to bring to mind. Furthermore, future projections were consistently perceived as the most positive of all events, whereas episodic counterfactual thoughts got lower emotional intensity ratings than other events.</p> <p>These results replicated the earlier findings in younger adult samples (Özbek et al., 2017, 2018) and suggested that the event differences reflect general cognitive processes that are little affected by age. In alignment with our findings, the reality and source monitoring theory posits that the memories of actually experienced events contain higher sensory, perceptual, and contextual information than the imagined past and future events (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981). It has been argued that such salient information helps people keep track of what they really experienced in the past and what they just imagined experiencing (Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981). This then helps grounding oneself in life in terms of what has been done and what has been planned to be done, and hence, is important for goal management.</p> <p>Moreover, a positivity bias for episodic future projections was observed, possibly due to self‐enhancement motives (e.g., Grysman, Prabhakar, Anglin, & Hudson, 2015; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008) and/or potential implications for successful goal management (e.g., Barsics, Van der Linden, & D'Argembeau, 2016; D'Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). This resonates well with the idea that both the ideality of the future and the reality of the past serve the purpose of learning from mistakes and plan the future accordingly, in a better and more positive way (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013).</p> <p>Consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g., De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; Özbek et al., 2017), emotional intensity of episodic counterfactual thoughts in the present studies was lower than for the other event types, and this was observed both in the younger and the older groups. It seems that as a strong predictor of autobiographical memory experience (Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004), emotional intensity can be p/re‐experienced to a greater extent for actual or anticipated events than for events that could have occurred, but did not. Another possible explanation might be that the emotional intensity of episodic counterfactual thoughts may vary as a function of different factors, such as the valence of the actual event, direction of the counterfactual alternative (i.e., worse or better), or direct versus indirect exposure to a highly negative event prior to counterfactual thinking (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Roese, 1994; Stanley, Parikh, Stewart, & De Brigard, 2017). Future research needs to clarify these points.</p> <p>We also found several effects of age group, but these were largely limited to Study 1. Consistent with our hypotheses 2 and 3, we found that the older participants showed an overall emotional positivity effect and rated the sensory characteristics of the events higher than the younger participants. In Study 2, we found no elevated valence ratings in the older group, and an age‐related increase in ratings of imagery was seen only for past events. The older participants had a clearer image of people and objects in their episodic memories and reported less specific future projections compared with the younger participants.</p> <p>In Study 1, there were several significant interactions between event type and age group as well. These interaction effects probably stemmed from the different ways that the older and the younger participants perceived the past and future. More specifically, the older participants rated the characteristics, such as importance, centrality to life story and identity, and voluntary rehearsal similarly for their episodic memories and future projections, whereas the younger participants rated the same characteristics consistently higher for their episodic future projections than for other events.</p> <p>While the event‐type manipulation replicated across the two studies, the effects of age group did not. In Study 2, we observed hardly any effects of age group, except the older participants reported using more of a first‐person perspective, unlike the older participants in Study 1. The fact that the age group effects observed in Study 1 did not replicate in Study 2 may reflect the role that the cultural differences between Turkish and American samples might have played. The comparison of Turks and Americans has been limited so far to few laboratory studies of memory errors (e.g., Gutchess & Boduroglu, 2019; Gutchess, Garner, Ligouri, Konuk, & Boduroglu, 2018; Schwartz, Boduroglu, & Gutchess, 2014) and to only two cross‐cultural studies related to autobiographical memory (Rubin et al., 2007; Sahin & Mebert, 2013). For example, Rubin et al. compared the component processes in autobiographical remembering of participants from Japan, Turkey, and the USA, and demonstrated a marked similarity across cultures. Measures of auditory imagery and language correlated more strongly with measures of recollection and belief in autobiographical memory in the Turkish sample. The Turkish participants also had higher ratings of auditory imagery than visual imagery for their word‐cued autobiographical memories. Future research should examine how the differences between these cultures may play out in autobiographical studies focusing on significant and self‐defining personal experiences.</p> <p>The lack of age effects in Study 2 may alternatively reflect the lower emotional valence ratings that the younger Turkish participants reported compared to the younger American participants. The mean emotional valence ratings of the younger participants in Study 1 were indeed significantly less positive than in Study 2 (i.e.,.59 versus 1.03, respectively; <emph>t</emph>[<reflink idref="bib99" id="ref20">99</reflink>] = −2.379, <emph>p</emph> =.019), whereas the mean emotional valence ratings of the older participants in Study 1 and in Study 2 were similar (i.e., 1.11 versus.97, respectively; <emph>t</emph>[<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref21">65</reflink>] =.574, <emph>p</emph> =.568). However, the age effects in Study 1 were significant even after controlling for event valence, suggesting that the observed age effects were not simply a matter of different valence of the reported events.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-25">Limitations</hd> <p>The present studies inevitably have some limitations. As mentioned earlier, for instance, the cognitive functioning and depression scores were only obtained from the older participants in Study 1, which we remedied in Study 2. Further, the data were obtained in different ways in Study 1 and in Study 2. The questionnaires in Study 1 were administered either in a group setting or individually, at the expense of possibly creating demand characteristics on participants. The same questionnaires were administered online in Study 2. Although such testing differences may create additional noise in the data, previous research has shown that high‐quality data can be obtained reliably through online platforms with Mechanical Turk workers and that these data are comparable to the ones obtained through more traditional survey methodologies (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Buhrmester, Talaifar, & Gosling, 2018). Also, Study 2 showed robust replication of the event type effects observed in Study 1. Last, but not least, the lack of group differences in Study 2 may be related to low statistical power due to a smaller sample size. Since we did not have an initial power analysis, this is hard to address in a post hoc manner. Nevertheless, the effect sizes observed for analyses related to group differences were systematically lower in Study 2 than in Study 1. Also, the sample sizes in both studies were similar to the sample sizes of earlier studies reporting differences regarding phenomenological characteristics of past, counterfactual, and future thinking between younger and older adults (e.g., De Brigard et al., 2016, 2017).</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-26">Conclusion</hd> <p>Across two studies, we have shown consistent differences between episodic memories, counterfactual thoughts, and future projections both in younger and older adults and in Turkish and American samples, extending the earlier findings on event type effects in groups of young Turkish college students (Özbek et al., 2017, 2018). In Study 1, we found an emotional positivity effect across different events among the older Turkish participants. Some of these differences were qualified by an interaction between event type and age group, suggesting that age may to some extent affect the characteristics of the three categories of imagined and remembered events. More specifically, the younger Turkish participants in Study 1 appeared to have an idealized view on the future, as manifested in the higher ratings of importance, voluntary rehearsal, and centrality to life story and identity specifically for their future projections. The age group effects in Study 1 did not replicate in Study 2, leaving the question about the role of age for the characteristics of different event types still open and necessitating further research on the potential role of cultural factors.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-27">ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</hd> <p>The authors thank the Danish National Research Foundation (DNRF89) and the Carlsberg Foundation (CF17‐0859) for financial support and professor Ali I. Tekcan for his collaboration regarding the data collection from college students at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey (Study 1). Further, the authors thank student assistants Nursel Alkoç, Neslihan Önay, Müge Özvarol, and Duygu Şerbetçi for the data collection from older adults (Study 1). Finally, the authors thank Daniel Munkholm Møller for his technical assistance during online data collection (Study 2).</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-28">CONFLICT OF INTEREST</hd> <p>The authors declare no potential conflict of interest.</p> <hd id="AN0145489195-29">DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</hd> <p>Data for Study 1 and Study 2 are available upon request from the corresponding author.</p> <p>Appendix</p> <p></p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th>Phenomenology questions answered for episodic counterfactual thoughts</th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td>(Vividness) This imagined event is vivid. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>to a very high degree</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Reliving) As I imagine the event, I feel as though I am experiencing the event now. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>as clearly as if it were happening now</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Visual imagery) As I imagine the event, I can see it in my mind. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>as clearly as if it were happening now</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Auditory imagery) As I imagine the event, I can hear it in my mind. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>as clearly as if it were happening now</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Spatial imagery) As I imagine the event, I know the location of people/objects in the place where it could have occurred—spatial layout. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>as clearly as if it were happening now</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Emotional valence) The emotions I have when I imagine the event are (−3 = <italic>very negative</italic>, +3 = <italic>very positive</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Emotional intensity) The emotions I have when I imagine the event are intense. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>to a very high degree</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Importance) If it had happened, the imagined event would have been important to my life. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>to a very high degree</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Perspective) When I imagine the event, I primarily see what could have happened from a perspective as seen through (1 = <italic>my own eyes</italic>, 7 = <italic>an observer</italic>'<italic>s eyes</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Voluntary rehearsal) Since the time it could have happened, I have willfully thought back to this event in my mind and thought about it or talked about it. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>very often</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Involuntary rehearsal) Has the imagined event suddenly popped up in your thoughts by itself—that is, without your attempting to imagine it? (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>very often</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Difficulty of remembering) Imagining this event was (1 = <italic>very easy</italic>, 7 = <italic>very difficult</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Specificity) This imagined event was specific in the sense that it could have happened at a specific time and place, and its duration would not have exceeded a full day—24 hours. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>very specific</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Date) If this event had happened, how long ago would it have happened? (weeks/months/years ago).</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p></p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th><italic>Phenomenology questions answered for episodic future projections</italic></th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td>(Vividness) This imagined event is vivid. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>to a very high degree</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Reliving) As I imagine the event, I feel as though I am preliving the event. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>as clearly as if it were happening now</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Visual imagery) As I imagine the event, I can see it in my mind. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>as clearly as if it were happening now</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Auditory imagery) As I imagine the event, I can hear it in my mind. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>as clearly as if it were happening now</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Spatial imagery) As I imagine the event, I know the location of people/objects in the place where it might occur—spatial layout. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>as clearly as if it were happening now</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Emotional valence) The emotions I have when I imagine the event are (−3 = <italic>very negative</italic>, +3 = <italic>very positive</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Emotional intensity) The emotions I have when I imagine the event are intense. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>to a very high degree</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Importance) The imagined event will be important to my life. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>to a very high degree</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Perspective) When I imagine the event, I primarily see what might happen from a perspective as seen through (1 = <italic>my own eyes</italic>, 7 = <italic>an observer</italic>'<italic>s eyes</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Voluntary rehearsal) I have willfully imagined the event in my mind and thought about it or talked about it. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>very often</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Involuntary rehearsal) Has the imagined event suddenly popped up in your thoughts by itself—that is, without your attempting to imagine it? (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>very often</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Difficulty of remembering) Imagining this event was (1 = <italic>very easy</italic>, 7 = <italic>very difficult</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Specificity) This imagined event was specific in the sense that it might happen at a specific time and place, and its duration will not exceed a full day—24 hours. (1 = <italic>not at all</italic>, 7 = <italic>very specific</italic>).</td></tr><tr><td>(Date) How long from now might this imagined event happen? (weeks/months/years from now).</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ref id="AN0145489195-30"> <title> Footnotes </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref1" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> There are no published normative data on MMSE cut‐off scores in the Turkish culture. However, a reliability and validity study of the standardized MMSE with clinically diagnosed dementia patients and healthy controls with at least 5 years of education has found that a cut‐off score of 23/24 in MMSE has the highest sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative predictive values, and kappa score to differentiate between a cognitively healthy older individual and an older individual with mild dementia in Turkey (Güngen et al., [34]). This cut‐off score is notably lower than 27, which is typically used for MMSE in Western societies. A similar discrepancy exists for the Montreal Cognitive Assessment, where the typical cut‐off score is 26 in Western societies versus 21 in Turkey (see Selekler, Cangöz, & Uluç, [62]). A MMSE score of ≥24 is commonly used as an inclusion criterion in aging studies with Turkish participants to justify that the sample consists of cognitively well‐functioning older adults. Therefore, we chose to follow the same rule in the present study in order not to run the risk of having a too conservative inclusion criterion for our older Turkish participants.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref2" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> To rule out the possibility that the observed age effects were due to the differences in the frequency of voluntary and involuntary rehearsal, we conducted a series of hierarchical regression analyses in which voluntary and involuntary rehearsal and age were predictors, and the variables for which we observed a significant main effect of age group were outcome variables (i.e., emotional valence, sensory‐imagery, perspective, and difficulty of remembering/imagining). The results of these analyses revealed significant age effects beyond the frequency of voluntary and involuntary rehearsal (.039 ≤ ΔR<sups>2</sups> ≤.078, <emph>β</emph>s ranged between.20–.28). Alternatively, it could be the case that the observed age effects were driven largely by the positivity effect shown by older participants. To rule out this, we ran another series of hierarchical regression analyses with emotional valence and age as predictors and the variables for which we observed a significant main effect of age group as outcome variables (i.e., sensory‐imagery, perspective, involuntary rehearsal, and difficulty of remembering/imagining). The results of these analyses revealed significant age effects beyond emotional valence ratings (.026 ≤ ΔR<sups>2</sups> ≤.084, <emph>β</emph>s ranged between.16–.30). Finally, we conducted a series of hierarchical regression analyses with event age (in weeks) and participant age as predictors and all the variables for which we observed a significant main effect of age group as outcome variables (i.e., emotional valence, sensory‐imagery, perspective, involuntary rehearsal, and difficulty of remembering/imagining). Event age did not explain any significant variance, whereas participant age unsurprisingly explained significant additional variance on top of that (.066 ≤ ΔR<sups>2</sups> ≤.138, <emph>β</emph>s ranged between.17–.37). Based on these exploratory analyses, we concluded that the observed age effects in Study 1 are valid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> Funding information Carlsbergfondet, Grant/Award Number: CF17‐0859; Danmarks Grundforskningsfond, Grant/Award Number: DNRF89</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <ref id="AN0145489195-31"> <title> REFERENCES </title> <blist> <bibtext> Addis, D. R., Musicaro, R., Pan, L., & Schacter, D. L. (2010). Episodic simulation of past and future events in older adults: Evidence from an experimental recombination task. Psychology and Aging, 25 (2), 369 – 376. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017280</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Addis, D. R., Pan, L., Vu, M. A., Laiser, N., & Schacter, D. L. (2009). Constructive episodic simulation of the future and the past: Distinct subsystems of a core brain network mediate imagining and remembering. Neuropsychologia, 47 (11), 2222 – 2238. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.10.026</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2007). Remembering the past and imagining the future: Common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration. Neuropsychologia, 45 (7), 1363 – 1377. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.10.016</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib4" type="bt">4</bibl> <bibtext> Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). Age‐related changes in the episodic simulation of future events. Psychological Science, 19 (1), 33 – 41. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02043.x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib5" type="bt">5</bibl> <bibtext> Altgassen, M., Rendell, P. G., Bernhard, A., Henry, J. D., Bailey, P. E., Phillips, L. H., & Kliegel, M. (2015). Future thinking improves prospective memory performance and plan enactment in older adults. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 68 (1), 192 – 204. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2014.956127</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib6" type="bt">6</bibl> <bibtext> Atance, C. M., & O'Neill, D. K. (2001). Episodic future thinking. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5 (12), 533 – 539. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01804-0</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib7" type="bt">7</bibl> <bibtext> Barsics, C., Van der Linden, M., & D'Argembeau, A. (2016). Frequency, characteristics, and perceived functions of emotional future thinking in daily life. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69 (2), 217 – 233. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1051560</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib8" type="bt">8</bibl> <bibtext> Berntsen, D., & Bohn, A. (2010). Remembering and forecasting: The relation between autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking. Memory & Cognition, 38 (3), 265 – 278. https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.38.3.265</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib9" type="bt">9</bibl> <bibtext> Berntsen, D., & Jacobsen, A. S. (2008). Involuntary (spontaneous) mental time travel into the past and future. Consciousness and Cognition, 17 (4), 1093 – 1104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.001</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Berntsen, D., Rasmussen, A. S., Miles, A. N., Nielsen, N. P., & Ramsgaard, S. B. (2017). Spontaneous or intentional? Involuntary versus voluntary episodic memories in older and younger adults. Psychology and Aging, 32 (2), 192 – 201. https://doi.org/10.1037/pag0000157</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Berntsen, D., & Rubin, D. C. (2004). Cultural life scripts structure recall from autobiographical memory. Memory & Cognition, 32 (3), 427 – 442. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195836</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Berntsen, D., & Rubin, D. C. (2006). The centrality of event scale: A measure of integrating a trauma into one's identity and its relation to post‐traumatic stress disorder symptoms. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44 (2), 219 – 231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2005.01.009</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Berntsen, D., & Rubin, D. C. (2008). The reappearance hypothesis revisited: Recurrent involuntary memories after traumatic events and in everyday life. Memory & Cognition, 36 (2), 449 – 460. https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.36.2.449</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Berntsen, D., Rubin, D. C., & Salgado, S. (2015). The frequency of involuntary autobiographical memories and future thoughts in relation to daydreaming, emotional distress, and age. Consciousness and Cognition, 36, 352 – 372. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.07.007</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Berntsen, D., Rubin, D. C., & Siegler, I. C. (2011). Two versions of life: Emotionally negative and positive life events have different roles in the organization of life story and identity. Emotion, 11 (5), 1190 – 1201. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024940</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Boals, A., Hayslip, B., Jr., & Banks, J. B. (2014). Age differences in autobiographical memories of negative events. The International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 78 (1), 47 – 65. https://doi.org/10.2190/AG.78.1.d</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Buhrmester, M. D., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's mechanical Turk: A new source of inexpensive, yet high‐quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6 (1), 3 – 5. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610393980</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Buhrmester, M. D., Talaifar, S., & Gosling, S. D. (2018). An evaluation of Amazon's mechanical Turk, its rapid rise, and its effective use. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13 (2), 149 – 154. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617706516</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Charles, S. T., & Carstensen, L. L. (2010). Social and emotional aging. Annual Review of Psychology, 61, 383 – 409. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100448</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Comblain, C., D'Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2005). Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories for emotional and neutral events in older and younger adults. Experimental Aging Research, 31 (2), 173 – 189. https://doi.org/10.1080/03610730590915010</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> D'Argembeau, A. (2012). Autobiographical memory and future thinking. In D. Berntsen & D. C. Rubin (Eds.), Understanding autobiographical memory (pp. 311 – 330). Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> D'Argembeau, A., & Mathy, A. (2011). Tracking the construction of episodic future thoughts. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 140 (2), 258 – 271. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022581</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> D'Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2004). Phenomenal characteristics associated with projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the future: Influence of valence and temporal distance. Consciousness and Cognition, 13 (4), 844 – 858. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.007</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> De Brigard, F. (2014). Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking. Synthese, 191 (2), 155 – 185. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0247-7</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> De Brigard, F., Addis, D. R., Ford, J. H., Schacter, D. L., & Giovanello, K. S. (2013). Remembering what could have happened: Neural correlates of episodic counterfactual thinking. Neuropsychologia, 51 (12), 2401 – 2414. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.015</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> De Brigard, F., & Giovanello, K. S. (2012). Influence of outcome valence in the subjective experience of episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking. Consciousness and Cognition, 21 (3), 1085 – 1096. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.06.007</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> De Brigard, F., Giovanello, K. S., Stewart, G. W., Lockrow, A. W., O'Brien, M. M., & Spreng, R. N. (2016). Characterizing the subjective experience of episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking in healthy younger and older adults. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69 (12), 2358 – 2375. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1115529</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> De Brigard, F., & Parikh, N. (2019). Episodic counterfactual thinking. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 28 (1), 59 – 66. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721418806512</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> De Brigard, F., Rodriguez, D. C., & Montañés, P. (2017). Exploring the experience of episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking in younger and older adults: A study of a Colombian sample. Consciousness and Cognition, 51, 258 – 267. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.007</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> De Brigard, F., Szpunar, K. K., & Schacter, D. L. (2013). Coming to grips with the past: Effect of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of episodic counterfactual thoughts. Psychological Science, 24 (7), 1329 – 1334. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612468163</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Folstein, M. F., Folstein, S. E., & McHugh, P. R. (1975). "Mini‐mental state": A practical method for grading the cognitive state of patients for the clinician. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 12 (3), 189 – 198. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-3956(75)90026-6</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Greenberg, S. (2012). The geriatric depression scale (GDS). Try This Series: Best Practice in Nursing Care to Older Adults, Hartford Institute for Geriatric Nursing, NYU College of Nursing. Retrieved from https://consultgeri.org/try-this/general-assessment/issue-4.pdf</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Grysman, A., Prabhakar, J., Anglin, S. M., & Hudson, J. A. (2015). Self‐enhancement and the life script in future thinking across the lifespan. Memory, 23 (5), 774 – 785. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.927505</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Güngen, C., Ertan, T., Eker, E., Yaşar, R., & Engin, F. (2002). Reliability and validity of the standardized mini mental state examination in the diagnosis of mild dementia in Turkish population. Turkish Journal of Psychiatry, 13 (4), 273 – 281.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gutchess, A., & Boduroglu, A. (2019). Cultural differences in categorical memory errors persist with age. Aging & Mental Health, 23 (7), 851 – 854. https://doi.org/10.1080/13607863.2017.1421616</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gutchess, A., Garner, L., Ligouri, L., Konuk, A. I., & Boduroglu, A. (2018). Culture impacts the magnitude of the emotion‐induced memory trade‐off effect. Cognition and Emotion, 32 (6), 1339 – 1346. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2017.1386620</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. Psychological Bulletin, 114 (1), 3 – 28. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88 (1), 67 – 85. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.88.1.67</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kane, J., Van Boven, L., & McGraw, A. P. (2012). Prototypical prospection: Future events are more prototypically represented and simulated than past events. European Journal of Social Psychology, 42 (3), 354 – 362. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1866</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal experience: The effects of episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient's ability to remember the past and imagine the future. Social Cognition, 20 (5), 353 – 379. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.20.5.353.21125</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Luchetti, M., & Sutin, A. R. (2018). Age differences in autobiographical memory across the adult lifespan: Older adults report stronger phenomenology. Memory, 26 (1), 117 – 130. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2017.1335326</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Mullally, S. L., & Maguire, E. A. (2014). Counterfactual thinking in patients with amnesia. Hippocampus, 24 (11), 1261 – 1266. https://doi.org/10.1002/hipo.22323</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Newby‐Clark, I. R., & Ross, M. (2003). Conceiving the past and future. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 29 (7), 807 – 818. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167203029007001</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Özbek, M., Bohn, A., & Berntsen, D. (2017). Imagining the personal past: Episodic counterfactuals compared to episodic memories and episodic future projections. Memory & Cognition, 45 (3), 375 – 389. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0671-2</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Özbek, M., Bohn, A., & Berntsen, D. (2018). Why do I think and talk about it? Perceived functions and phenomenology of episodic counterfactual thinking compared with remembering and future thinking. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71 (10), 2101 – 2114. https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021817738731</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rasmussen, A. S., & Berntsen, D. (2013). The reality of the past versus the ideality of the future: Emotional valence and functional differences between past and future mental time travel. Memory & Cognition, 41 (2), 187 – 200. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-012-0260-y</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rasmussen, K. W., & Berntsen, D. (2014). Autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking after moderate to severe traumatic brain injury. Journal of Neuropsychology, 8 (1), 34 – 52. https://doi.org/10.1111/jnp.12003</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rasmussen, K. W., & Berntsen, D. (2016). Deficits in remembering the past and imagining the future in patients with prefrontal lesions. Journal of Neuropsychology, 12, 78 – 100. https://doi.org/10.1111/jnp.12108</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Roese, N. J. (1994). The functional basis of counterfactual thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 805 – 818. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.805</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rubin, D. C. (2014). Schema‐driven construction of future autobiographical traumatic events: The future is much more troubling than the past. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143 (2), 612 – 630. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032638</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rubin, D. C., & Berntsen, D. (2003). Life scripts help to maintain autobiographical memories of highly positive, but not highly negative, events. Memory & Cognition, 31 (1), 1 – 14. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196077</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rubin, D. C., & Berntsen, D. (2009). The frequency of voluntary and involuntary autobiographical memories across the life span. Memory & Cognition, 37 (5), 679 – 688. https://doi.org/10.3758/37.5.679</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rubin, D. C., Schrauf, R. W., & Greenberg, D. L. (2003). Belief and recollection of autobiographical memories. Memory & Cognition, 31 (6), 887 – 901. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196443</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rubin, D. C., Schrauf, R. W., Gulgoz, S., & Naka, M. (2007). Cross‐cultural variability of component processes in autobiographical remembering: Japan, Turkey, and the USA. Memory, 15 (5), 536 – 547. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210701332679</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rubin, D. C., & Schulkind, M. D. (1997). Distribution of important and word‐cued autobiographical memories in 20‐, 35‐, and 70‐year‐old adults. Psychology and Aging, 12, 524 – 535. https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.12.3.524</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Sahin, B., & Mebert, C. J. (2013). The role of culture and self‐construal in autobiographical memories of US and Turkish college students. Memory, 21 (8), 1004 – 1017. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2013.774418</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Salthouse, T. A. (1993). Speed and knowledge as determinants of adult age differences in verbal tasks. The Journals of Gerontology Series B, Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 48, 29 – 36. https://doi.org/10.1093/geronj/48.1.P29</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Schacter, D. L., Benoit, R. G., De Brigard, F., & Szpunar, K. K. (2015). Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking: Intersections between memory and decisions. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 117, 14 – 21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Schwartz, A. J., Boduroglu, A., & Gutchess, A. H. (2014). Cross‐cultural differences in categorical memory errors. Cognitive Science, 38 (5), 997 – 1007. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12109</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2008). Self‐enhancement: Food for thought. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3 (2), 102 – 116. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00068.x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Selekler, K., Cangöz, B., & Uluç, S. (2010). Power of discrimination of Montreal cognitive assessment (MOCA) scale in Turkish patients with mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer's disease. Turkish Journal of Geriatrics, 13, 166 – 171.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Shipley, W. C. (1940). A self‐administered scale for measuring intellectual impairment and deterioration. The Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 9, 371 – 377. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.1940.9917704</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Spreng, R. N., & Levine, B. (2006). The temporal distribution of past and future autobiographical events across the lifespan. Memory & Cognition, 34 (8), 1644 – 1651. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195927</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Stanley, M. L., Parikh, N., Stewart, G. W., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and counterfactual thinking. Consciousness and Cognition, 48, 283 – 291. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.013</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Szpunar, K. K., Addis, D. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2012). Memory for emotional simulations: Remembering a rosy future. Psychological Science, 23 (1), 24 – 29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611422237</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Talarico, J. M., LaBar, K. S., & Rubin, D. C. (2004). Emotional intensity predicts autobiographical memory experience. Memory & Cognition, 32 (7), 1118 – 1132. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196886</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Tekcan, A. İ., Yılmaz, E., Kaya Kızılöz, B., Karadöller, D. Z., Mutafoğlu, M., & Aktan Erciyes, A. (2015). Retrieval and phenomenology of autobiographical memories in blind individuals. Memory, 23 (3), 329 – 339. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.886702</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology, 26, 1 – 12. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0080017</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Yesavage, J. A., & Sheikh, J. I. (1986). Geriatric depression scale (GDS): Recent evidence and development of a shorter version. Clinical Gerontologist, 5 (1‐2), 165 – 173. https://doi.org/10.1300/J018v05n01_09</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Zaragoza Scherman, A., Salgado, S., Shao, Z., & Berntsen, D. (2015). Event centrality of positive and negative autobiographical memories to identity and life story across cultures. Memory, 23 (8), 1152 – 1171. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.962997</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By Müge Özbek; Annette Bohn and Dorthe Berntsen</p> <p>Reported by Author; Author; Author</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib198" firstref="ref3"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib200" firstref="ref5"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib188" firstref="ref9"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib63" firstref="ref11"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib64" firstref="ref12"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib68" firstref="ref14"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib128" firstref="ref17"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib99" firstref="ref20"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib65" firstref="ref21"></nolink>
Header DbId: eric
DbLabel: ERIC
An: EJ1265935
AccessLevel: 3
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Characteristics of Personally Important Episodic Memories, Counterfactual Thoughts, and Future Projections across Age and Culture
– Name: Language
  Label: Language
  Group: Lang
  Data: English
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Özbek%2C+Müge%22">Özbek, Müge</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0845-3242">0000-0003-0845-3242</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Bohn%2C+Annette%22">Bohn, Annette</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Berntsen%2C+Dorthe%22">Berntsen, Dorthe</searchLink>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Applied+Cognitive+Psychology%22"><i>Applied Cognitive Psychology</i></searchLink>. Sep-Oct 2020 34(5):1020-1033.
– Name: Avail
  Label: Availability
  Group: Avail
  Data: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 14
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2020
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Evaluative
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Memory%22">Memory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Age+Differences%22">Age Differences</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Foreign+Countries%22">Foreign Countries</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Emotional+Response%22">Emotional Response</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cognitive+Processes%22">Cognitive Processes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Phenomenology%22">Phenomenology</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cultural+Differences%22">Cultural Differences</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Individual+Differences%22">Individual Differences</searchLink>
– Name: Subject
  Label: Geographic Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Turkey%22">Turkey</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22United+States%22">United States</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1002/acp.3681
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 0888-4080
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: We have limited knowledge as to whether the phenomenological differences between episodic memories, counterfactuals, and future projections show the same pattern across age groups and diverse samples. Here we compared the characteristics of these mental events, reported by younger and older participants in a Turkish (Study 1) and in an American sample (Study 2). In both studies, memories contained more sensory-perceptual-spatial details, were easier to bring to mind, and more specific. Future projections were the most positive, whereas counterfactuals were the least emotionally intense. In Study 1, older participants rated the events more positively and experienced them with more perceptual detail, whereas younger participants reported the future to be more voluntarily rehearsed, important, and central. These age differences did not replicate in Study 2. Overall, phenomenological differences between the events are robust and replicate across diverse samples. However, age differences are more sensitive to cultural or individual differences.
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2020
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1265935
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1265935
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1002/acp.3681
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 14
        StartPage: 1020
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Memory
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Age Differences
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Foreign Countries
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Emotional Response
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Cognitive Processes
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Phenomenology
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Cultural Differences
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Individual Differences
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Turkey
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: United States
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Characteristics of Personally Important Episodic Memories, Counterfactual Thoughts, and Future Projections across Age and Culture
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Özbek, Müge
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Bohn, Annette
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Berntsen, Dorthe
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2020
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 0888-4080
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 34
            – Type: issue
              Value: 5
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Applied Cognitive Psychology
              Type: main
ResultId 1