View in EDS HTML Full Text PDF Full Text

A Confucian Approach to Teaching Humility

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: A Confucian Approach to Teaching Humility
Language: English
Authors: Lam, Chi-Ming (ORCID 0000-0002-5902-2891)
Source: Educational Philosophy and Theory. 2023 55(2):207-216.
Availability: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 10
Publication Date: 2023
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Evaluative
Descriptors: Confucianism, Teaching Methods, Educational Philosophy, Western Civilization, Asian Culture, Ethics, Moral Values, Self Concept, Christianity, Cultural Differences, Social Behavior
DOI: 10.1080/00131857.2022.2112032
ISSN: 0013-1857
1469-5812
Abstract: Humility as an aspect of our humanity is an important concept in both Confucian and Western philosophy. In the modern world, whether Western or not, there seems to be a growing need to promote humility, especially intellectual humility, as a fundamental virtue among students. In this paper, I first compare and contrast the Confucian and Western conceptions of humility. Then I explore a Confucian approach to teaching intellectual humility, arguing that the focus of teaching be directed towards cultivating the Confucian virtues of reflection ("si") and reverence ("jing").
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2023
Accession Number: EJ1382952
Database: ERIC
Full text is not displayed to guests.
FullText Links:
  – Type: pdflink
    Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwE5aphnlkjNI1YzzKr8p84TAAAA4jCB3wYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHRMIHOAgEAMIHIBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDHUB7EfaT_DtWdgLowIBEICBmuFH3x6XvqojD2mqmkfLAmebfukt75zDcJNesFh4W_fQ_RBUxMpxE7oIa3m24S_aDeymAS3bbTVorub7agDb3byerecgXHgMAriUfOw7IxYPett7FJ6YxeptSmE6b_QLKugd1x12awfUlh3Srx4Ce7PYybj1EP5bX93Rg0tVxaBluCx5SBNc2rSgcsuMzpJuhAYBuSHXwCVEa8o=
Text:
  Availability: 1
  Value: <anid>AN0161831555;54l01feb.23;2023Feb14.06:15;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0161831555-1">A Confucian approach to teaching humility </title> <p>Humility as an aspect of our humanity is an important concept in both Confucian and Western philosophy. In the modern world, whether Western or not, there seems to be a growing need to promote humility, especially intellectual humility, as a fundamental virtue among students. In this paper, I first compare and contrast the Confucian and Western conceptions of humility. Then I explore a Confucian approach to teaching intellectual humility, arguing that the focus of teaching be directed towards cultivating the Confucian virtues of reflection (si) and reverence (jing).</p> <p>Keywords: Confucianism; Confucian virtues; humility; teaching of intellectual humility</p> <hd id="AN0161831555-2">Introduction</hd> <p>Humility as a feature of our humanity is a key concept in both Confucian and Western philosophy. Indeed, the concept of humility is crucial in classical Confucian literature, such as the <emph>Analects</emph> and <emph>Xunzi</emph>. In the <emph>Analects</emph> (Lau, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref1">13</reflink>]), despite the absence of the term 'humility' (<emph>qian</emph> 謙), there are many passages that are explicitly critical of arrogance – the opposite of humility. For instance, some of these passages suggest that the gentleman (<emph>junzi</emph> 君子) should not boast of his own goodness (5:26), but be humble when administering a state with rituals (11:26) and be at ease without being arrogant (13:26). In particular, to elaborate on the meaning of 'be at ease without being arrogant' (<emph>tai er bu jiao</emph> 泰而不驕), Confucius says in 20:2 that 'The gentleman never dare neglect his manners whether he be [<emph>sic</emph>] dealing with the many or the few, the young or the old' (Lau, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref2">13</reflink>], p. 205). In the <emph>Xunzi</emph> (Knoblock & Zhang, [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref3">10</reflink>]), the story about the tilting vessel (<emph>qiqi</emph> 欹器) in 28:1 illustrates the importance of humility to rulers. Sitting on the right side of the ruler's seat as a warning vessel, the <emph>qiqi</emph> inclines when empty, is upright when half full, and overturns when completely full. To maintain complete fullness, Confucius suggests that a ruler should reduce by ladling out, say using yielding (<emph>rang</emph> 讓) and modesty (<emph>qian</emph> 謙) to guard 'meritorious achievements covering the whole empire ... and riches encompassing all within the four seas' (Knoblock & Zhang, [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref4">10</reflink>], pp. 927, 929), respectively.</p> <p>With regard to the concept of humility in Western philosophy, it has been examined and defined in different ways by different philosophers. For example, Thomas Aquinas considers humility as a virtue that restrains the mind from pursuing good things immoderately and irrationally, whereas Aristotle and David Hume conceive humility as a vice, claiming that it renders people small-minded by making them think of themselves as less worthy of honour than they actually deserve, and that it engenders a feeling of shame in people by disposing them to have a low opinion of their worth, respectively (Roberts & Cleveland, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref5">21</reflink>]). In the contemporary world, whether Western or not, there seems to be a growing need to foster humility, especially intellectual humility, as a cardinal virtue among students. For one thing, over the past generation, students have been reported to have higher levels of narcissism characterized by both inflated and fragile views of the self (DeWall, [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref6">5</reflink>]). Such self-views hinder their development of humility, which involves having an accurate view of the self that is willing to accept their limitations, and thus of critical thinking as narcissistic people find it difficult to be open and respond to criticism due to their overconfidence and fragility. For another, students show an increasing tendency towards 'us and them' tribalism fuelled by social media, where truth is distorted, reason is abandoned, and empathy is lacking. Curbing this tendency, according to Splitter ([<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref7">27</reflink>]), requires a return to humility that underlies certain important norms of social interaction, whether online or offline, such as truthfulness, reasonableness, and respectfulness. In the following discussion, I first make a comparison between Western and Confucian conceptions of humility. Then I examine a Confucian approach to teaching intellectual humility, focusing particularly on the notions of <emph>jing</emph> 敬 and <emph>si</emph> 思 in Confucianism.</p> <hd id="AN0161831555-3">Western conception of humility</hd> <p>Humility has been traditionally conceived of as the opposite of pride in the Western world, exemplified by the Christian tradition, as if a humble person cannot have pride and a proud person humility. It is arguable, however, that there are both virtues and vices of pride: while the former includes self-confidence, dignity, authority, and aspiration, the latter includes self-righteousness, vanity, arrogance, and domination (Roberts & Cleveland, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref8">21</reflink>]). The virtue of humility can be seen as the absence of the vices of pride. This conceptual clarification is helpful not only in explaining why such philosophers as Aristotle and Hume hold a negative view of humility – it is because they contrast humility with the virtues of pride – but in defending humility as a positive virtue. Just as Roberts and Cleveland (Ibid.) rightly point out that 'the various vices of pride are all at root the concern to be <emph>self-important</emph>' (p. 44), so the virtue of humility can be defined as the absence of concern for self-importance. Here self-importance is interpreted as comparative (i.e. desiring to be as important as or even more important than others), non-instrumental (i.e. not desiring this as a means to some other end), and granted by such things as honour, glory, credit, power, and social status (i.e. desiring things that make us important). Although this definition tends to exclude young children from having the virtue of humility, assuming that they are incapable of making <emph>intelligent</emph> choices about the kind of desirable things people regard as means to self-importance and thus incapable of the vices of pride, it helps to address the issues underlying different conceptions of humility. For example, a brief survey of recent conceptions of humility indicates that humility can be conceptualized as a disposition towards ignorant underestimation of one's self-worth (Driver, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref9">6</reflink>]), non-overestimation of one's self-worth (Flanagan, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref10">7</reflink>]), acknowledgement of one's limitations (Grenberg, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref11">8</reflink>]), and inattention to one's good qualities (Bommarito, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref12">1</reflink>]). In response to these four conceptions of humility, it can be argued that, on the one hand, ignorance of one's self-worth and inattention to one's good qualities are not necessary conditions for humility, since there is no reason why a humble person should not be aware of their own worth and should not pay attention to their good qualities as long as such awareness and attention are motivated by something other than self-importance. On the other hand, non-overestimation of one's self-worth and acknowledgement of one's limitations are not sufficient, though necessary, conditions for humility, since they are compatible with a concern for self-importance.</p> <p>With regard to intellectual humility, it is plausible that the world needs it more than ever. Not only do ordinary people often ignore, reject, and marginalize dissenting opinions when faced with difficult questions, but even scientists and scholars are time and again found to be obstinately defending their ideas rather than relentlessly pursuing objective truth, being blind to evidence challenging their viewpoints and uncharitable to the standpoint of opponents. So the world needs more people who are intellectually humble, or more likely to consider it possible that their moral, political, religious, and scientific beliefs may be mistaken. Despite the profound practical significance of intellectual humility, the problem, according to Church and Samuelson ([<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref13">3</reflink>]), is that 'a robust conceptual, theoretical, and empirical understanding of intellectual humility ... is surprisingly difficult to come by' (p. 6). One central issue is whether intellectual humility is a subset of humility. Many scholars think of the concept of intellectual humility as a subset of the concept of humility. For instance, DeWall ([<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref14">5</reflink>]) asserts that intellectual humility, as a narrower facet of humility, focuses entirely on how people approach and embrace the limitations of their information, ideas, and knowledge. And Roberts ([<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref15">20</reflink>]) asserts that intellectual humility differs from the aforementioned broader definition of humility as the absence of concern for self-importance in that such concern is mediated by intellectual factors like intellectual ability, performance, and accomplishment. Yet, it seems possible to argue for the reverse. Understanding intellectual humility as the virtue of neither overvaluing one's own beliefs (intellectual arrogance) nor undervaluing them (intellectual diffidence) but valuing them as one ought, Church and Barrett ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref16">2</reflink>]) argue that humility is simply being intellectually humble about how one conceives of oneself and thus a subset of intellectual humility. Indeed, this understanding of intellectual humility can avoid the problems of two current influential accounts of intellectual humility, viz. Roberts and Wood ([<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref17">22</reflink>]) and Whitcomb et al. ([<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref18">29</reflink>]) accounts of intellectual humility as 'the opposite of intellectual arrogance' (p. 271) and 'appropriate attentiveness to, and owning, one's intellectual limitations' (p. 528), respectively. The problem with these two accounts is that while the former account allows for intellectually diffident people who fail to properly recognize and appreciate their own intellectual accomplishments, the latter account allows for intellectually arrogant people who are willing to fully own their intellectual limitations in some domains they care little about but not others. Moreover, by claiming that it is just a necessary condition for intellectual humility, Church and Barrett's (ibid.) account of intellectual humility can also accommodate the non-epistemic dimensions in folk conceptions of intellectual humility: a study of how people describe an intellectually humble person found that in the folk mind, the concept of an intellectually humble person is a complex combination of not only epistemic (e.g. being intelligent and learning-loving) but intrapersonal (e.g. being modest and not showing off) and interpersonal (e.g. being polite and unselfish) dimensions (Church & Samuelson, ibid.). That said, it may not be necessary for Church and Barrett's account to make such a concessionary claim in that the folk comprehension of concepts, though a good starting point for comprehending them, often seems ill-informed or misguided and hence is not particularly authoritative when compared with the expert development of theoretically robust conceptions.</p> <hd id="AN0161831555-4">Confucian conception of humility</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0161831555-5">Similarity to Western conception</hd> <p>Wang Yangming, widely recognized as the most influential Confucian scholar of the Ming dynasty, once made the following shrewd remark on pride and humility:</p> <p>A great defect in life is pride [<emph>ao</emph> 傲]. The proud son is sure not to be filial, nor the proud minister loyal, nor the proud father affectionate, nor the proud friend faithful. ... One must not harbor any egoism in the mind. To do so means to have pride. The many good points about ancient sages are but selflessness. Being selfless, one is naturally humble [<emph>wu wo zi neng qian</emph> 無我自能謙]. Humility is the foundation of all virtues, while pride is the chief of all vices. (Wang, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref19">28</reflink>], p. 259)</p> <p>This is a continuation of the emphasis classical Confucians put on pride and humility, as well as a reflection of the similarity between Confucian and Western conceptions of humility in the sense that both are related to the concept of pride and involve the diminishment or disappearance of the self or ego. What makes the Confucian conception of humility distinctive is that Confucian scholars have put in a great deal of effort to understand the nuances of the concepts involved in defining humility. In particular, they distinguish between two problematic modes of pride comprising traits in opposition to humility: <emph>jiao</emph> 驕 which, conceiving of oneself as having abundance, often leads to negative comparative judgements about others; and <emph>ao</emph> 傲 which, though conceiving of oneself as on a high level, does not involve a conscious comparison with others (Shun, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref20">25</reflink>]). By way of illustration, Xunzi argues that 'Exalted, highly esteemed, and honored – he does not use these to be arrogant toward others [<emph>jiao ren</emph> 驕人]' (Knoblock & Zhang, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref21">9</reflink>], p. 135), interpreting <emph>ao</emph> 傲 as 'informing where no question has been posed' (ibid., p. 15) and 'having discussions with one whom one ought not' (ibid., p. 19). What <emph>jiao</emph> and <emph>ao</emph> have in common is that they both involve an inflated conception of oneself as being superior to others, attempting to strengthen such a self-conception by raising oneself above others and thus resulting in an eagerness to outdo others and a tendency to take things lightly.</p> <p>The concept of humility derived from these two problematic modes of pride, according to Shun ([<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref22">25</reflink>]), has three dimensions involving nine core Confucian concepts, viz. <emph>qian</emph> 謙, <emph>rang</emph> 讓, <emph>bei</emph> 卑<emph>, ju</emph> 懼, <emph>jie</emph> 戒, <emph>shen</emph> 慎, <emph>gong</emph> 恭, <emph>zhuang</emph> 莊, and <emph>wei</emph> 畏. The first dimension of humility involves a deflated conception of the self (<emph>qian</emph> 謙) that emphasizes two facets concerning one's relationship to others: being yielding (<emph>rang</emph> 讓) to rather than competitive with others and lowering (<emph>bei</emph> 卑) rather than raising oneself. <emph>Rang</emph> is about counteracting the human tendency to compete for honour. Hence the reminders from the <emph>Book of Changes</emph> that it is in <emph>qian</emph> that 'we have the giving [of] honour to others, and the distinction thence arising' (Legge, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref23">14</reflink>]) and from the <emph>Book of Rites</emph> that 'If (the ruler) ascribe [<emph>sic</emph>] what is good to others, and what is wrong to himself, the people will not contend (among themselves)' (Legge, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref24">15</reflink>]). As for <emph>bei</emph>, it is about cultivating oneself through self-restraint. Hence the gentleman (<emph>junzi</emph> 君子) not only 'abases himself and gives honour to others' (Legge, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref25">16</reflink>]), but the gentleman 'who adds humility to humility is [also] one who nourishes his (virtue) in lowliness' (Legge, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref26">17</reflink>]). The second dimension of humility involves an attitude of fearfulness and caution in opposition to that of laxity commonly found in pride. While the attitude of fearfulness is primarily expressed in Confucianism as <emph>ju</emph> 懼, the attitude of caution is as <emph>jie</emph> 戒 and <emph>shen</emph> 慎. <emph>Ju</emph>, as a general fearful attitude not connected with any specific threat, emphasizes the importance of forestalling potential problems with a deliberative and committed attitude. A person who is <emph>ju</emph>, as described by Confucius in the <emph>Analects</emph> (Lau, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref27">13</reflink>]), is fearful of having failures, keen on making plans, and capable of achieving successes (7:11). With regard to <emph>jie</emph> and <emph>shen</emph>, they emphasize the importance of exercising vigilance about what needs to be avoided and caution about what needs to be done, respectively. Confucius illustrates this in the <emph>Analects</emph> (Lau, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref28">13</reflink>]) by asserting that, on the one hand, the gentleman should guard against lust in youth, bellicosity in the prime of life, and acquisitiveness in old age (16:7), and that, on the other hand, an official career lies in making few mistakes in cautious speech and having few regrets in cautious action (2:18). The third dimension of humility involves an attitude of seriousness (<emph>gong</emph> 恭 and <emph>zhuang</emph> 莊) and awe (<emph>wei</emph> 畏) in opposition to that of taking things lightly often found in pride. With a view to achieving reverence rather than shame, <emph>gong</emph> requires one to give serious attention to one's appearance and demeanour when interacting with others, while <emph>zhuang</emph> further requires one to ensure not only that everything is proper on the outside, but also that the proper attitude of heart and mind is inwardly and completely present. Hence the claim of Yu Tzu in the <emph>Analects</emph> (Lau, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref29">13</reflink>]) that 'To be respectful [<emph>gong</emph>] is close to being observant of the rites in that it enables one to stay clear of disgrace and insult' (p. 7), and of Confucius that 'Rule over them [the common people] with dignity [<emph>zhuang</emph>] and they will be reverent' (p. 15). As for <emph>wei</emph>, it takes the attitude of seriousness involved in <emph>gong</emph> further, too, by involving one's being favourably impressed by some objects of attention and one's looking up to them with a sense of submission. Such objects possess an awe-inspiring attribute, as illustrated by Confucius' assertion that 'The gentleman stands in awe [<emph>wei</emph>] of three things. He is in awe of the Decree of Heaven. He is in awe of great men. He is in awe of the words of the sages' (Lau, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref30">13</reflink>], p. 165).</p> <p>In order to enrich our understanding of Confucian humility, apart from what it involves, it is important to explain what it does not imply. Indeed, interestingly, although the <emph>Analects</emph> does not provide an explicit and careful examination of the concept of humility, it arguably articulates a conception of humility as 'three nots': not a blind obedience, not a moral weakness, and not a passive attitude (Rushing, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref31">23</reflink>]). To start with, humility does not imply a blind obedience to traditional norms and practices, but a full recognition of one's historical givenness within one's tradition. It thus requires one to suspend judgement or action until reflective listening and learning have taken place, as illustrated in the following two passages from the <emph>Analects</emph> (Lau, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref32">13</reflink>]) respectively: 'While singing in the company of others, when the Master found a song attractive, he always asked to hear it again before joining in' (p. 65); and 'To love benevolence without loving learning is liable to lead to foolishness. To love cleverness without loving learning is liable to lead to straying from the right path' (p. 173). Considering the requirement to reflect on the knowledge acquired through listening and learning, humility as a Confucian virtue involves the application of critical rather than affirmative thinking (Lam, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref33">12</reflink>]). Moreover, humility does not imply a moral weakness, but a moral strength that empowers one to recognize more clearly what one can best accomplish. It thus requires one to exactly determine what the current situation demands and realistically assess one's strengths and weaknesses to deal with it, as illustrated in the following two passages from the <emph>Analects</emph> (Lau, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref34">13</reflink>]): 'The Master told Ch'i-tiao K'ai to take office. Ch'i-tiao K'ai said, "I cannot trust myself to do so yet." The Master was pleased' (p. 37); and 'The Master said, "If anyone were to employ me, in a year's time I would have brought things to a satisfactory state, and after three years I should have results to show for it"' (p. 125). Here both Ch'i-tiao K'ai in the first passage and Confucius in the second passage demonstrate humility in terms of realistic assessment of themselves, acknowledging that he is not yet ready to take office, and that he needs at least one year to bring about desirable changes, respectively. Finally, humility does not imply a passive attitude, but a righteous indignation that enables and expects one to righteously and properly express indignation when encountering historically determined limitations to one's agency. It thus requires one to critically engage with others and one's circumstances, even if the end result is never guaranteed. Two examples from the <emph>Analects</emph> (Lau, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref35">13</reflink>]) serve to illustrate this point: Confucius expresses his righteous indignation against his disciple Ch'iu for helping the already wealthy Chi family to accumulate more wealth by asking his other students to 'attack him openly to the beating of drums' (p. 101), and against Ju Pei for not following the ritual of meeting scholars by declining to see him on grounds of illness while taking the lute and singing, 'making sure that he [Ju Pei] heard it' (p. 179).</p> <p>Perhaps more importantly, this Confucian conception of humility is consistent with and supported by the psychological research findings reported in Western societies. In general, humility is regarded as a personal trait in psychology and expected to last at least over time if not at all times consistently across contexts. A comprehensive review of recent psychological studies on humility conducted by Li ([<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref36">19</reflink>]) shows that the following tendencies of humble people cohere with the three dimensions and three nots of Confucian humility: to share the spotlight of honour with their teammates rather than claiming all the credit for themselves (first dimension: <emph>qian</emph>, <emph>rang</emph>, and <emph>bei</emph>); to be more open to criticism, more willing to cooperate, and more motivated to work hard and achieve success (second dimension: <emph>ju</emph>, <emph>jie</emph>, and <emph>shen</emph>); to be willing to acknowledge their imperfections and show respect for people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds (third dimension: <emph>gong</emph>, <emph>zhuang</emph>, and <emph>wei</emph>); to admit their mistakes, be open to new ideas, and engage more in self-criticism and self-reflection (first not: not a blind obedience); to have a more accurate view of themselves, including their strengths and weaknesses, and keep their abilities and accomplishments in perspective (second not: not a moral weakness); and to be fair-minded and greed-avoidant but not be correlated with low self-esteem and pessimism, and seek ways to reach out to others in conflicts (third not: not a passive attitude).</p> <hd id="AN0161831555-6">Dissimilarity to Western conception</hd> <p>Yet, there are two main differences between Confucian and Western conceptions of humility. First, humility is relatively less valued and prevalent in Western cultures than in Confucian heritage cultures. This, according to Li ([<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref37">19</reflink>]), can be attributed to two factors: the adoption of a cognitive framework for examining the concept of humility, which is regarded as one of the intellectual virtues that are conducive to truth and knowledge; and the expression of ambivalence towards humility, which may be regarded as the opposite of such highly-valued personal qualities as self-expression, self-confidence, and self-assertiveness. It is worth noting in the former factor that young children and less-educated adults may not be able to demonstrate the cognitively formed humility due to the requirement of higher-order thinking and education-dependent abilities for pursuing truth and acquiring knowledge. Therefore, as Li (ibid.) puts it, 'intellectual humility, although desirable for all in the West, is, as a matter of cultural practice, less expected of, promoted among, pursued and achieved by everyone' (p. 150). With regard to the latter factor, it contributes to a decline in popularity of humility in the West, particularly among powerful leaders who view humility as not desirable for leadership and thus tend not to display it for others to emulate. In contrast, humility is more prevalent as a term in Confucian heritage cultures, where people experience humility more commonly and are more inclined to think and act according to it, leading to more elaborate conceptualization and linguistic differentiation for it. By way of illustration, a recent survey reported by Li (ibid.) found that 87% of 79 Grade 6 students in China said they knew the term 'humble', among whom 67% could give the following relevant explanations for this term: <emph>humble</emph> means not feeling proud of one's high achievement, not bragging about one's accomplishment, not inflating one's sense of self, remaining cautious, keeping low-key, yielding the honour to others, seeking to learn from others, etc. The reason for humility to be more valued in Confucian heritage cultures is not that humility can help fulfil such cognitive purposes as acquiring knowledge and establishing truth, but that it can help remove such inevitable obstacles as complacency (<emph>ziman</emph> 自滿) and arrogance (<emph>zida</emph> 自大) brought about by achievement from a lifelong process of realizing one's humanity through self-cultivation (Lam, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref38">11</reflink>]). Indeed, although learning to become a better human being aims to achieve continuously higher levels of success for oneself, high achievement tends to lead one to become overconfident, more egoistic, and less receptive to other perspectives and thus to become degenerate and lose sight of true excellence in self-cultivation. Confucian humility avoids this inherent trap of high achievement by assuming that the self is never full: like the <emph>qiqi</emph> mentioned in the introduction, it is a combination of achievement (i.e. addition of water) and humility (i.e. reduction of water), rather than achievement alone, that <emph>completes</emph> each step of the lifelong process of self-cultivation. Hence the high regard for humility with little ambivalence, and the great admiration for anyone who displays it, in Confucian heritage cultures.</p> <p>The second difference between Confucian and Western conceptions of humility is that the former has political implications whereas the latter is more or less apolitical. Specifically, as discussed above, Confucianism provides what appears to have been lacking in Western conceptions of humility: the cultivation of a completely <emph>relational</emph> disposition through reflective listening and learning, realistic assessment of strengths and weaknesses, and expression of proper and righteous indignation. The implication is that cultivating humility in Confucianism</p> <p>allows one to grasp how one can and <emph>cannot</emph> struggle for ethical and political transformation within given conditions of existence, and thus provides a moral foundation for political perseverance and for bearing appropriate witness against impropriety and corruption among the powers that be. (Rushing, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref39">24</reflink>], p. 201)</p> <p>This Confucian understanding of how the people can persevere and bear witness in the face of power can significantly contribute to the Western reconceptualization of humility as a political virtue. After all, Confucian humility requires one to critically engage with others and one's conditions in a way that is neither submissive nor aggressive but assertive. It prevents not only one from becoming demoralized when one's actions fail to bring about profound change, but also righteous indignation from slipping into self-righteousness. Considering the Confucian conception of humility as a disposition rejects the dichotomy between blind obedience and radical transformation, it may be more in accord with the contemporary democratic ethos, grounding other virtues that are important to good citizenship, such as proper protest and righteous indignation.</p> <hd id="AN0161831555-7">A Confucian approach to teaching intellectual humility</hd> <p>Confucianism does not have the concept of <emph>intellectual</emph> humility, which comes close to the concept of humility in learning. A Confucian approach to teaching humility in learning, and thus intellectual humility, can be understood from both a theoretical and practical perspective. Theoretically, it is arguable that the focus of teaching should be placed on cultivating the Confucian virtue of reverence (<emph>jing</emph> 敬), which encompasses the above-mentioned three dimensions and nine concepts of humility (Shun, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref40">25</reflink>]). For one thing, as the spirit behind the rituals, <emph>jing</emph> involves lowering oneself and raising others; hence its connection with <emph>qian</emph>, <emph>rang</emph>, and <emph>bei</emph>. For another, <emph>jing</emph> is favourably contrasted with a casual, slack, and idle attitude, as illustrated by the following extracts from the <emph>Book of Poetry</emph> and the <emph>Xunzi</emph> respectively: 'Revere the anger of Heaven, and presume not to make sport or be idle' (Legge, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref41">18</reflink>]); and 'If reverent care triumphs over negligent indolence, there will be good fortune. If negligent indolence triumphs over reverent care, there will be annihilation' (Knoblock & Zhang, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref42">9</reflink>], p. 473). It is associated with the other six Confucian concepts of humility and is used in the combinations <emph>jing ju</emph>, <emph>jing jie</emph>, <emph>jing shen</emph>, <emph>gong jing</emph>, <emph>zhuang jing</emph>, and <emph>wei jing</emph>. To better grasp how the three Confucian dimensions of humility are united in <emph>jing</emph>, according to Shun (ibid.), the inquiry into classical texts can be used as an example. Concerning the first dimension, one works with a deflated conception of the self that involves having a strong awareness of one's own limitations, being willing to acknowledge one's mistakes and others' achievements, viewing oneself as a member of a larger community of inquiry, and concentrating on one's contribution to the advancement of, rather than one's personal gains from, the inquiry. Concerning the second dimension, one approaches the inquiry with an attitude of caution and fearfulness, aiming at valid and well-grounded conclusions, giving careful attention to the textual evidence and its precise details, as well as guarding constantly against mistakes made in one's conclusions and related to psychological biases such as confirmation bias (Lam, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref43">11</reflink>]). Concerning the third dimension, one pays serious attention to both the evidence and methodology for the inquiry to ensure that the conclusions are substantiated by the former and the goals are accomplished by the latter, conducting the inquiry with an awe-inspiring sense: the sense that the inquiry is contributing to genuine progress in understanding, although there is neither limit to the scope of inquiry with a multiplicity of ideas awaiting exploration, nor to the progress one can make in a particular area.</p> <p>In addition to and underlying <emph>jing</emph>, critical reflection is another virtue that needs to be cultivated if intellectual humility is to be fostered among learners. Indeed, in opposition to popular belief, Confucianism values criticism and critical discussion rather than simply being affirmative in thinking, as exemplified by conforming to the norm of ritual (<emph>li</emph> 禮) (Lam, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref44">12</reflink>]). Specifically, in Confucianism, criticism and critical discussion have two vital roles to play in optimizing learning and achieving harmony, and hence in realizing benevolence (<emph>ren</emph> 仁). First, criticism, interpreted as reflection (<emph>si</emph> 思) on the knowledge accrued in learning (<emph>xue</emph> 學) and on oneself, aims to optimize learning. The former reflection is conducive to the synthesis and systematization of knowledge into a meaningful totality which is a crucial element of wisdom; while the latter one is conducive to the internalization of the resulting knowledge and wisdom, ensuring that such synthesis and systematization proceed in a logical, fair-minded, and open-minded manner. Second, critical discussion, understood as a cooperative undertaking among participants showing concern and accepting responsibility for an issue of common interest, serves to achieve harmony in diversity. To do so, apart from using ritual as a social institution to manage the behaviour of participants, the participants themselves need to show certain desirable qualities, in particular impartiality, studiousness, humaneness, and non-quarrelsomeness. Such self-critical attitude promoted by Confucianism, which involves critical reflection on one's knowledge and one's self, is transformative in the sense that it enables one to successfully adapt and appropriately respond with humility to one's natural and social environment. For Sigurðsson ([<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref45">26</reflink>]), this attitude 'refers to the ongoing and never wholly attainable effort to transform oneself to become fully human' (p. 139). It entails recognizing one's moral obligations to oneself and others that compel one to transcend self-centred concerns and activities. Undoubtedly, while the success of self-critical reflection in engendering positive transformations is not certain, a lack of it is certain not to result in any improvements due to a failure to learn from one's mistakes.</p> <p>Practically, there are three processes through which children in Confucian heritage cultures may develop humility in learning, viz. recognition, socialization, and education (Li, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref46">19</reflink>]). First, the Confucian cultural ethos is such that humility is recognized, welcomed, and encouraged when it is ubiquitously shown in every part of social life. Those who witness or receive humility not only don't look down upon humble people, but actually take preventive measures against anyone doing so, creating a safe environment for each other to display and appreciate humility. Second, adults, especially parents and teachers, often express and respond to humble attitudes and behaviours, serving as role models for children to emulate during the process of socialization. Apart from between adults and children, the socialization between children themselves is also conducive to the reinforcement of values, norms, and practices of humility through mutual encouragement, modelling, and support. Finally, the stories of many historical figures who uphold the value of humility, like Emperors Yao, Shun, and Tang Taizong, have built up a repertoire of oral tales, children's books, and classic movies that are widely available both online and offline. More importantly, much of this cultural heritage is integrated into the formal education curriculum in many Confucian societies. A recent local example comes from the <emph>Values Education Curriculum Framework (Pilot Version)</emph> published by the Curriculum Development Council ([<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref47">4</reflink>]) in Hong Kong, which suggests that students should understand and practise such traditional Chinese virtues as humility from an early age so that they can be well prepared for the challenges they face in their studies and daily life.</p> <hd id="AN0161831555-8">Conclusion</hd> <p>To sum up: although Confucian and Western conceptions of humility are similar in the sense that both are related to the concept of pride and involve the diminishment or disappearance of the self or ego, there are two main differences between them. The first is that humility is relatively less valued and prevalent in Western cultures than in Confucian heritage cultures, which can be attributed to the expression of ambivalence towards humility and the adoption of a cognitive framework for examining the concept of humility. The second is that the Western conception of humility is more or less apolitical whereas the Confucian one has political implications which require one to critically engage with others and one's conditions in a way that is neither submissive nor aggressive but assertive. With regard to the Confucian approach to teaching intellectual humility, it can be understood from both a theoretical and practical perspective. Theoretically, it is arguable that the focus of teaching should be placed on cultivating the Confucian virtues of reverence (<emph>jing</emph>) and reflection (<emph>si</emph>). On the one hand, <emph>jing</emph> unites three dimensions of humility with nine Confucian concepts, that is a deflated conception of the self (<emph>qian</emph>, <emph>rang</emph>, and <emph>bei</emph>), an attitude of fearfulness (<emph>ju</emph>) and caution (<emph>jie</emph> and <emph>shen</emph>), and an attitude of seriousness (<emph>gong</emph> and <emph>zhuang</emph>) and awe (<emph>wei</emph>). On the other hand, <emph>si</emph>, as a self-critical attitude that involves critical reflection on one's knowledge and one's self, is transformative in the sense that it enables one to successfully adapt and appropriately respond with humility to one's natural and social environment. Practically, children in Confucian heritage cultures may develop intellectual humility through the processes of recognition, socialization, and education.</p> <ref id="AN0161831555-9"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref12" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Bommarito, N. (2013). Modesty as a virtue of attention. The Philosophical Review, 122 (1), 93 – 117. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1728723</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref16" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Church, I. M., & Barrett, J. L. (2016). Intellectual humility. In E. L. Worthington, Jr., D. E. Davis, & J. N. Hook (Eds.), Handbook of humility: Theory, research, and applications (pp. 71 – 84). Routledge.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref13" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> Church, I. M., & Samuelson, P. L. (2017). Intellectual humility: An introduction to the philosophy and science. Bloomsbury Academic.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib4" idref="ref47" type="bt">4</bibl> <bibtext> Curriculum Development Council. (2021). Jiazhiguan jiaoyu kecheng jiagou: Shixingban [Values education curriculum framework: Pilot version]. Curriculum Development Council.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib5" idref="ref6" type="bt">5</bibl> <bibtext> DeWall, C. N. (2016). Fostering intellectual humility in public discourse and university education. In E. L. Worthington, Jr., D. E. Davis, & J. N. Hook (Eds.), Handbook of humility: Theory, research, and applications (pp. 237 – 249). Routledge.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib6" idref="ref9" type="bt">6</bibl> <bibtext> Driver, J. (1989). The virtues of ignorance. The Journal of Philosophy, 86 (7), 373 – 384. https://doi.org/10.2307/2027146</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib7" idref="ref10" type="bt">7</bibl> <bibtext> Flanagan, O. (1990). Virtue and ignorance. The Journal of Philosophy, 87 (8), 420 – 428. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026736</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib8" idref="ref11" type="bt">8</bibl> <bibtext> Grenberg, J. (2005). Kant and the ethics of humility: A story of dependence, corruption, and virtue. Cambridge University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib9" idref="ref21" type="bt">9</bibl> <bibtext> Knoblock, J., & Zhang, J. (Trans.). (1999a). Xunzi (Vol. 1). Hunan People's Publishing House.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Knoblock, J., & Zhang, J. (Trans.). (1999b). Xunzi (Vol. 2). Hunan People's Publishing House.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lam, C. M. (2013). Childhood, philosophy and open society: Implications for education in Confucian heritage cultures. Springer.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lam, C. M. (2017). Confucianism and critical rationalism: Friends or foes? Educational Philosophy and Theory, 49 (12), 1136 – 1145. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2016.1225561</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lau, D. C. (Trans.). (1992). Confucius: The Analects (2nd ed.). The Chinese University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Legge, J. (Trans.). (n.d.a). Book of changes. Retrieved June 30, 2022, from https://ctext.org/book-of-changes?searchu=%E8%AC%99&page=2</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Legge, J. (Trans.). (n.d.b). Book of rites. Retrieved June 30, 2022, from https://ctext.org/liji?searchu=%E5%89%87%E6%B0%91%E4%B8%8D%E7%88%AD</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Legge, J. (Trans.). (n.d.c). Book of rites. Retrieved June 30, 2022, from https://ctext.org/liji?searchu=%E5%8D%91%E5%B7%B1</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Legge, J. (Trans.). (n.d.d). Book of changes. Retrieved June 30, 2022, from https://ctext.org/book-of-changes?searchu=%E5%8D%91</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Legge, J. (Trans.). (n.d.e). Book of poetry. Retrieved June 30, 2022, from https://ctext.org/book-of-poetry?searchu=%E6%95%AC</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Li, J. (2016). Humility in learning: A Confucian perspective. Journal of Moral Education, 45 (2), 147 – 165. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2016.1168736</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Roberts, R. C. (2016). Learning intellectual humility. In J. Baehr (Ed.), Intellectual virtues and education: Essays in applied virtue epistemology (pp. 184 – 201). Routledge.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Roberts, R. C., & Cleveland, W. S. (2016). Humility from a philosophical point of view. In E. L. Worthington, Jr., D. E. Davis, & J. N. Hook (Eds.), Handbook of humility: Theory, research, and applications (pp. 43 – 56). Routledge.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2003). Humility and epistemic goods. In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (Eds.), Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology (pp. 257 – 279). Oxford University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rushing, S. (2013a). What is Confucian humility?. In S. C. Angle & M. Slote (Eds.), Virtue ethics and Confucianism (pp. 173 – 181). Routledge.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rushing, S. (2013b). Comparative humilities: Christian, contemporary, and Confucian conceptions of a political virtue. Polity, 45 (2), 198 – 222. https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2013.1</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Shun, K.-L. (2021). Dimensions of humility in early Confucian thought. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 48 (1), 13 – 27. https://doi.org/10.1163/15406253-12340001</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Sigurðsson, G. (2017). Transformative critique: What Confucianism can contribute to contemporary education. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 36 (2), 131 – 146. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-015-9502-3</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Splitter, L. J. (2022). Enriching the narratives we tell about ourselves and our identities: An educational response to populism and extremism. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 54 (1), 21 – 36. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2020.1805311</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Wang, Y.-M. (1963). Instructions for practical living and other Neo-Confucian writings (W.-T. Chan, Trans.). Columbia University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Snyder, D. (2017). Intellectual humility: Owning our limitations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94 (3), 509 – 539. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12228</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By Chi-Ming Lam</p> <p>Reported by Author</p> <p></p> <p>Chi-Ming Lam is Associate Professor of the Department of International Education at the Education University of Hong Kong. His research interests include the philosophy of Karl Popper, critical thinking, Confucianism, and philosophy for children. His books include Childhood, Philosophy and Open Society: Implications for Education in Confucian Heritage Cultures (2013), Sociological and Philosophical Perspectives on Education in the Asia-Pacific Region (co-edited with Jae Park, 2016), and Philosophy for Children in Confucian Societies: In Theory and Practice (edited, 2020).</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib13" firstref="ref1"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib10" firstref="ref3"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib21" firstref="ref5"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib27" firstref="ref7"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib20" firstref="ref15"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib22" firstref="ref17"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib29" firstref="ref18"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib28" firstref="ref19"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib25" firstref="ref20"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl10" bibid="bib14" firstref="ref23"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl11" bibid="bib15" firstref="ref24"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl12" bibid="bib16" firstref="ref25"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl13" bibid="bib17" firstref="ref26"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl14" bibid="bib23" firstref="ref31"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl15" bibid="bib12" firstref="ref33"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl16" bibid="bib19" firstref="ref36"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl17" bibid="bib11" firstref="ref38"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl18" bibid="bib24" firstref="ref39"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl19" bibid="bib18" firstref="ref41"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl20" bibid="bib26" firstref="ref45"></nolink>
Header DbId: eric
DbLabel: ERIC
An: EJ1382952
AccessLevel: 3
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: A Confucian Approach to Teaching Humility
– Name: Language
  Label: Language
  Group: Lang
  Data: English
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Lam%2C+Chi-Ming%22">Lam, Chi-Ming</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5902-2891">0000-0002-5902-2891</externalLink>)
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Educational+Philosophy+and+Theory%22"><i>Educational Philosophy and Theory</i></searchLink>. 2023 55(2):207-216.
– Name: Avail
  Label: Availability
  Group: Avail
  Data: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 10
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2023
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Evaluative
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Confucianism%22">Confucianism</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Teaching+Methods%22">Teaching Methods</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Philosophy%22">Educational Philosophy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Western+Civilization%22">Western Civilization</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Asian+Culture%22">Asian Culture</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Ethics%22">Ethics</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Moral+Values%22">Moral Values</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Self+Concept%22">Self Concept</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Christianity%22">Christianity</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cultural+Differences%22">Cultural Differences</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+Behavior%22">Social Behavior</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1080/00131857.2022.2112032
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 0013-1857<br />1469-5812
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: Humility as an aspect of our humanity is an important concept in both Confucian and Western philosophy. In the modern world, whether Western or not, there seems to be a growing need to promote humility, especially intellectual humility, as a fundamental virtue among students. In this paper, I first compare and contrast the Confucian and Western conceptions of humility. Then I explore a Confucian approach to teaching intellectual humility, arguing that the focus of teaching be directed towards cultivating the Confucian virtues of reflection ("si") and reverence ("jing").
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2023
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1382952
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1382952
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1080/00131857.2022.2112032
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 10
        StartPage: 207
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Confucianism
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Teaching Methods
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Educational Philosophy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Western Civilization
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Asian Culture
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Ethics
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Moral Values
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Self Concept
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Christianity
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Cultural Differences
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Social Behavior
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: A Confucian Approach to Teaching Humility
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Lam, Chi-Ming
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2023
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 0013-1857
            – Type: issn-electronic
              Value: 1469-5812
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 55
            – Type: issue
              Value: 2
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Educational Philosophy and Theory
              Type: main
ResultId 1