Educators, Epistemic Reflexivity and Post-Truth Conditions
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| Title: | Educators, Epistemic Reflexivity and Post-Truth Conditions |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Christopher T. McCaw (ORCID |
| Source: | Journal of Educational Change. 2024 25(3):455-484. |
| Availability: | Springer. Available from: Springer Nature. One New York Plaza, Suite 4600, New York, NY 10004. Tel: 800-777-4643; Tel: 212-460-1500; Fax: 212-460-1700; e-mail: customerservice@springernature.com; Web site: https://link.springer.com/ |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Page Count: | 30 |
| Publication Date: | 2024 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Reports - Research |
| Descriptors: | Ethics, Epistemology, Trust (Psychology), Teacher Attitudes, Social Problems, Faculty Development, Deception, Misinformation |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10833-023-09499-1 |
| ISSN: | 1389-2843 1573-1812 |
| Abstract: | Under 'post-truth' conditions the generation, circulation and status of knowledge are being transformed, with significant implications for institutional trust, social cohesion and public safety. These conditions raise complex challenges and opportunities within education, which plays a potentially pivotal role in supporting communities to respond in an assertive and critical manner. However, little is currently understood about the way key stakeholders within education position themselves epistemically in relation to post-truth conditions. The purpose of this research was to analyse epistemic aspects of educators' responses to post-truth conditions using a 'social lab' methodology, which is a qualitative, action-oriented approach to studying complex social problems. Analysis of data from the social lab, which involved a variety of education stakeholders, identified four epistemic aims (with associated ideals, processes and actions) to orient an educational response to post-truth conditions. However, overall, epistemic aims lacked precision and contextual specificity. Furthermore, aims were associated with divergent underpinning epistemological commitments, mirroring divergences in literature on the educational implications of post-truth conditions. Teachers may require additional training to enhance epistemic reflexivity and drive more productive and inclusive conversations about post-truth in classrooms, staffrooms and ITE programs. The findings are suggestive of the complex epistemological and institutional dynamics that need to be negotiated in educational responses to post-truth conditions. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Entry Date: | 2024 |
| Accession Number: | EJ1439250 |
| Database: | ERIC |
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| FullText | Links: – Type: pdflink Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwEZsuwn9QnqSxkVY3zSb9zAAAAA4jCB3wYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHRMIHOAgEAMIHIBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDGnbaqArI62Zo8YvfQIBEICBmpm6HeaxnCiGS1nidf0reeRS6hkUbKDCxiCvMGiHICSqFlnPpocQP7SprKfLcNH6s57D2AF3IkBhhYQktwG7ckTRqZMr3WXo1mGnO73lXRt8p8HhjmOzDNHKgMjxRO2AjyidtpzJljKT2YiyTOd-5tiNf31fwdFFZMTZqA6YVjSKBbHZEwignl95Hvffi75MbOgMHi3OSFondkw= Text: Availability: 1 Value: <anid>AN0179669460;9m301sep.24;2024Sep18.06:47;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0179669460-1">Educators, epistemic reflexivity and post-truth conditions </title> <p>Under 'post-truth' conditions the generation, circulation and status of knowledge are being transformed, with significant implications for institutional trust, social cohesion and public safety. These conditions raise complex challenges and opportunities within education, which plays a potentially pivotal role in supporting communities to respond in an assertive and critical manner. However, little is currently understood about the way key stakeholders within education position themselves epistemically in relation to post-truth conditions. The purpose of this research was to analyse epistemic aspects of educators' responses to post-truth conditions using a 'social lab' methodology, which is a qualitative, action-oriented approach to studying complex social problems. Analysis of data from the social lab, which involved a variety of education stakeholders, identified four epistemic aims (with associated ideals, processes and actions) to orient an educational response to post-truth conditions. However, overall, epistemic aims lacked precision and contextual specificity. Furthermore, aims were associated with divergent underpinning epistemological commitments, mirroring divergences in literature on the educational implications of post-truth conditions. Teachers may require additional training to enhance epistemic reflexivity and drive more productive and inclusive conversations about post-truth in classrooms, staffrooms and ITE programs. The findings are suggestive of the complex epistemological and institutional dynamics that need to be negotiated in educational responses to post-truth conditions.</p> <p>Keywords: Post-truth conditions; Epistemic cognition; Epistemic reflexivity; Teachers; Social labs; Knowledge</p> <p>Copyright comment Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-2">Introduction</hd> <p>Under "post-truth" conditions the generation, circulation and status of knowledge are being rapidly transformed, with significant implications for institutional trust, social cohesion and public safety worldwide (Cosentino, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref1">18</reflink>]; McIntyre, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref2">43</reflink>]; Perry, [<reflink idref="bib54" id="ref3">54</reflink>]). These conditions raise significant challenges for school education, as teachers encounter the increasing presence of misinformation, conspiracy theories, and socio-political polarization in classrooms (Nelson, [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref4">49</reflink>]). More deeply, the decay in institutional trust under post-truth conditions is unsettling the epistemic authority of teachers, and forcing an examination of the extent to which schools are adequately able to serve their epistemic and democratic educational aims (Peters, [<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref5">55</reflink>]).</p> <p>Reciprocally, schools play a potentially pivotal role in supporting young people, and the communities of which they are part, to respond in an informed way (Barzilai &amp; Chinn, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref6">8</reflink>]; Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref7">17</reflink>]; Peters, [<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref8">55</reflink>]). This paper advances understanding in this domain, presenting an analysis of educators' attempts to think through the implications of post-truth conditions for school education. Specifically, we focus on <emph>epistemic cognition</emph>, which refers to the variety of explicit and tacit human cognitions regarding the nature, source and justification of knowledge, as well as matters of belief, evidence, understanding and truth (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref9">14</reflink>], p. 141; Greene et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref10">24</reflink>]). Specifically, we take up the 3R-EC model of epistemic reflexivity (Lunn Brownlee et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref11">39</reflink>]) which considers how epistemic cognition is contextualised within the expression of teachers' professional agency, through a focus on three components of reflection (on epistemic aims, ideals and reliable processes), reflexive deliberation, and resolved action. The findings presented here are grounded in empirical data from a social lab study (Hassan, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref12">28</reflink>]), undertaken Australia in 2021, involving a diverse group of education stakeholders. To contextualise the study, the following sections outline key aspects of post-truth conditions as they relate to education, and introduce the study's theoretical framework.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-3">Post-truth politics, cultures, and information ecologies</hd> <p>The notion of 'post-truth' has been subject to substantial academic and popular discussion since its selection as the Oxford Dictionary's word of the year in 2016. Broadly speaking, the label post-truth has been used to denote an historical context in which both the widespread and deliberate misuse of facts, as well as a general disregard for facts and truthfulness altogether, have become a significant concern (Davis, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref13">20</reflink>]). Lewandowsky et al. ([<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref14">38</reflink>]) see these phenomena as stemming from an underlying "alternative epistemology" that diverges from "conventional standards of evidentiary support", brought about by a range of political, social and technological drivers (p. 356). Importantly, some challenge the usefulness of post-truth as a periodizing notion (Read &amp; Uçan, [<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref15">57</reflink>]), noting that many of its supposed features, such as the brazen use of lies and manipulation in politics (Horsthemke, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref16">29</reflink>]), and the deleterious effects of deeply ingrained cognitive biases (Davis, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref17">20</reflink>]), are not historically new. However, several potentially novel features of 'post-truth' conditions have been identified. Specifically, we find it useful to distinguish between post-truth politics, post-truth cultures, and post-truth information ecologies.</p> <p>Post-truth politics are characterised by the cynical embrace of emotive and identity appeals in political dialogue, rather than appeals to legitimate expertise or policy substance. Symptoms include the proliferation of lying by public figures, and the embrace of so-called "alternative facts" to support political agendas. This orientation is exemplified in the political style of Donald Trump in the USA, the successful Brexit campaign in the UK and, in Australia, tactics of groups opposed to a constitutionally-enshrined voice to parliament for Australia's Indigenous peoples (McKenzie-Murray, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref18">45</reflink>]). Working in the domain of history, Gudonis and Jones ([<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref19">26</reflink>]) thus see post-truth as composed of three elements: appeal to emotion and personal belief; indifference to historicity; and ideological motivation (p. 8).</p> <p>Post-truth political styles, furthermore, have a reciprocal relationship with broader post-truth culture; that is, post-truth is just as much about the <emph>reception</emph> of information as its <emph>production</emph>. McIntyre ([<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref20">43</reflink>]) describes this as a condition where political allegiances and identity concerns come to dominate commitments to truth and accuracy: ('alternative') facts are readily sought and selected to suit one's partisan views and tastes. This, Read and Uçan ([<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref21">57</reflink>]) observe, parallels prevailing consumeristic norms. Consequently, the need for political figures to hide their manipulative epistemic strategies fades. It is no longer shocking to craft the evidence to serve one's interests; it is merely expected (McIntyre, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref22">43</reflink>]).</p> <p>Post-truth politics and cultures are understood to be thriving within a broader restructuring of the information ecologies of contemporary life, with roots in declining social capital, rising inequality, increasing social polarisation, and decreasing trust in science and mainstream media (Lewandowsky et al., [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref23">38</reflink>]). Central to this restructuring has been the role of online social media platforms, the attention economy in which they operate, and their underlying recommendation algorithms. These have fundamentally shifted the way many people access information (Cosentino, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref24">18</reflink>]), producing epistemic echo chambers and filter bubbles (Nguyen, [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref25">50</reflink>]). Other key features of post<emph>-</emph>truth information ecologies include the rapid circulation and amplification of conspiracy theories (Filibeli, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref26">23</reflink>]); the coordinated distribution of disinformation by both grassroots and state-actors; and the availability of technologies to create new kinds of disinformation including so-called "deep-fake" videos (Schick, [<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref27">60</reflink>]). Advances in data analytics have allowed resource-rich actors to target and curate misinformation, further cultivating skepticism to authority, and accelerating the breakdown of societal trust, in order to serve their own ends (Harsin, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref28">27</reflink>]). The combined effects of these different aspects of post-truth conditions have implications that are not merely political or social – but also ontological. Post-truth conditions may not just hide or distort reality but provide windows, or potentially even bridges, to a range of potentially incommensurable alternative realities (Lewandowsky et al., [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref29">38</reflink>]; McIntyre, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref30">43</reflink>]).</p> <p>Post-truth conditions of knowledge circulation and interpretation pose potentially significant challenges for human societies. The prospects of increasingly fractured social realities for a functioning liberal democracy, with its requirement for a well-informed public, holding some sense of a shared reality, are clearly troubling (Bennett &amp; Livingston, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref31">9</reflink>]). Anti-vaccination movements (Arede et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref32">5</reflink>]), social inequalities exaggerated by the COVID-19 pandemic (Nally, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref33">48</reflink>]), and climate change denial (McIntyre, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref34">43</reflink>]), in addition, have all become amplified within this new information ecology. The social, ethical and epistemic significance of post-truth conditions have been particularly salient within the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic. The circulation of conspiracy theories regarding the nature and origin of the virus, housed on Facebook pages with tens of thousands of followers, have been cited as causal factors in a range of behaviours that pose a direct threat to public health. In Australia, for example, these include test refusal, ignorance of mandated social distancing measures, and refusal to cooperate with police during enforcement of public health regulations (Paynter &amp; Simonis, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref35">52</reflink>]; Varga, [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref36">66</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-4">Post-truth conditions and education</hd> <p>Post-truth conditions raise new questions, and present new problems, regarding the way people gather, assess, share and use knowledge. They also impact the tenor and quality of public discourse regarding issues of social importance. Education, in relation to its epistemic, socialisation and civic aims (Biesta, [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref37">10</reflink>]), is thus implicated in the ways societies respond to post-truth conditions.</p> <p>Literature examining the educational implications of post-truth conditions, however, is complex and multi-vocal. Many scholars position post-truth primarily as a threat to rational, democratic public discourse and effective public policies (Arede et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref38">5</reflink>]; Horsthemke, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref39">29</reflink>]; Nally, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref40">48</reflink>]; Valladares, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref41">65</reflink>]). In response, Peters ([<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref42">55</reflink>]) emphasises the necessity of a general, critical engagement with the wider "Orwellian implications of post-truth politics, science and education" (p. 565). Others frame the response, more narrowly, in terms of epistemological beliefs and practices, the task for education being to support critical thinking, cultivate epistemic virtues, and initiate a return to reliable epistemic procedures for guaranteeing truth. Reflecting this set of concerns, Barzilai and Chinn ([<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref43">8</reflink>]) summarise four "lenses" on post-truth in education, emphasising (respectively): "not knowing how to know, fallible ways of knowing, not caring about truth (enough), and disagreeing about how to know"(p. 107). Although recommending different types of responses, these perspectives share an evaluation of post-truth as irreducibly (and negatively) normative (McIntyre, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref44">43</reflink>]).</p> <p>The educational implications of post-truth are, however, presented by others in a more optimistic and affirmative light. In this view, post-truth represents a mass, distributed unveiling of the "mythology of Truth" (Nelson, [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref45">49</reflink>], p. 78), and provides an ambivalently welcomed but potentially exciting opportunity to embrace polycentric epistemologies. This unveiling is not entirely novel, but is the popularisation of a trajectory with origins in the perspectivalism of Nietzsche and, more recently, within Science and Technology Studies (Koro-Ljungberg et al., [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref46">34</reflink>]). Aligning with this view are hopes for previously marginalised knowledge perspectives, such as First Nations perspectives, to find a place within educational discourses and practices (Madden, [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref47">42</reflink>]; Moncrieffe, [<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref48">47</reflink>]).</p> <p>Post-truth conditions thus energise potentially deep epistemic disagreements within education (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref49">16</reflink>], p. 168): disagreements not just about what the facts are, but about how knowledge claims are understood and assessed. These epistemic differences, furthermore, underlie concrete ethical and political dilemmas for educators. On one hand, a commitment to epistemic justice (Knight et al., [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref50">33</reflink>]) suggests that a greater diversity of views and ways of knowing should be embraced in classrooms. In many cases, ways may be found for different perspectives to co-exist, with the resulting plurality serving to enhance the richness of student understanding. On the other hand, in certain cases, there exist substantial ethical consequences where students share views which openly contradict best evidence on issues of real importance (Valladares, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref51">65</reflink>]). A corresponding array of questions arise, which point towards the centrality of epistemic cognition: How do these epistemic tensions emerge in the thinking and action of educators? What connections do educators see between broader conditions of post-truth, and the knowledge work they do in everyday practice? What kinds of pedagogical responses might be suitable and effective?</p> <p>While substantial commentary has arisen regarding normative issues of post-truth for education (see Barzilai &amp; Chinn, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref52">8</reflink>]), there is currently little empirical work that directly explores educators' engagement with post-truth. Nelson ([<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref53">49</reflink>]) provides important case studies of social science teachers, reporting how they responded to the irruption of post-truth in their classrooms by reverting to absolutist reference to facts and suppressing disruptive post-truth views, which were associated with emotional discord. Wescott ([<reflink idref="bib68" id="ref54">68</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib69" id="ref55">69</reflink>]) provides critical analyses of how the politics of pedagogical knowledge articulates with the post-truth context in Australia. The interview data demonstrates attempts by teachers to negotiate various forms of resistance and accommodation to hegemonic 'evidence-based' discourses of teaching practice, and the accompanying devaluation of teacher knowledge. Here, it is the plurality and contextual specificity of teacher knowledge that is suppressed by policy discourses that insist on scientific access to the 'truth' about 'what works', a truth obtained through randomised control trials and big-data. This situation appears somewhat paradoxical, in light of the ongoing erosion of trust in conventional, institutional sources of scientific knowledge aligned with post-truth conditions. Teachers challenging the evidence-based orthodoxy are thus potentially exposed to the critique of being "anti-evidence", or taking a post-truth view themselves (p.14). Wescott's, and other empirical studies (Damico et al., [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref56">19</reflink>]), while usefully taking post-truth conditions as the context for inquiry and interpretation, do not directly address the implications of post-truth conditions, themselves, for educators' classroom practice. Looking at the curriculum context more broadly, Bleazby ([<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref57">11</reflink>]) examines how ongoing practices of Religious Instruction in Australia may serve to frustrate educational attempts to respond to post-truth conditions, but relies on policy, media and literature analysis to ground her findings. The present empirical study addresses what is an important gap in current understanding by providing a rich account of educators' encounters with post-truth through the analytical framework of epistemic reflexivity.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-5">Epistemic cognition and epistemic reflexivity</hd> <p>Founding work in the field of epistemic cognition focused on general, developmental outlines of individual epistemologies (Kuhn et al., [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref58">35</reflink>]; Perry, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref59">53</reflink>]), and measuring individuals' epistemic beliefs (Schommer et al., [<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref60">61</reflink>]; Schraw et al., [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref61">62</reflink>]). Subsequent research has cast doubt on the statistical integrity and cross-cultural applicability of related self-report instruments (Chan &amp; Elliott, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref62">13</reflink>]; DeBacker et al., [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref63">21</reflink>]; Welch &amp; Roy, [<reflink idref="bib67" id="ref64">67</reflink>]), and raised critical questions about the linearity and individualism of developmental schemes that discount the complex social contexts of epistemological decision-making (Knight &amp; Littleton, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref65">32</reflink>]). Correspondingly, recent work has focused on the socially situated, action<emph>-</emph>oriented and ethical dimensions of epistemic cognition (Knight et al., [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref66">33</reflink>]), and the role of reflexivity in situating epistemic cognition in everyday classroom practice (Feucht et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref67">22</reflink>]).</p> <p>To examine the connection between epistemic cognition and teacher practice, this study employed the <emph>3R-EC model of epistemic reflexivity</emph> (Lunn Brownlee et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref68">39</reflink>]) as a conceptual framework. This model highlights key aspects of individual epistemology (Reflection), and situates these in relation to the individual's action-oriented deliberations (Reflexive deliberation &amp; Resolved action) in professional contexts. Existing research demonstrates the potential for this framework to assist in analysing and potentially shifting educators' epistemic cognition (Lunn Brownlee et al., [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref69">40</reflink>]).</p> <p>Embedded within the (first) reflection element of 3R-EC is the AIR model (Barzilai &amp; Chinn, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref70">7</reflink>]; Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref71">15</reflink>]), which articulates three foci of epistemic reflection or discernment: Aims, Ideals and Reliable processes. Epistemic aims describe individuals' "goals to achieve epistemic ends" (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref72">15</reflink>], p. 428), or "goals related to inquiry and finding things out" (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref73">14</reflink>], p. 142). The epistemic outputs identified in epistemic aims are potentially diverse, including "knowledge, understanding, explanation, justification, true belief, the avoidance of false belief, useful scientific models, and wisdom" (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref74">15</reflink>], p. 428). These aims can be contrasted to other, non-epistemic aims such as the mere recall of facts (Alexander, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref75">1</reflink>]), achieving esteem in the eyes of others, and pedagogical aims such as creating inclusive classrooms. Epistemic aims are understood to operate locally and contextually, and in line with certain values that establish why they are worth achieving (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref76">14</reflink>]). Epistemic ideals (or "epistemic criteria" as we refer to them[<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref77">1</reflink>]) indicate the norms or criteria "for evaluating whether epistemic aims have been achieved and appraising the quality of various epistemic products" (Barzilai &amp; Chinn, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref78">8</reflink>], p. 110). These could include evaluating a scientific theory according to its fit with evidence, or evaluating an explanation according to whether or not strong counterevidence exists (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref79">15</reflink>], p. 426). Reliable epistemic processes describe the "procedures, strategies, and methods that have a good likelihood of resulting in successful epistemic outcomes" (Barzilai &amp; Chinn, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref80">8</reflink>], p. 110).</p> <p>Characteristic of the second element of the 3R-EC model is reflexive deliberation. Drawing on the work of Archer ([<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref81">3</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref82">4</reflink>]), reflexivity "is characterised by an internal dialogue that takes place in order to understand and evaluate multiple perspectives" (Lunn Brownlee et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref83">39</reflink>], p. 247). Through this process, individuals "consider their personal values and motivations in relation to the immediate context but also the broader political and social context" (Ryan &amp; Bourke, 2013, as cited in Lunn Brownlee et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref84">39</reflink>], p.247). Deliberation occurs with respect to three kinds of emergent social properties. Cultural properties (CEPs) include broadly held norms, beliefs and practices at various scales (social groups, institutions, nations, etc.). Structural properties (SEPs) pertain to matters of social institutions, laws, policies, technological and industrial infrastructures. Personal properties (PEPs) refer to personal factors (such as personal experiences, capacities and values) that impinge upon an educators' practical action. The distinction between different kinds of emergent properties is taken as analytical, not ontological; in practice, there can be interdependencies between different kinds of properties. Epistemic reflexivity, in line with the 3R-EC model, describes when educators' reflexive deliberation is focused on epistemic cognition and the achievement of epistemic aims, "leading to action for transformative practices in the classroom" (Feucht et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref85">22</reflink>], p. 234).</p> <p>Finally where do we, as researchers, position ourselves with regard to matters of knowledge and truth? To support our understanding of and inquiry into post-truth conditions, in this paper, we take up an epistemic position aligned with Critical Realism, seeking to tread a middle path between naïve realism and constructivist relativism (Scott, [<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref86">63</reflink>]). This view holds that there are natural and social realities that exist independently of human knowledge or perception of them (ontological realism), while insisting that human knowledge of that reality will always be partial, mediated by concepts, and thus subject to revision (epistemological relativism). Truth, in this view, is firmly part of the "transitive" domain of reality, being a (potential) quality of historically, culturally and conceptually-situated bodies of human knowledge (Groff, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref87">25</reflink>]). Truth claims are thus inherently <emph>fallible</emph>, "always open to critique and their replacement by a different set of categories and relationships" (Scott, [<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref88">63</reflink>], p. 635). A notion of truth thus retains relevance and importance as a regulative norm of rational critique, regardless of the fact that its requirements may never be fully met in any given case. Importantly, this position admits that, particularly in the case of knowledge of humans and human affairs, knowledge claims and their related discourses are always to some extent bound up with relations of power and the making of human subjectivities, and thus with matters of freedom and domination (e.g. Rose, [<reflink idref="bib58" id="ref89">58</reflink>]). Projects of knowledge-making, especially in the human domain, therefore, cannot be divorced from questions of ethics, politics and justice.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-6">Research problem and research questions</hd> <p>Diverse views have emerged in educational scholarship regarding the course educators (and education) should take regarding post-truth conditions. However, little is known about educators' understanding of these conditions, or their epistemic responses. Without this knowledge, it is unlikely that educational policy, Initial Teacher Education (ITE) curriculum, or professional development programs, have a strong foundation on which to move forward. This paper seeks, therefore, to contribute to the establishment of a stronger conceptual and empirical foundation for a well-informed educational response to post-truth conditions. Specifically, we aim to respond to this research question: What are the epistemic features (Aims, Ideals, Reliable epistemic processes) of educators' responses to post-truth conditions, and what reflexive deliberations mediate their intentions towards related practical action in their professional work?</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-7">Methodology and methods</hd> <p>Social labs are an approach to responding to complex social problems which bring a range of stakeholders into constructive dialogue, focused on action, experimentation and transformation (Hassan, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref90">28</reflink>]; McKenzie, [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref91">44</reflink>]; Timmermans et al., [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref92">64</reflink>]). Educational researchers have previously employed social labs to explore teacher educators' epistemic cognition regarding inclusive teaching (Lunn Brownlee et al., [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref93">40</reflink>]), and to facilitate action-oriented sustainability education (Lake et al., [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref94">36</reflink>]). Characteristically, social labs should be ongoing, iterative and involve the testing of prototype solutions (Hassan, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref95">28</reflink>]). Social labs encourage not merely the articulation of participants' views, but engage them in collaborative problem-construction and problem-solving processes, to create a platform for their own personal and professional growth (Lunn Brownlee et al., [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref96">40</reflink>]). This approach is consistent with a conception of epistemic cognition as socially-negotiated and contextually enacted, as described above. Social labs, as an action-oriented research methodology, are thus well-suited to the aims of exploring educators' responses to post-truth conditions, and supporting them to generate well-informed responses in their own professional practice.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-8">Participants</hd> <p>Assembling a diverse range of stakeholders is core requirement of social labs—recognising the multi-faceted nature of complex problems, and the value of bringing together different perspectives and resources (Hassan, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref97">28</reflink>]). Correspondingly, recruitment was sought from the following stakeholder groups:</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> Teacher educators.</item> <p></p> <item> Pre-service teachers (primary/elementary, secondary).</item> <p></p> <item> Undergraduate students of education studies.</item> <p></p> <item> Practicing schoolteachers.</item> </ulist> <p>Recruitment for groups 1—3 was facilitated through communication platforms within the lead author's host institution. Recruitment for group 4 was undertaken through the lead author's professional networks in local schools, with the assistance of teachers' associations. In total, seven participants were recruited (representing all four stakeholder groups) and provided full informed consent. Participant characteristics are reported in Table 1.</p> <p>Table 1 Participant characteristics</p> <p> <ephtml> &lt;table frame="hsides" rules="groups"&gt;&lt;thead&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pseudonym&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Gender&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Stakeholder Group (specialisation)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/thead&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Brenda&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;F&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Teacher Educator (Secondary)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;David&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;M&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Practicing Secondary School Teacher (Humanities)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Nicola&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;F&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pre-service Teacher (Secondary &amp;#8211; Mathematics &amp; Science)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Bhavya&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;F&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pre-service Teacher (Secondary &amp;#8212; Humanities)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Huifen&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;F&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pre-service Teacher (Primary)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Zhen&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;F&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pre-service Teacher (Primary)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Carly&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;F&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Undergraduate student of Education Studies&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; </ephtml> </p> <hd id="AN0179669460-9">Methods</hd> <p>The study used a modified social lab format, proceeding in three phases: an initial two-hour workshop (study commencement), a second two-hour workshop (one week later), and a follow-up survey (consisting of three short answer questions) after a further two months. Following the distilled features and strategies of social labs, as articulated by McKenzie ([<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref98">44</reflink>], p. 4), research proceeded as shown in Table 2 below. Each phase included questions and prompts to move the group gradually through the social lab process, and to facilitate epistemic reflexivity, in line with the 3R-EC model. This structure, while not allowing for a fully iterative process, did exemplify most of the key features of social labs as described in the literature.</p> <p>Table 2 Social-lab protocol (abbreviated)</p> <p> <ephtml> &lt;table frame="hsides" rules="groups"&gt;&lt;thead&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Phase&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Steps of the Social Lab&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Example question prompts&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/thead&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Workshop 1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Social Lab strategies: 1) Mapping the system and 2)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Questioning our stances and understandings of the problem&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;What do you understand by the idea that we live in "post-truth" times?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What role do you see schools and school-teachers as taking in responding to post-truth conditions?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Under post-truth conditions, what are appropriate &lt;italic&gt;aims&lt;/italic&gt; for educators to be working towards, when seeking and assessing knowledge? (&lt;italic&gt;3R-EC: Reflection - epistemic aims&lt;/italic&gt;)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;How do you know when to be satisfied that the knowledge you have obtained is adequate? &lt;italic&gt;(3R-EC: Reflection - epistemic ideals)&lt;/italic&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As educators and students, what resources and procedures do you use to achieve these knowledge aims? What can you do when different sources conflict in their claims? &lt;italic&gt;(3R-EC: Reflection - reliable procedures)&lt;/italic&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Workshop 2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Social lab strategies: 3) Identifying points for intervention and 4)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Producing hypotheses &amp; goals&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;italic&gt;Worksheet Prompt 1&lt;/italic&gt;: In relation to matters of post-truth, what is working well, or effectively in the educational organisations and communities we work in?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;italic&gt;Worksheet Prompt 2&lt;/italic&gt;: In relation to matters of post-truth, what changes would you like to see in the educational organisations and communities we work in? What is &lt;italic&gt;not&lt;/italic&gt; working adequately at the moment?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What are the conditions under which we operate that might be barriers to achieving this? What conditions might assist us? (&lt;italic&gt;3R-EC: Reflexive Deliberation&lt;/italic&gt;)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;italic&gt;Worksheet Prompt 3&lt;/italic&gt;: What specific actions can you, personally, take which could improve how our educational institutions and communities are responding to post-truth conditions? (&lt;italic&gt;resolved action&lt;/italic&gt;)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Follow-up survey&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Reflection and evaluation of process&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Arising from your participation in the workshops, what has been the most significant change (if any) in&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;your &lt;italic&gt;thinking&lt;/italic&gt; about how schools and educators might respond to post-truth circumstances?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Arising from your participation in the workshops, what has been the most significant change (if any) in your own &lt;italic&gt;behaviour&lt;/italic&gt; (personal and/or professional) in relation to post-truth circumstances?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; </ephtml> </p> <p>Due to social distancing restrictions in Australia during the study period, workshops were held in hybrid mode. Participants joined either in-person or online, through a Zoom-enabled meeting space. In each workshop participants were provided with a worksheet for taking notes and responding to reflection prompts. Time was allocated for participants to write, privately, before discussion commenced, to counter-act tendencies towards consensus in group discussions. In-lieu of a substantively iterative design, the follow-up survey at two months post-workshop assessed any changes to participants' thinking and action, in relation to post-truth matters. Participants were provided with gift vouchers as compensation for the inconveniences of participation. There was some attrition relating to two participants: Carly only completed Workshop 1, and neither Carly nor Bhavya returned the follow-up survey.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-10">Data and data analysis</hd> <p>In summary, empirical data produced in the project consisted of:</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> Audio recordings of Workshop 1 and Workshop 2.</item> <p></p> <item> Digital and/or written worksheets completed by participants during the workshops.</item> <p></p> <item> Follow-up survey responses for five participants (excluding Carly and Bhavya).</item> </ulist> <p>Verbatim transcripts for each workshop were obtained via professional transcription services, and reviewed for accuracy by the lead author. Participant worksheets were transcribed by the project's Research Assistant (RA). All data were loaded into NVIVO software (QSR International Pty Ltd, n.d.) for analysis.</p> <p>Working from epistemic cognition literature, and in consultation with the co-authors, the lead author developed a code-book providing definitions of, and examples for, each element of the 3R-EC model, namely:</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> Reflection on:</item> <p></p> <item> epistemic aims.</item> <p></p> <item> epistemic criteria (ideals).</item> <p></p> <item> reliable epistemic processes.</item> <p></p> <item> Reflexive deliberation on.</item> <p></p> <item> cultural emergent properties.</item> <p></p> <item> structural emergent properties.</item> <p></p> <item> personal emergent properties.</item> <p></p> <item> Resolved action.</item> </ulist> <p>A moderation procedure was undertaken whereby segments of data were initially coded separately by the lead author and the RA. This coding was compared, line-by-line, and inconsistencies between coders was used to drive discussion, leading to further clarification and elaboration of the original code book. Subsequently, the RA coded the entire data corpus. The coded data was then shared and discussed with the co-authors, driving further refinement of interpretation. As a final measure, the lead author reviewed coding of the entire data set, making adjustments in line with the preceding deliberations.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-11">Results</hd> <p>In response to the stated research question, above, this section lays out the epistemic features of the educators' responses to post-truth conditions. Initially we present a high-level summary of reflections on epistemic aims, criteria (Ideals), reliable epistemic processes, and identify the types of resolved actions participants dedicated to as outcomes of the social lab. Subsequently, we present a more detailed analysis of epistemic reflexivity, organised via four main epistemic aims identified in the analysis. Finally, we summarise additional features of reflexive deliberation that were not tied to specific epistemic aims.</p> <p>Although social lab facilitation was aimed directly at stimulating discernment of <emph>epistemic aims</emph>, these were not easily forthcoming. Indeed, participants expressed perplexity about this challenge. As Bhavya noted after Workshop 1: "What should we aim toward? Is 'truth' achievable?". While generally implicit in the data, four specific epistemic aims (knowledge outputs deemed educationally important in the post-truth context) were discerned by participants:</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> forming justified positions.</item> <p></p> <item> gaining accurate knowledge.</item> <p></p> <item> developing shared understanding.</item> <p></p> <item> accessing diverse knowledge-narratives.</item> </ulist> <p>Explicit discussion of <emph>epistemic criteria</emph>, indicators of the quality of knowledge outputs, occurred relatively rarely in discussions. However, data analysis identified several examples. Participants identified the reliability of sources and the provision of supporting evidence as important indicators of accuracy and justification in student written work. Every student having a voice in class discussion was seen as indicating success in the pursuit of shared understanding. The presence of authentic, lived experience and associated emotions were identified as an indicator that diverse knowledge-narratives were being accessed.</p> <p>In contrast, a significant volume of participant talk focused on <emph>reliable epistemic processes.</emph> Through the inductive clustering analysis, depicted schematically in Fig. 1, these were organised into two categories: critical thinking skills and personal dispositions.</p> <p>Graph: Fig. 1 Reliable epistemic processes identified in the social lab as educational responses to post-truth conditions, organised into two categories: personal dispositions and critical thinking skills</p> <p>Personal dispositions are interpreted here as "epistemic virtues" (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref99">14</reflink>], p. 142), understood as a "learned, stable disposition that is (a) directed at epistemic aims... and (b) relatively efficacious in achieving these aims" (p. 156). Table 3 summarises the links between epistemic aims, ideals/criteria, and reliable processes identified in the analysis.</p> <p>Table 3 Summary of AIR analysis from the social lab</p> <p> <ephtml> &lt;table frame="hsides" rules="groups"&gt;&lt;thead&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Epistemic Aims&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Criteria (Ideals)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Reliable Processes&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/thead&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;(i) forming justified positions&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Provision of evidence &amp; reasoning&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Critical thinking&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;(ii) gaining accurate knowledge&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Use of reliable sources, provision of evidence&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Access reliable sources, calm (non-emotional) dialogue, verification of sources and claims, cautious, self-aware disposition&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;(iii) developing shared understanding&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;All voices are heard respectfully&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Open-mindedness, respect, active perspective-taking&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;(iv) accessing diverse knowledge-narratives&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Historically marginalised voices are represented, authentic lived experience &amp; emotion&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;All students have a voice in discussion, accessing diverse voices via social-media&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; </ephtml> </p> <p>As part of the explicit action-orientation of the social lab, participants dedicated to <emph>resolved actions</emph> relating to their work as educators. These practical responses to the challenges of post-truth conditions included specific instructional strategies, but also curriculum enhancements in ITE and forms of collegial interaction. These commitments represent personal emergent properties (PEPs), which then become subject to participants' reflexive deliberations. A schematic summary of resolved actions is given in Fig. 2.</p> <p>Graph: Fig. 2 Resolved action. What participants resolved to do as an outcome of the post-truth social lab</p> <p>Having concluded this high-level overview, we now move to a detailed analysis of participants' epistemic reflexivity, organised around the four epistemic aims. In line with the 3R-EC model, reflections on each aim (along with related epistemic criteria (ideals) and reliable processes) are presented with corresponding resolved actions and reflexive deliberations—indicating internal conversations (Archer, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref100">3</reflink>]) about enabling and constraining factors (i.e. cultural, structural or personal emergent properties) relevant to the pursuit of epistemic aims in the contexts of educational work. The three types of emergent properties are indicated parenthetically as CEP, SEP and PEP where appropriate.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-12">Epistemic aim (i): justified positions</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0179669460-13">Reflection</hd> <p>The epistemic aim of forming justified personal positions was expressed in the need for students to reach "reasoned conclusions" (David, secondary teacher), "reasonable positions" (Zhen, primary pre-service teacher) and "form a considered, well-informed opinion" (Huifen, primary pre-service teacher). These aims were seen as desirable both in the context of class discussion, as well as in students' written work.</p> <p>Epistemic criteria related to this aim focused on the provision of evidence. Justified views, for example, were based on "facts and true evidence" (Brenda, secondary teacher educator). In the humanities, David looked for "quantifiable evidence", which was seen to add "scientific rigour" and "objectivity" to students' presentation of views. Independence of thought was also identified as an indicator of good justification, where students "construct their own opinions, their own arguments, rather than being stuck in their own little bubble" (Huifen). Correspondingly, as an instructional aim, educators should work to cultivate the capacity of students to think independently about complex issues. This required a particular stance from the teacher, and devoted attention in the ITE curriculum. As Brenda put it:Independent thinking. That's the nirvana of where we're going. Teaching controversial and sensitive topics, teachers are not supposed to have a biased, obvious perspective. We're not supposed to take sides. It's present the information, [then] students make up their own minds. You give them the skills to do it. That's what we're trying to do.</p> <p>As reliable epistemic processes for reaching aim (i), participants prioritised students' use of critical thinking skills, and specifically the need to "use some form of data to support some argument" (David). Notably, the provision of reasoning was posited as a condition for the inclusion of diverse views in classroom discussion. As articulated by Zhen: "It's allowed that we have different perspectives, but you need to base on the [sic.] reasoning". This, in turn, posed requirements for the educator: to "teach them [students] to reason and use evidence" (Zhen).</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-14">Reflexive deliberations</hd> <p>As discussed in more detail below, action towards this (and other) aims were seen as strongly constrained by a lack of time and an over-crowded curriculum (SEP).</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-15">Resolved action</hd> <p>Participants identified opportunities, within classroom practice (PEP), to strengthen expectations around providing justification: "asking students to prove their responses are correctly [sic] or not by themselves, to improve their recognition on post-truth" (Nicola, secondary pre-service teacher).</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-16">Epistemic aim (ii): accurate knowledge</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0179669460-17">Reflection</hd> <p>Gaining accurate knowledge was an epistemic aim for both educators themselves (to gain and convey accurate knowledge) and their students (to possess and use it)—reflecting, perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the core challenges of post-truth identified by researchers (Lewandowsky et al., [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref101">38</reflink>]). This aim was most clearly expressed by Huifen who argued that teachers are responsible for conveying "correct information", identifying if a student is saying something "far from the truth", driving students "back to the right track" and "correct[ing] student thinking if it is obviously false". A component of this aim was discerning the real from the fake, which aligns to Chinn and colleagues' ([<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref102">15</reflink>]) epistemic aim of "avoidance of false belief" (p. 428). This arose specifically in deliberations about cultural aspects of the post-truth media landscape, where malicious knowledge actors actively seek to spread disinformation online for political or economic gain (CEPs). This issue was discussed mostly in regard to students, but also came up regarding how educators' themselves access and assess knowledge (PEP). Fake news, deep fakes and other forms of disinformation are post-truth phenomena (CEPs) that, as Huifen put it, "make[s] it challenging for students to determine what is the reality".</p> <p>Although explicit epistemic criteria for reaching accurate knowledge were not given, these were often implied in the discussion of related reliable epistemic processes. For example, the use of reliable sources was promoted as a process for reaching accurate knowledge, but also could indicate the accuracy of a claim. Bhavya encouraged students to "read news articles through reliable sources" and asserted that teachers should share information only from "first-hand" sources, such as official data repositories (SEP). A more complex process for gaining accurate knowledge in post-truth circumstances was the verification of claims and sources, drawn together by the idea of "reading with a critical perspective" (Bhavya). This included "fact-checking" (Brenda), "consideration of breadth of sources" (David), as well as the careful analysis of an authorial intention and motivation: "consider[ing] the perspective of the writer of a text, their reasons for writing it and the reaction they are trying to get" (Brenda).</p> <p>The development of a personal disposition of cautiousness (PEP), as a form of epistemic virtue (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref103">14</reflink>]), served to insulate teachers and students from false information. Outwardly, Brenda identified this cautiousness as "cynicism" or, facetiously, an attitude of "trust no-one". The inward, self-reflective version of this virtue involved self<emph>-</emph>awareness and humility: being aware of the status and foundation of one's own beliefs, and framing these as fallible and subject to revision. Bhavya articulated this as the "awareness of being vulnerable" and the "need to acknowledge your own biases and how they form your opinions"; for example, she noted, "how my experiences are leading me to access certain things, certain types of information online". An extension of this was an explicit readiness to update one's beliefs (PEP), articulated by Bhavya as "being open to changing my opinion when I hear the other side". These dispositions involved acknowledging that oneself (PEP), as well as others, was susceptible to the distortions inherent in post-truth information ecologies (CEP).</p> <p>The reduction or removal of inhibiting emotions (PEP) was also important for reaching accurate knowledge in the context of classroom discussions, especially when there was substantial disagreement. This strategy links to the generally accepted view that appeal to emotion, rather than facts and reason, are central to the problematic of post-truth (Gudonis &amp; Jones, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref104">26</reflink>]; Jones, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref105">30</reflink>]). As David put it, it was important for educators to "take the emotion <emph>out</emph> of" conversations such that "the temperature might come down", meaning discussions could proceed in a "calm, rational manner". Forming an interesting contrast, certain emotions might actually contribute positively to accurate knowledge outcomes. For example, David remarked how in a humanities setting "we <emph>want</emph> out students to be emotional because we want them to feel passionate about issues that are relevant to them so that they can take action". This led to a reflection from Carly (undergraduate student) that critical thinking skills could be "paired with important emotions – empathy, compassion, directing <emph>the right kind</emph> of emotions". In this way, as David reflected, one might seek to "avoid anger, but not diminish passion" as part of the dialogical process toward accurate knowledge.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-18">Reflexive deliberations</hd> <p>Several aspects of the post-truth context were identified as inhibitory regarding the capacity of teachers to convey, and the capacity of students to form, accurate knowledge. In line with scholarly discussions (McIntyre, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref106">43</reflink>]) several features of the post-truth landscape were judged to facilitate the formation of distorted views (CEP), for example via the algorithmic amplification (SEP) of conspiracy theories, as part of a general increase in the pace and intensity of information distribution, facilitated through smartphone devices (SEP). As part of this, participants recognised the role of recommendation algorithms in creating echo-chambers (Nguyen, [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref107">50</reflink>]), and the emergence of deep fake technologies (Schick, [<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref108">60</reflink>]) as new frontiers in disinformation. These factors directly impinged on the capacity of students, and educators, to establish a reliable basis for accurate knowledge. As summarised by Huifen in the follow-up survey.</p> <p>I think there are certain challenges associated with the media and as many others mentioned in the workshops, aided by social media which result in potentially this tendency for students or even educators to fall down a rabbit hole due to repeated exposure to the same type of information. This not only makes it challenging for students to determine what is the reality, but also difficult for educators to clarify misunderstandings if the information is biased.</p> <p>Here, Huifen touches on an important point about responding to misinformation that has been confirmed by experimental research. Even where misinformation can be identified, debunking and correction can often fail to shift incorrect views due to the power of repetition, false consensus effects, and possible backfire effects (Lewandowsky et al., [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref109">38</reflink>]).</p> <p>Conveying accurate knowledge was also complicated by the changing status of the teacher as an authority figure in contemporary schooling. Carly put forward a distinctively critical view, grounded in her overtly political and de-colonial perspective on education (PEP). As she explained, "I don't think there should be that much trust in our teachers and the current curriculum and just the authoritative and submissive relationship that teachers and students tend to have." Brenda, relatedly, observed in young people an "in-built cynicism" which (positively) gave them an orientation of skepticism towards information, especially online, but (negatively) also left them "highly cynical of authority and not readily (sic.) take the teacher's word/advice". As a practicing educator, David presented a pragmatic view, acknowledging the value of an increasingly democratic classroom, while maintaining the importance of the teacher as an authority figure. As he put it, while it is "a really healthy mindset, for students to be skeptical even of their own teachers...I think there's the risk that that mindset of being critical of what your teachers have to say goes beyond that, into, oh, actually they're not the authority figure." As seen here, the unsettling and dispersion of traditional sources of authority under post-truth conditions produces a parallel unsettling of the epistemic authority of the teacher.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-19">Resolved action</hd> <p>Related to this aim was the intention to get students practicing working with questionable information. That is, the teacher provides students with opportunities for "encountering disputed, unvetted, and unreliable information and encourage them to validate the information and seek justification" (Zhen). In the ITE space, Brenda planned for the addition of "contemporary language and case studies for TCs [teacher candidates] to relate to their life-worlds". These actions usefully re-create (in schools and ITE programs) a more messy and authentic knowledge context, which more closely resembles the outside post-truth world (CEP/SEP), in contrast to the largely sanitised epistemic atmospheres of contemporary schooling (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref110">16</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-20">Epistemic aim (iii): shared understanding</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0179669460-21">Reflection</hd> <p>The epistemic aim of shared understanding emerged in relation to a focus on epistemically productive conversations in school classrooms, which were identified as a core element of an educational response to post-truth challenges. Epistemic aim (iii) emerged explicitly when David noted how, in classroom conversations mirroring the ugly dynamics of post-truth online culture (CEP): "the conversation...isn't about coming to a shared understanding. It's about settling scores". The desired mode of classroom discourse expressed by participants (PEP) closely resembled practices of exploratory talk (Mercer &amp; Hodgkinson, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref111">46</reflink>]) and models of dialogic pedagogy more broadly (Alexander, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref112">2</reflink>]).</p> <p>Epistemic criteria for aim (iii) were implied in the ideal of a classroom where each student's perspective or 'voice' could be heard in class and received in a fair and respectful manner by others. Correspondingly, reliable processes for aim (iii) related to the epistemic virtues of open-mindedness, respectfulness, and active perspective-taking. Open-mindedness emerged as essential for the conduct of robust, epistemically-productive conversations that would lead to shared understanding. Huifen, for example, reflected that teachers should "help students to think about issues in an open-minded way while considering other people's viewpoints". The first step to this is acknowledging and appreciating the existence of diverse perspectives. As David summarised:you want them [students] to explicitly understand that other people will think differently, not necessarily that they're correct, but an understanding that not everyone is gonna come to the same conclusion as you, and to understand why that's the case.</p> <p>A related quality was respectfulness, which required managing the impulse to contradict others (PEP), and supported active listening. As described by Zhen, "Whatever [the] other says, you don't just jump in and just [say], 'I don't agree with you, and what you said is totally not true,' and just listen and think about it before you make any judgements." Respectful engagement in classroom discussion required moving beyond the effort to merely 'win' arguments. This (latter) attitude was recognised by David, in his all-male secondary classrooms, as "one-upmanship", and linked by Brenda to the culture of "burning" others on social media (CEPs). As Hiufen summarised, "It's so important to be actively listening and being constructive, yeah, participating in the discussion rather than just, yeah, shutting others down". Active perspective-taking, as the intentional, tentative consideration of others' perspectives on disputed issues, arose as a complementarity disposition to the more receptive quality of open-mindedness. Specifically, David emphasised that educators should "teach students these skills to actually have the humility...to appreciate another person's argument and actually see that as having some validity." Practically, this could involve "get[ting] them [students] to take the position of someone they disagree with" in formal classwork.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-22">Reflexive deliberations</hd> <p>The capacity to effectively support the development of shared understanding in school contexts was directly frustrated by the appearance of post-truth dynamics in classrooms, mirroring what David called an "increased coarseness of public debate" in the online world (CEP). This resonates with the finding that emotional escalation, and especially infectious anger, are key features of post-truth discourses (Davis, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref113">20</reflink>]).There was a significant concern for the long-term impacts of exposure to these post-truth cultural norms (CEPs) online: "young people are learning not to actually sit in front of someone else and have a conversation in person... [and] these [emotion-driven] conversations then become normalised online" (David). These dynamics were seen to amplify differences, driving increasing polarization as well as emotions such as outrage amongst students. As David reported, in his own class, debates about contentious issues "railroaded" and "side-tracked" lessons, where "students reverted to their ideological biases and their bubbles in terms of the information they consume" (PEPs) leading to "very unstructured, un-substantive conversation", diverting time and attention from core learning aims. This report from David hints at an enduring tension that exists between securing student engagement and autonomy, and maintaining a safe and orderly environment for learning. This remains one of the perennial paradoxes complicating the exercise of teacher authority (Pace &amp; Hemmings, [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref114">51</reflink>]), and appears to become intensified as post-truth dynamics flow into classroom life.</p> <p>In addition to post-truth cultures of debate, common teacher practices (SEP) were identified which prevented the respectful airing of all students' voices in discussion; as David summarised:This goes back to teachers falling back into—and I think we're all guilty from time to time, when we let the loudest voices dominate, because we know that they'll speak...It makes it comfortable because we don't like the silence, and we're fearful of that, that we're somehow failing as a teacher if no one's talking.</p> <p>In this way, teachers' own professional identity and self-efficacy (PEP) is implicated in the inhibition of shared understanding as an epistemic aim.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-23">Resolved action</hd> <p>In relation to aim (iii) there was a commitment to practices which would increase safety and participation in group discussion (SEP). This included a focus on classroom norms of behaviour, "setting up expectations, co-creating them beforehand, and dealing in a respectful way" (Brenda), and also the aim to "clarify expectations from the start, try to encourage quieter students to share/work in small groups first so everyone has the chance to discuss" (Huifen). In her ITE classes, Brenda planned for "a more advanced workshop...that covers how [a] teacher can manage emotional students presenting controversial views or falsehoods," as well as modelling these skills in her own teaching.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-24">Epistemic aim (iv): accessing diverse knowledge-narratives</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0179669460-25">Reflection</hd> <p>The aim of accessing diverse knowledge-narratives was championed by Carly, distinctively, as an important educational response to post-truth conditions. She called to "engage in the fluidity of knowledge and truth, the dispersion of knowledge – many shapes and forms", leading to an endorsement of "<emph>truths</emph>, plural truths". Correspondingly, she argued for importance of recognising multiple, local knowledges, as opposed to "universal truths and universal knowledges".</p> <p>If we refocused our knowledge, more localised knowledge, and accept difference, then there might be a more positive experience with exchanging that type of knowledge and truth. Because we understand that this is what I know, this is my personal, objective—but, when I realise that this is my own knowledge, I can then accept that other people will have their own localised knowledge that is...reinforced by whatever experience they've had.</p> <p>This polycentric view of epistemology was elaborated in terms of truths belonging to specific groups, as collective truth (Carly), and also (as explained by Brenda) as personal truth. Brenda put forward, in seeming counterpoint to the aim of verified, accurate knowledge, that "truth is very personal thing":it's hard to ever be truly objective and that everyone in the end has their own truth, and they come with their own prior knowledge and schema and understanding of how the world works, and that we have to respect that.</p> <p>Knowledge, in this view, was constituted not by (more or less accurate or well-justified) claims, but by <emph>narratives</emph> grounded in lived experience, and subject to dispute and power relations. As argued by Carly, archives of lived experience (accessed through social media (SEP)) could allow formerly oppressed people "to control our narrative a bit more". Historically and politically marginal narratives were positioned as an important counterpoint to "authorities like the government and media traditional authorities, [who] no longer have the strong hold over the way we conceptualise issues that they control". Similarly, in light of anti-colonial critique of the subjugation of Indigenous knowledges, Carly remarked that history, as a discipline, "has almost become redundant in its ability to narrate the truth".</p> <p>For epistemic criteria relating to aim (iv), "collective" and "personal" truths were seen as valid when grounded in authentic, lived experience. Specifically, it was a sense of shared experience that indicated the validity of collective truth (CEP). As Carly related: "I've always thought about a truth in a sense of collective experiences and unity within the truth of that collective community or group of people." Emotions were identified as another criterion by which diverse narratives could be assessed. As Carly stated in relation to Australian First-Nations people, there are "emotions that back their truth". Pain and suffering were particularly salient in verifying the validity of these knowledge-narratives, which went beyond objectivity. As she stated: "It doesn't necessarily have to be an objective truth, but it is a truth because they suffered, and they have that pain to validate whatever story that they're sharing." It is important to note here that this polycentric view appears to rest on a crucial ambivalence regarding the kinds of narratives which might be accepted as "collective" or "personal" truths. In the Discussion section below, we unpack how this view, while often embraced and promoted by those with progressive or left-leaning politics, also reflects some of the core problematics of post-truth itself.</p> <p>As with aim (iii), above, ensuring all students' voices were present and heard in classroom discussions was an important reliable epistemic process for achieving aim (iv). Platforms such as TikTok were put forward, in contrast to above observations about the inhibiting role of social media (SEP), as a reliable way to access the authentic knowledge-narratives of marginalised people. In this way, for Carly, post-truth had a hopeful and affirmative aspect which was specifically enabled by social media technologies. In further contrast to reliable processes put forward for aim (ii), for aim (iv) emotions (in relation to collective and personal narratives) were positioned as a kind of epistemic virtue. For Carly, emotion was "quite important in finding the truth", and could "fuel our access to the truth".</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-26">Reflexive deliberations</hd> <p>As with aim (iii), above, the capacity to share and access multiple knowledge perspectives in classrooms was complicated by cultures and habits of classroom practice that often led to a small number of louder voices dominating discussion. As Zhen explained (CEP) "only a few of the students gets to talk, and that voice might dominate the whole—the topic. It's not necessarily true, but people might listen to it." The pursuit of multiple perspectives also ignited deliberations on how to balance free, open discussion amongst students with the recognition that not all views were equally true or robust. Participants noted that some views may not just be false or inaccurate, but actually harmful or dangerous in some circumstances. This presented complex professional dilemmas for teachers and schools. As David summarised.</p> <p>I don't think there's enough training yet in schools on how to deal with some of these issues ...and this is not about constraining what students are allowed to think or say, but does each school have an understanding about what's appropriate? So, is the student allowed to have a provocative political opinion? ... If a student was saying something to that effect, what should the school do?...I think the risk is that, if schools don't have clear understandings about what to do in those situations, then teachers have to react based on their own experiences on top of all the other things that they have to do.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-27">Resolved action</hd> <p>Resolved actions for aim (iv) mirrored those for aim (iii), relating to an enhanced focus on the support of respectful, open discussions in class through the creation of classroom norms of behaviour, and increasing teachers' capacities to manage discussion of controversial issues in class.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-28">Generic deliberations on post-truth</hd> <p>While some resolved actions, and related deliberations, were linked to specific epistemic aims (as shown above), others were connected in a more generic way to post-truth conditions. These actions and deliberations linked to the development of critical thinking capacities and dispositions (see Fig. 2), as generically useful reliable epistemic processes, without reference to specific epistemic aims.</p> <p>In deliberating on a variety of possible actions, participants repeatedly returned to the inhibiting structural factor of time-scarcity (SEP), along with educational cultures of "focusing too much on the final academic outcomes" (Nicola) (CEP). Together, these limited opportunities to engage in open discussion but also, for staff, as David reflected, a "lack of time to share experiences and explore different strategies" and "therefore no common understanding amongst teachers on how to respond/pre-empt these issues" (of post-truth).</p> <p>Curriculum policy (SEP) was seen to have both supportive and inhibiting aspects in relation to the development of critical thinking skills and epistemic virtues in students. The Australian General Capabilities curriculum (Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref115">6</reflink>]) (SEP) was identified as a supporting factor in prioritising critical and ethical thinking in schools. However, the generally over-crowded nature of curriculum, as well as burdensome assessment and reporting structures, prevented educators from making the best use of the possibilities. The General Capabilities, Brenda argued, were often overlooked in Secondary schools, with their focus on disciplinary curriculum. On this matter she expressed particular disappointment:Of course, there isn't enough time. I think that if a school really sat down to map against the general capabilities to see where it's being done, they might find that a lot of people are assuming other people are doing it, and it's not being done. It's nobody's job.</p> <p>Other resolved actions were aligned to addressing the challenges of post-truth conditions in the contexts of education more generally, rather than epistemic matters specifically. According to the pre-service participants (Nicola, Zhen, Bhavya, Huifen) the idea of post-truth was rarely, if ever, acknowledged within ITE curriculum (SEP). This meant that prospective teachers remained largely unaware of the issues, and unprepared to respond. The implications are summarised here by Bhavya:The lack of special attention to this and specific time allotted for this in the timetable itself – doesn't allow awareness. Secondly, are all teachers prepared? If teachers are not equipped with time and knowledge, they cannot help students. This should be a popular PD topic as well as should be included in the day as a special workshop for students. I think awareness is key.</p> <p>The lack of specific attention in ITE was not due to a lack of care (PEP) but, as above, related to time-scarcity (SEP). As related by Brenda, in ITE the "Barriers are just the same as in schools—lots to do and not much time."</p> <p>There was also a dedication to intentional collegial interaction (i.e. with fellow teacher educators, teachers, pre-service teachers) focused on post-truth issues. This would help broaden awareness of the matter and potentially provide an avenue for institutional changes:At a minimum, we can all tell our colleagues about our experiences in this—these two workshops and the fact that, regardless of where we're at in our careers, we're all reckoning with these challenges, and that they're not just isolated experiences. Maybe that helps make others more aware of these issues and lays the groundwork then...to establish some better understanding and some norms of what schools should do consistently in responding to these issues. (David).</p> <p>Part of this approach, though, involved increasing listening and receptivity, and not assuming colleagues would always share the same views and concerns (CEP). As David observed, "it's not just students who might be in a post-truth environment. Some teachers might be as well". For Bhavya, action meant "being aware of this issue, keeping an open mind, entering discussions of respect and not always with an intent to change perspectives of other people" (PEP).</p> <p>Amongst these broader reflexive deliberations, the social lab discussion surfaced several instances of imprecision and conceptual confusion (PEPs) that are illustrative of what might be common in broader educational discussions of post-truth conditions. Examples are provided in Table 4.</p> <p>Table 4 Post-truth and epistemic misconceptions</p> <p> <ephtml> &lt;table frame="hsides" rules="groups"&gt;&lt;thead&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Issue&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Explanation&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Quotation&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/thead&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Everyone is entitled to their opinion&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;This claim confuses the right of individuals to &lt;italic&gt;hold&lt;/italic&gt; beliefs with their right to have the substance of those beliefs taken seriously or not challenged.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;"So now I think teachers may correct student thinking if it is obviously false, or radical in a way that is detrimental for the classroom environment or the individual's personal development, but not necessarily try to influence students' views because everyone is entitled to an opinion" (Huifen)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Conflation of strategic pedagogical neutrality with epistemic undecidability&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;The teacher maintaining a neutral stance on a disputed issue, in order to encourage independent inquiry, becomes erroneously conflated with the idea that there is (in fact) no correct (or more correct) position, or that all positions are of equal merit.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;"My teacher was telling me that he encourages discussions and debates in the class, but he never gives his own opinion. That's because the students tend to believe the teacher most of the time, and then there is a position of right and wrong in the class. Also having that in the back of the mind to say that there is no right position, and the teacher has to maintain a neutral stance." (Bhavya)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Respect for persons conflated with respect for the veracity of their beliefs.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;The virtue of developing empathy for the causes of a particular erroneous belief are falsely conflated with taking that erroneous view to be true (as a 'personal truth' for that individual).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;"I've actually had personal experience with an anti-vaxxer and anti-COVID, and I think what made me a lot more empathetic toward their beliefs was the fact that I understood their vulnerability in society and what made them vulnerable and susceptible to these ideas." (Carly)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Concern with post-truth conflated with specific politically progressive causes&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;A concern with post-truth information disorder &lt;italic&gt;in general&lt;/italic&gt; (which affects all citizens) is conflated with advocacy regarding particular causes which are taken as politically partisan in nature.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td align="left"&gt;&lt;p&gt;"I think it's permeated a lot of my equivocations over the two workshops is the idea that this is about censoring speech, and that if we're saying that there is a truthful frame in the classroom, then we're saying that other lenses or other perspectives are not permitted... a cynic would say, 'Oh, you're just trying to mandate the teaching of pro-climate change, pro-vaccination, pro-minority rights' and all those kind of things." (David)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; </ephtml> </p> <p>These tended to occur where epistemic questions were being interpreted in classroom and collegial contexts. Statements of apparent common sense, for example that 'everyone has a right to an opinion', might leave erroneous beliefs unchallenged. Where concerns with post-truth conditions, as a general problematic, are conflated with specific, partisan causes (e.g. a specifically progressive political agenda) then discussions are unlikely to move beyond polarised opposition towards shared understanding. These examples indicate the complexity of the terrain that educators are working in—as epistemic, pedagogical and socio-political factors intersect.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-29">Discussion</hd> <p>In this section we synthesise several observations from the above 3R-EC analysis of the social lab data. These concern how epistemic aims were specified by participants and the relation of epistemic aims to implicit, divergent underpinning epistemic commitments.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-30">Well-defined epistemic aims in post-truth complexity—a missing anchor?</hd> <p>Notably, epistemic aims emerged vaguely (rather than explicitly) in the social-lab, and generally did not express the kind of contextual precision with which epistemic aims are exemplified in the literature—for instance "a mother may be motivated by the goal of finding out the truth about whether vaccines are safe for her children" (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref116">15</reflink>], p. 425). That is, it was rarely specified about <emph>which</emph> topics, or in <emph>which</emph> circumstances, students should be developing reasonable positions, gaining accurate knowledge, and so on. This relative lack of clarity around epistemic aims is highly significant, since epistemic aims constitute "the end to which all other epistemic beliefs and activities are directed" (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref117">14</reflink>], p. 147). In contrast, discussions of reliable epistemic processes were wide-ranging, nuanced, and inspired conversations about many potentially powerful instructional strategies, such as teaching critical thinking, introducing more epistemically authentic situations into learning, and cultivating epistemic virtues in students (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref118">17</reflink>], pp. 54, 56). Reliable epistemic processes, regardless, remained at a generic level, without a secure anchor to well-articulated and contextualized epistemic aims (see Lunn Brownlee et al., [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref119">41</reflink>]). This tendency in the social lab, to focus on outlining reliable epistemic processes, rather than clarifying epistemic aims and ideals, reflects similar tendencies in school curricula, which often put forth strategies to be learned, leaving epistemic aims implicit (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref120">17</reflink>], p. 54). This lack of reflective clarity about aims represents a potential weakness in an educational response to post-truth conditions. As argued by Barzilai and Chinn ([<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref121">7</reflink>]) effective competence in epistemic activities (what they term "apt epistemic performance") requires that aims, ideals and process are used coherently, and in an adaptive manner that is sensitive to the local context (p. 367). Vagueness about epistemic aims also inherently limits the extent to which educators can become reflexive through a meta-awareness of their own epistemic stances and how these calibrate with their teaching practice.</p> <p>Even interested and motivated participants, with significant tertiary-level training, were apparently unequipped with adequate conceptual vocabulary for articulating the precise epistemic outcomes they desired their students (or themselves) to reach, or with the disposition to link those aims consistently to associated criteria and reliable processes. This suggests the existence of significant knowledge gaps, which may need to be addressed for educators to successfully engage in meta-epistemic discourse (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref122">16</reflink>]) regarding post-truth conditions. A greater degree of interconnectedness also needs to be facilitated between educators' existing disciplinary knowledge and their epistemic cognition. If educators are unable to clearly specify <emph>their own</emph> epistemic aims, it is likely that their capacity to facilitate students' epistemic cognition, in the complex emergent cultural and structural conditions of post-truth, will be similarly limited.</p> <p>In one sense, this lack of specificity in participants' epistemic cognition was possibly an outcome of the framing of the project itself, as responding to rather global and generic phenomenon: 'post-truth' conditions. In the absence of highly specific knowledge contexts for discussion in the social lab, the participants indeed found a productive approach—focussing on generic characteristics (skills, dispositions) that are likely to be useful in just about any context. Future social lab studies, in response, might more actively seek to activate local, disciplinary contexts of epistemic cognition.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-31">Epistemic aims and deep epistemic disagreements</hd> <p>The four identified epistemic aims also suggested significant divergence in underpinning epistemic commitments—using the term 'commitment' to indicate epistemic beliefs that remain tacit and unexpressed, but nonetheless can be inferred from the practices and tendencies of individuals (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref123">14</reflink>], p. 146). Specifically, aims (i) and (ii) (justified positions, accurate knowledge) represent epistemic commitments contrasting with those implied in aims (iii) and (iv) (shared understanding, diverse knowledge-narratives). The former pair prioritises the production of judgements to be shared and evaluated on relative merit; the latter pair prioritises intersubjective practices of knowing (rather than evaluation). Drawing from earlier work in developmental epistemology, these two pairs might be aligned to <emph>evaluativist</emph>, and <emph>multiplist</emph> epistemological stances, respectively (Kuhn et al., [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref124">35</reflink>]). Importantly, this division in the epistemic aims emerging in the social lab appears to mirror the divergence in the literature on post-truth and education, described in the Introduction, above. Aims (i) and (ii) align with the literature affirming a commitment to re-establishing the truth and traditionally valued avenues to knowing (Arede et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref125">5</reflink>]; Horsthemke, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref126">29</reflink>]; Peters, [<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref127">55</reflink>]), while aims (iii) and (iv) resonate with literature suggesting a more affirmative embrace of polycentric epistemologies (Koro-Ljungberg et al., [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref128">34</reflink>]; Nelson, [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref129">49</reflink>]).</p> <p>These divergent, and potentially contradictory, epistemic commitments would likely recommend substantially different educational responses to post-truth conditions. Such incompatibilities concern not just the status of specific knowledge claims, but reflect the existence of deep epistemic disagreements, demonstrating how "some 'post-truth' problems can arise from fundamental disagreements about what kinds of knowledge are valuable, which sources are reliable, and what the standards and procedures for achieving knowledge should be" (Chinn et al., [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref130">16</reflink>], p. 168). They are disagreements not just about what is true, but about how to know, which sources of knowledge are of value, and what counts as a legitimate claim to knowing. Without clarity around various parties' various epistemic commitments, these deep epistemic disagreements may readily remain unaddressed, preventing productive progress in responses to post-truth conditions in schools.</p> <p>Of particular significance here are the views articulated by Carly and Brenda in the discussion of Epistemic aim iv: accessing diverse knowledge narratives. These views are clearly driven by concerns for epistemic justice, namely the importance recognizing previously ignored or misrecognized voices of marginalised groups (Carly specifically names Indigenous Australians, in the case above). This is clearly a value of such a polycentric view. However, in grounding the authority of knowledge-narratives in epistemic criteria of "lived experience" (either collective or personal) they risk, by implication, making space for <emph>other</emph> morally questionable lived experiences or "personal truths" that might be racist, sexist, and so on. The implicit deep epistemic commitments here are, therefore, potentially implicated in just the opposite sort of agenda that Carly and Brenda appear to want to promote. This tension exhibited in the participant data forces into view a broader inquiry into the potential role that progressive academic scholarship (postmodernism, poststructuralism and Science and Technology Studies, to be specific) may have played historically in fertilizing the soil in which post-truth conditions came to flourish (Calcutt, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref131">12</reflink>]; Latour, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref132">37</reflink>]; Wight, [<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref133">70</reflink>]). Whether or not the charges of radical epistemological relativism aimed at these schools of thought are ultimately well-founded (Kennedy, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref134">31</reflink>]), it remains the case that certain damaging causes, such as climate change denialism, have drawn both implicitly and explicitly from them in advancing their activities (McIntyre, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref135">43</reflink>]).</p> <p>At issue here is an important distinction between two possible kinds of polycentric epistemology. On one hand, there is a radical polycentric view that celebrates the existence of different "truths" for their own sake, eschewing the desire for convergence or coherence (which in many ways exemplifies the essence of post-truth conditions). On the other, there is a more nuanced view which seeks to engage with a rich diversity of knowledge-perspectives <emph>as part of</emph> an ongoing commitment to some notion of objectivity—which nevertheless may remain far flung and ever elusive (Sassower, [<reflink idref="bib59" id="ref136">59</reflink>]; Wight, [<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref137">70</reflink>]). While the former view seems to emerge from the commentary of Carly and Brenda, it is the latter type of pluralism which appears to hold the most promise for a productive engagement with the complexity of post-truth conditions.</p> <p>Greater conceptual clarity and reflexivity regarding epistemic aims, underlying epistemic commitments, and associated ethical or political stances is also likely to be useful in combatting the various misconceptions identified above (see Table 4). For example, deliberately cultivating classroom spaces in which a greater variety of voices are encouraged and heard respectfully, in pursuit of epistemic justice (Knight et al., [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref138">33</reflink>]), need not compromise the general principle that views should be supported by reasoning and evidence. Respect for persons, and an affirmative awareness of past epistemic injustices, need not be confused with actual epistemic endorsement of those persons' views. An acknowledgement of the undeniable significance of "lived experience" in discussions of knowledge need not be joined to the view that lived experiences somehow form a foundation to knowledge claims that cannot be challenged or critically evaluated. The important role of educators in building cohesion, and addressing social inequality, under post-truth and pandemic-affected conditions (Nally, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref139">48</reflink>]) does not require any sacrifice of epistemological rigour. Further, commitment to the shared pursuit of truth as a regulative ideal, as represented in the critical realist view outlined above, does not in fact commit anyone to (a) believing that it is possible to fully access or represent truth, or (b) holding any specific claim (politicised or otherwise) as representing the truth. Building educators' competence and confidence in this domain, we propose, would support more productive and inclusive discussions about effective educational responses to post-truth conditions.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-32">Conclusions</hd> <p>Taken together, these findings highlight the need for a renewed emphasis on the <emph>epistemic</emph> in ITE and teacher learning, if school-education is to adequately respond to the rapidly changing information ecologies of the post-truth era. This epistemic focus must go significantly beyond the idea of delivering curriculum, or transmitting information, to engage in epistemic reflexivity regarding the nature, production and justification of knowledge in schooling. Educators will, of course, already hold substantial disciplinary knowledge, and understand disciplinary norms of knowledge production and evaluation. However, as shown in the findings presented here, there may still be significant gaps in their meta-epistemic competence. They are likely to need support and professional development if they are to be able to develop well-defined epistemic aims (for themselves, and for their students), situated in local, meaningful professional (and disciplinary) contexts, that will empower students to engage with the complex and messy knowledge contexts of post-truth conditions. Educators need to build their capacity for epistemic reflexivity (Lunn Brownlee et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref140">39</reflink>]), to be confident and capable handling epistemological concepts related to truth, belief, opinion, justification, understanding and explanation, as well as the notions of epistemic aims, ideals and reliable procedures themselves.</p> <p>Of course, individual epistemic competence will be necessary, but not sufficient to adequately respond to post-truth politics, cultures and the underlying information ecology: structural and technical responses are ultimately needed to address the scale and complexity of the problem (Lewandowsky et al., [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref141">38</reflink>]). Educators' localised practices of reflexive deliberation must, therefore, occur in light of an understanding of the broader cultural and structural emergent properties of post-truth politics and post-truth information ecologies. It is this linking of the 'micro' and the 'macro', to drive resolved action in the contexts of educational work, which constitutes the task of epistemically reflexive deliberation. In summary, enhancing the qualities of teachers' epistemic reflexivity must go hand in hand with more explicit engagement with the phenomenon of post-truth conditions in ITE courses and teacher professional learning more broadly. In terms of specific classroom skills, teachers may require greater support to engage with and facilitate discussion of controversial issues and deep epistemological disagreement in classrooms, and the attendant emotional (Nelson, [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref142">49</reflink>]) and ethical (Knight et al., [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref143">33</reflink>]) complexities. Chinn and colleagues' ([<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref144">16</reflink>]) "explorations into knowing" provides a promising model that could be used and tested more widely. Methodologically, the complexity of linking the micro and macro in reflexive deliberation suggests that more contextually located studies of epistemic reflexivity, in situated school and classroom contexts, may be a productive avenue for future research.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-33">Acknowledgements</hd> <p>The authors express their thanks to the Research Assistant for the project, who provided support with project administration and aspects of the analysis.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-34">Funding</hd> <p>This work was supported by a University of Melbourne Early Career Researcher Grant [grant number 2021ECR035].</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-35">Data Availability</hd> <p>The full data set underlying this research cannot be made available in accordance with the ethical requirements to maintain participant confidentiality.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-36">Declarations</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0179669460-37">Competing interests</hd> <p>The authors have no competing interest to declare in relation to this article.</p> <hd id="AN0179669460-38">Publisher's Note</hd> <p>Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.</p> <ref id="AN0179669460-39"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref75" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Alexander, P. 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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Educators, Epistemic Reflexivity and Post-Truth Conditions – Name: Language Label: Language Group: Lang Data: English – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Christopher+T%2E+McCaw%22">Christopher T. McCaw</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9827-0572">0000-0002-9827-0572</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Mary+Ryan%22">Mary Ryan</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2237-9368">0000-0003-2237-9368</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Jo+Lunn+Brownlee%22">Jo Lunn Brownlee</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2929-4770">0000-0003-2929-4770</externalLink>) – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Journal+of+Educational+Change%22"><i>Journal of Educational Change</i></searchLink>. 2024 25(3):455-484. – Name: Avail Label: Availability Group: Avail Data: Springer. Available from: Springer Nature. One New York Plaza, Suite 4600, New York, NY 10004. Tel: 800-777-4643; Tel: 212-460-1500; Fax: 212-460-1700; e-mail: customerservice@springernature.com; Web site: https://link.springer.com/ – Name: PeerReviewed Label: Peer Reviewed Group: SrcInfo Data: Y – Name: Pages Label: Page Count Group: Src Data: 30 – Name: DatePubCY Label: Publication Date Group: Date Data: 2024 – Name: TypeDocument Label: Document Type Group: TypDoc Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Research – Name: Subject Label: Descriptors Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Ethics%22">Ethics</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Epistemology%22">Epistemology</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Trust+%28Psychology%29%22">Trust (Psychology)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Teacher+Attitudes%22">Teacher Attitudes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+Problems%22">Social Problems</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Faculty+Development%22">Faculty Development</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Deception%22">Deception</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Misinformation%22">Misinformation</searchLink> – Name: DOI Label: DOI Group: ID Data: 10.1007/s10833-023-09499-1 – Name: ISSN Label: ISSN Group: ISSN Data: 1389-2843<br />1573-1812 – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: Under 'post-truth' conditions the generation, circulation and status of knowledge are being transformed, with significant implications for institutional trust, social cohesion and public safety. These conditions raise complex challenges and opportunities within education, which plays a potentially pivotal role in supporting communities to respond in an assertive and critical manner. However, little is currently understood about the way key stakeholders within education position themselves epistemically in relation to post-truth conditions. The purpose of this research was to analyse epistemic aspects of educators' responses to post-truth conditions using a 'social lab' methodology, which is a qualitative, action-oriented approach to studying complex social problems. Analysis of data from the social lab, which involved a variety of education stakeholders, identified four epistemic aims (with associated ideals, processes and actions) to orient an educational response to post-truth conditions. However, overall, epistemic aims lacked precision and contextual specificity. Furthermore, aims were associated with divergent underpinning epistemological commitments, mirroring divergences in literature on the educational implications of post-truth conditions. Teachers may require additional training to enhance epistemic reflexivity and drive more productive and inclusive conversations about post-truth in classrooms, staffrooms and ITE programs. The findings are suggestive of the complex epistemological and institutional dynamics that need to be negotiated in educational responses to post-truth conditions. – Name: AbstractInfo Label: Abstractor Group: Ab Data: As Provided – Name: DateEntry Label: Entry Date Group: Date Data: 2024 – Name: AN Label: Accession Number Group: ID Data: EJ1439250 |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1007/s10833-023-09499-1 Languages: – Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 30 StartPage: 455 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Ethics Type: general – SubjectFull: Epistemology Type: general – SubjectFull: Trust (Psychology) Type: general – SubjectFull: Teacher Attitudes Type: general – SubjectFull: Social Problems Type: general – SubjectFull: Faculty Development Type: general – SubjectFull: Deception Type: general – SubjectFull: Misinformation Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Educators, Epistemic Reflexivity and Post-Truth Conditions Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Christopher T. McCaw – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Mary Ryan – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Jo Lunn Brownlee IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 09 Type: published Y: 2024 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 1389-2843 – Type: issn-electronic Value: 1573-1812 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 25 – Type: issue Value: 3 Titles: – TitleFull: Journal of Educational Change Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |
