View in EDS HTML Full Text PDF Full Text

A Little Imprecision Goes a Long Way in Launching Memory Development

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: A Little Imprecision Goes a Long Way in Launching Memory Development
Language: English
Authors: Vladimir M. Sloutsky (ORCID 0000-0003-4054-3360), Robby Ralston, Brandon M. Turner, Simona Ghetti
Source: Child Development Perspectives. 2025 19(3):139-145.
Availability: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 7
Publication Date: 2025
Sponsoring Agency: National Science Foundation (NSF), Division of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences (BCS)
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) (DHHS/NIH)
Contract Number: 1847603
R01HD078545
Document Type: Journal Articles
Information Analyses
Descriptors: Memory, Cognitive Development, Mnemonics, Infants, Young Children, Adults, Age Differences, Individual Development
DOI: 10.1111/cdep.12536
ISSN: 1750-8592
1750-8606
Abstract: From the earliest moments in their lives, infants begin to build memories about their past and accumulate knowledge about the world. In this article, we focus on the distinction between memory for "specific" events and memory for "general" information, and the ongoing debate about which type of memory provides the foundation for the development of the other. Some researchers argue that specific memory developmentally precedes general memory, whereas others support the opposite position. Our literature review suggests that the latter position is inconsistent with many empirical findings and theoretical principles of memory captured by computational models capable of accounting for these findings. We propose that just good enough mnemonic acuity could be a starting point for memory development, and that it can support both specific and generalized memories.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2025
Accession Number: EJ1480091
Database: ERIC
Full text is not displayed to guests.
FullText Links:
  – Type: pdflink
    Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwHbHbL21xTB3-IVHjnMvaLZAAAA4zCB4AYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHSMIHPAgEAMIHJBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDH0_G5n7pKqsS80teQIBEICBmz8QdplUe584KcV6JYzlChjpSv9htGE8wutYd_mekN7RiLuAaJQ1a4P4OEYMWJen5K4AOIrlGwAovRYqGt3U732x9X5y20jQwaAqaotdbxktAhkXmiHd6BGu7bbZk3F3uqBG2K1uKs0mvVy5O7bAsG5c6CdScgd2hA0Ku9YSB7fWAaRvOcxXctQHPvcJHgmpSSE5lZZmKD6beG3R
Text:
  Availability: 1
  Value: <anid>AN0187278088;[30rc]01sep.25;2025Aug14.03:17;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0187278088-1">A little imprecision goes a long way in launching memory development </title> <p>From the earliest moments in their lives, infants begin to build memories about their past and accumulate knowledge about the world. In this article, we focus on the distinction between memory for specific events and memory for general information, and the ongoing debate about which type of memory provides the foundation for the development of the other. Some researchers argue that specific memory developmentally precedes general memory, whereas others support the opposite position. Our literature review suggests that the latter position is inconsistent with many empirical findings and theoretical principles of memory captured by computational models capable of accounting for these findings. We propose that just good enough mnemonic acuity could be a starting point for memory development, and that it can support both specific and generalized memories.</p> <p>Keywords: episodic memory; generalization; memory development; semantic memory</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> Abbreviations</item> <p></p> <item> ARM the Adaptive Representation Model</item> <p></p> <item> ATHENA Autoassociative and Heteroassociative Neural Attention</item> <p></p> <item> C‐HORSE Complementary Hippocampal Operations for Representing Statistics and Episodes</item> <p></p> <item> FTT fuzzy trace theory</item> <p></p> <item> GCM Generalized Context Model</item> <p></p> <item> REMERGE Recurrency and Episodic Memory Results in Generalization</item> </ulist> <p>Memory is not unitary, and multiple elaborate taxonomies of memory domains exist (Squire, [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref1">50</reflink>]; Tulving, [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref2">51</reflink>]). In this article, we focus on the distinction between memory for <emph>specific</emph> events (e.g., the food an individual ate for breakfast yesterday) and memory for <emph>general</emph> information (e.g., food that people typically eat for breakfast).</p> <p>In a variety of laboratory studies—most of which were conducted in the United States with participants from middle‐class areas near universities—even young infants demonstrated the ability to learn both specific information (Bauer, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref3">1</reflink>]; Hayne, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref4">21</reflink>]; Nelson, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref5">33</reflink>]; Newcombe et al., [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref6">34</reflink>]) and more general information (Graham et al., [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref7">20</reflink>]; Mareschal & Quinn, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref8">30</reflink>]), with both undergoing development. (For the sociodemographic characteristics of the studies reviewed herein, please see Table S1.) In focusing on the distinction between memory for <emph>specific</emph> events and memory for <emph>general</emph> information, we aspire to elucidate how memory representations of specific events, however imprecise they might be, suffice to provide the foundation of memory development for specific and general information. In doing so, we are humbled by the fact that this is one of the foundational issues in cognitive science and also one of the most difficult issues, since both types of memory may function in parallel, at least later in development (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref9">7</reflink>]; Knowlton & Squire, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref10">26</reflink>]).</p> <p>To understand memory development, including the increasing ability to learn and retain both specific and general information, some proposals focus on the distinction between <emph>episodic</emph> memory (or memory for events) and <emph>semantic</emph> memory (knowledge of facts, meanings of words, and regularities in the environment), whereas others focus on the distinction between memory for <emph>specific</emph> and memory for <emph>generalized</emph> information. Although these conceptual distinctions are not identical, they have enough in common to provide the foundation of different conceptualizations of memory development. For example, one idea is that the formation of semantic or generalized memories may be favored during early childhood due to a developmental pressure to accumulate knowledge about the world and thus retain information about what is common across experiences versus what is unique. From this perspective, the capacity to retain generalized memories might emerge first, whereas the capacity to remember specific episodes would come later in development (Keresztes et al., [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref11">25</reflink>]; Ngo et al., [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref12">35</reflink>]).</p> <p>In this article, we present this position and discuss its important limitations. We underscore that some memory representation of individual events is necessary to support generalized memories. We conclude by discussing how classical and emerging computational models embodying various principles of organizing memory handle the emergence of both specific and general memory.</p> <hd id="AN0187278088-2">MEMORIES OF EARLY EVENTS ARE POWERFUL LEARNING TOOLS</hd> <p>Although infants and young children can form memories of events, they typically do not retain these specific memories past early childhood, a phenomenon called <emph>infantile</emph> or <emph>childhood amnesia</emph> for early life events (see Bauer, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref13">3</reflink>]; Donato et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref14">14</reflink>]; Hayne, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref15">21</reflink>]; Newcombe et al., [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref16">34</reflink>]). However, they do retain robust memories for more general information acquired during that time, such as environmental contingencies (e.g., unsupported items tend to fall), meanings of words, or understanding of more general categories (e.g., balls are round). These differences in memory have been interpreted by some (e.g., Keresztes et al., [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref17">25</reflink>]; Ngo et al., [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref18">35</reflink>]; see also Gómez & Edgin, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref19">19</reflink>], for a review) as evidence that the ability to retain commonalities among experiences emerges before and without memory for specific information. This is consistent with the compelling idea that amassing general knowledge should be favored in early development.</p> <p>Although there is evidence consistent with the idea of general before specific, there are also substantial theoretical and empirical difficulties. We argue that these difficulties may stem from a conflation of the notion of generalized memory with that of imprecise memory. Specifically, when children exhibit memory for an object but do not recall its color or the context in which it appeared (e.g., Ngo et al., [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref20">35</reflink>]), they demonstrate merely an imprecise memory of their experience, not necessarily a generalized memory of what <emph>typically</emph> happens. Therefore, distinguishing imprecision from generalization may resolve these difficulties and explain the onset and development of both specific and generalized memory. Although this distinction may seem purely terminological, it is consequential for understanding memory development because truly generalized memories have properties that imprecise memories lack (cf. Shepard, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref21">45</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0187278088-3">No specific memory—No concepts?</hd> <p>Theoretically, it is necessary to ask: Is it possible to form a general category of a "bird" from just <emph>few</emph> exposures to birds without retaining memories of the individual birds? Although many theories predict that the answer to this question is no (see Hintzman, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref22">23</reflink>]; McClelland et al., [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref23">31</reflink>]), they do so for different reasons. By some accounts, it is impossible to form a general category without memory of specific instances or exemplars, whereas other accounts suggest that it is impossible to form a general memory from just a small number of encounters.</p> <p>We suggest another critical consideration within this framework—the distinctiveness of an item in memory, or <emph>mnemonic acuity</emph>: If memory traces are too precise (and distinct), they may prevent generalization (especially when a limited body of knowledge is available to bias processing toward the most diagnostic features). If memory traces are too vague, very different instances would be confused. In the former case, an individual would remember two very similar birds as distinct, which would interfere with the formation of the general category of birds. In the latter case, an individual may fail to recognize a bird and a ball as distinct, potentially resulting in the formation of a category that is too broad and unconstrained to be useful.</p> <p>We further suggest that such imprecise yet specific memories, coupled with the <emph>accumulation</emph> of individual traces, support increasing generalization, and that the <emph>developing ability</emph> to integrate across episodes allows for inference and derivation of new knowledge. Concurrently, the developing ability to form more precise and more complex, relational episodic memories (Ghetti & Fandakova, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref24">18</reflink>]) results in better identification of exemplars and protection against interference‐based forgetting (Darby & Sloutsky, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref25">12</reflink>]; Yim et al., [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref26">56</reflink>]). These developments are likely driven by both maturation and increasing interactions between the medial temporal lobe structures, and the prefrontal and parietal cortices (Selmeczy et al., [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref27">44</reflink>]).</p> <p>In the remainder of this article, we discuss empirical evidence supporting the early emergence and developmental primacy of specific but imprecise memories. Then, we examine theoretical principles embodied by classical and emerging computational models of memory and generalization. We argue that models that embody the specific‐to‐general principles can account for both early memory and memory development data, whereas models that embody the general‐without‐specific principles cannot do so (although they can account for many other important aspects of learning). We conclude that this specific but imprecise memory is a more plausible starting point than the early‐emerging ability to extract regularities across episodes.</p> <hd id="AN0187278088-4">Why early memories for specific events suffice to support generalization</hd> <p>A large body of empirical evidence on memory and categorization development suggests the developmental primacy of specific memories. Specifically, we identify three lines of complementary evidence: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref28">1</reflink>) infants' early ability to retain specific memories, (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref29">2</reflink>) greater developmental <emph>improvements</emph> in the ability to form more general memories and to integrate across episodes than improvements in specific memories, and (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref30">3</reflink>) a developmental <emph>decrease</emph> in exemplar‐specific encoding during category learning.</p> <hd id="AN0187278088-5">Infants and young children exhibit impressive abilities to remember specific events</hd> <p>From the early days of their lives, infants exhibit an ability to remember past episodes (e.g., Bauer, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref31">2</reflink>]; Bauer et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref32">5</reflink>]; Hayne, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref33">21</reflink>]; Simcock & Hayne, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref34">46</reflink>]; see also Donato et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref35">14</reflink>]). At 6 months, infants can remember (i.e., imitate) sequences of events for a day (Hayne et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref36">22</reflink>]), with 9‐month olds remembering the learned sequences for weeks, 10‐month olds for months (Carver & Bauer, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref37">9</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref38">10</reflink>]), and 20‐month olds for almost a year (Bauer et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref39">5</reflink>]). Moreover, evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging indicates that such memory for specific experience may be based on hippocampal processes (Mooney et al., [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref40">32</reflink>]; Prabhakar et al., [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref41">38</reflink>]). At the same time, we are unaware of any studies demonstrating long‐term retention of categories learned in the laboratory in infancy.</p> <p>Even word learning that should provide the strongest case for a primacy of generalization in infancy and early childhood may not support this idea. This is because word learning is subject to constraints typical of specific memory (Vlach, [<reflink idref="bib54" id="ref42">54</reflink>]), and learning a new word starts with a specific, context‐dependent memory of a word‐referent pair (Vlach & Sandhofer, [<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref43">55</reflink>]), engaging regions in the brain subserving episodic memory, including the hippocampus (Johnson et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref44">24</reflink>]). Although the precision and durability of these memories improve during development (Ghetti & Fandakova, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref45">18</reflink>]), these early memories may suffice to provide the foundation for generalization across multiple exposures, as we discuss next.</p> <hd id="AN0187278088-6">Memories become more general with development</hd> <p>Although development results in the ability to form more precise and more complex memories (Darby et al., [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref46">11</reflink>]; Drummey & Newcombe, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref47">15</reflink>]; Lee et al., [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref48">29</reflink>]; Sluzenski et al., [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref49">49</reflink>]; Yim et al., [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref50">56</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref51">57</reflink>]), it also results in the ability to form more general, less context‐dependent memories (Hayne, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref52">21</reflink>]). Specifically, in one study, 6‐ and 12‐month olds could recall studied information only when information at retrieval was identical to that at encoding (Hayne et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref53">22</reflink>]), with even small contextual changes disrupting the memories of 6‐month olds. In contrast, the older infants were more tolerant of differences in the context of encoding/retrieval and used a wider range of retrieval cues.</p> <p>In research with preschool‐ and elementary school‐age children guided by the fuzzy trace theory (FTT), researchers demonstrated that general (or gist) representations lag behind specific (or verbatim) representations (Brainerd et al., [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref54">8</reflink>]). Specifically, preschoolers are less prone to semantic intrusions than are older children and adults: When presented with a list of semantic associates of the word <emph>sweet</emph> (i.e., <emph>candy</emph>, <emph>sugar</emph>, <emph>chocolate</emph>, <emph>cake</emph>, and <emph>pie</emph>), preschoolers were less likely to incorrectly recall the word <emph>sweet</emph> than were older participants. Although FTT posits the <emph>parallel</emph> functioning of gist and verbatim memories, these findings clearly challenge the general‐before‐specific accounts.</p> <p>Similarly, in another study, when presented with pictures of animals from different general categories (e.g., cats, birds, and bears) in a generalization task, preschoolers had fewer same‐category intrusions than did adults in a subsequent recognition task while having better memory for the individual items (Sloutsky & Fisher, [<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref55">47</reflink>]). The proportion of same‐category intrusions increased between 4 and 11 years, indicating a protracted <emph>development</emph> of the ability to form generalized memories (Fisher & Sloutsky, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref56">16</reflink>]).</p> <p>Furthermore, the ability to generalize by integrating information <emph>across distributed‐in‐time experiences</emph> depends on the ability to retain individual experiences (Bauer et al., [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref57">4</reflink>]; Savic et al., [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref58">40</reflink>]; Schlichting et al., [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref59">42</reflink>]; Unger et al., [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref60">53</reflink>]; see also Kumaran et al., [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref61">27</reflink>]; Kumaran & McClelland, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref62">28</reflink>], for computational arguments). For example, in studies using an associative inference paradigm (i.e., the ability to infer that A is related to C from being exposed to A related to B and B related to C), inference from A to C did not happen in the absence of memories for AB and BC, and even retaining these specific memories did not guarantee associative inference in 7‐ to 10‐year olds (Bauer et al., [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref63">4</reflink>]; Schlichting et al., [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref64">42</reflink>]), with associative inference being related to the maturation of the hippocampus in childhood and adolescence (Schlichting et al., [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref65">43</reflink>]). Similarly, in word learning, when presented with direct links between (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref66">1</reflink>) a novel adjective and a familiar noun (e.g., A‐B) and (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref67">2</reflink>) the novel adjective and a novel noun (e.g., A‐C), preschoolers retained (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref68">1</reflink>) and (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref69">2</reflink>) well before they could form a second‐order link between B and C (Savic et al., [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref70">40</reflink>]; see also Sloutsky et al., [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref71">48</reflink>]; Unger et al., [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref72">53</reflink>]). Together, these studies demonstrate that generalized or integrated memories may depend on individual memories accumulated through repeated experiences.</p> <hd id="AN0187278088-7">Children tend to retain more exemplar‐specific information than adults when tasked with learn...</hd> <p>At first glance, commonly used categories like "dog" or "cup" are a prime example of general knowledge accumulated early in development. Yet evidence suggests that early category knowledge is tied to memory for specifics: Because of their tendency to distribute attention rather than selectively attend to the most informative features, infants and young children tend to retain more exemplar‐specific information than do adults (Best et al., [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref73">6</reflink>]; Deng & Sloutsky, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref74">13</reflink>]; Plebanek & Sloutsky, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref75">37</reflink>]). In one study (Deng & Sloutsky, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref76">13</reflink>]), 4‐ to 5‐year olds, 5‐ to 6‐year olds, and adults first learned two categories, and then were given a surprise memory test. Whereas adults tended to remember mostly the features that controlled their categorization responses, younger children also remembered features that were less relevant to their categorization response.</p> <p>Taken together, this evidence suggests that early memories tend to be rather specific and that these specific memories may underlie learning categories and forming early concepts. In the next section, we examine our proposal against theoretical principles of memory embodied by current and emerging computational models of memory. In doing so, we argue that <emph>just good enough</emph> mnemonic acuity is an appropriate starting point for memory development and that such <emph>just good enough</emph> acuity can give rise to both specific memory and generalization. In contrast, when mnemonic acuity is too low or too high, generalization becomes problematic.</p> <hd id="AN0187278088-8">MEMORY DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE LENSES OF THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES OF MEMORY</hd> <p>In addition to the empirical evidence we have reviewed, another way to compare proposals on memory development is to analyze them against theoretical principles formulated by researchers who study memory and generalization and represented as computational models of learning, memory, and generalization. Because our focus is the <emph>emergence</emph> of memory and generalization, we discuss only the models capable of learning new (rather than those that retain familiar) information. The two fundamental approaches for handling memory and generalization problems that we discuss here are <emph>instance‐based and strength‐based</emph> theories.</p> <p>Although these approaches converge in their ability to solve some problems (see Turner, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref77">52</reflink>], for an extended discussion), they diverge in their ability to solve others, and most importantly, in how they generate solutions. The primary difference is that instance‐based theories posit a separate memory trace for each stimulus or even for each encounter with a stimulus, whereas strength‐based theories posit a pattern of activation for each input stimulus and a link to an output or response, whose strength changes with experience. This matters because an instance (or exemplar) is a <emph>specific</emph> memory that is also a starting point of any future generalization. Generalization is a function of accumulation of traces. In contrast, although specific memories are possible in some variants (McClelland et al., [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref78">31</reflink>]; Schapiro et al., [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref79">41</reflink>]), they are not possible in the standard variants of strength‐based theories.</p> <p>The instance‐based (or exemplar) theories and relevant models posit encoding specific memories as a precondition of extracting more general regularities. This is true for the classical models of memory and memory‐based generalization, such as MINERVA2 (Hintzman, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref80">23</reflink>]) and GCM (Nosofsky, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref81">36</reflink>]); for more recent models, such as REMERGE (Kumaran & McClelland, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref82">28</reflink>]; Kumaran et al., [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref83">27</reflink>]); and for emerging models, such as ARM (Galdo et al., [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref84">17</reflink>]; Turner, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref85">52</reflink>]) and ATHENA (Ralston, [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref86">39</reflink>]). Although these models differ in how generalization is implemented, they all agree that for generalization to occur, some specific information must be retained. As a result, this class of theories and many respective models have a natural way of modeling infants' ability to retain episodic memories after a few exposures (Bauer et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref87">5</reflink>]; Carver & Bauer, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref88">9</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref89">10</reflink>]) and perform simple categorization tasks (Mareschal & Quinn, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref90">30</reflink>]), as well as preschoolers' struggle to perform associative inference (AB, AC → BC) until they firmly retain AB and AC information (Unger et al., [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref91">53</reflink>]).</p> <p>In contrast, some strength‐based theories may allow the formation of generalized without specific memories (e.g., cortical learning within the complementary learning systems; McClelland et al., [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref92">31</reflink>]), but learning resulting in generalized memories must be very slow (to avoid <emph>catastrophic interference</emph>—a complete loss of newly acquired memories due to interference), perhaps too slow to account for the deferred imitation and potential categorization of findings in infants, with both typically requiring a small number of exposures.</p> <p>One emerging computational model that combines the principles of strength‐based models implemented as neural networks with fast (hippocampal) learning is the complementary learning systems within the hippocampus model, C‐HORSE (Schapiro et al., [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref93">41</reflink>]). According to this approach, both specific and general memories may form relatively quickly (since both are formed in the hippocampus), but these memories rely on different neural circuitry. The model posits two separate pathways: the monosynaptic pathway, subserving the extraction of general regularities, such as statistical learning, and the trisynaptic pathway, subserving the formation of specific memories. However, an analysis of modeling results (see figure 2 in Schapiro et al., [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref94">41</reflink>]) clearly indicates that in <emph>both</emph> pathways, learning starts with memory for specific information.</p> <p>Although the model demonstrates an impressive ability to simulate a variety of tasks, including simple statistical learning and tasks that require the extraction of a higher‐order structure, its primary mechanism of memory development (the maturation of the trisynaptic pathway) may be too simple to account for the intricacies of memory development. Such maturation may explain the formation of more complex memory traces, but it is not immediately obvious how it would explain the fact that with development, memories become more flexible and depend less on context. In contrast, the instance‐based models we reviewed have a natural way of explaining the development of memory and generalization, with the former being driven by increasing mnemonic acuity and the latter by the number and diversity of encountered instances. To be fair, the ability of the models to account for memory development data can be fully established only through computational simulations or model fitting.</p> <p>Many instance‐based models of memory have a mechanistic (and quantitative) way of capturing specificity of memory for a stimulus, or mnemonic acuity. When mnemonic acuity is near the minimum or functional floor (which is the case in low specific memory), categories may become lumped together and thus indistinguishable at retrieval. Alternatively, when mnemonic acuity is near the maximum or functional ceiling, all items could be represented only as individuals, resulting in exceptionally good memory for items and difficulty to generalize across items. Therefore, very low levels of mnemonic acuity result in no memory and unrealistically broad generalization (since anything could be generalized to anything else), whereas very high levels of mnemonic acuity result in unrealistically good memory and almost no generalization.</p> <p>In contrast, the intermediate levels of mnemonic acuity (i.e., not very low or very high) represent a plausible starting point. When the number of encountered instances of a category (e.g., cats) is very low (as is often the case with infants and young children), people can remember individual items while exhibiting some evidence of generalization. As the number of instances increases, memories of individual items become less distinct, with more general category knowledge emerging. Although the latter could be said to be what occurs in the case of general knowledge without specific memory, it is a <emph>product</emph> of development (as the number of instances increases over time) rather than a <emph>starting point</emph>.</p> <p>In short, we suggest that moderate mnemonic acuity for specific memories is a plausible starting point for the development of both specific and general memory. As mnemonic acuity increases with development, memory for items should become more robust. Furthermore, as the number of encountered instances rises with development and information about these instances is accumulated, knowledge of a general category should become more robust.</p> <p>In summary, models that can explain the reviewed empirical data are incompatible with the idea that generalization would be achieved without memory for specific events. However, a somewhat modified idea of specific but not very precise memory (stemming from moderate mnemonic acuity) could be a starting point for memory development. Of course, to properly test this idea, the principles we discussed—of memory captured by computational models—should be applied (via simulations) to a wide range of findings on early memory and memory development.</p> <hd id="AN0187278088-9">CONCLUSION</hd> <p>In this article, we examined how memory and generalization change with development. Our review suggests that a strict general‐before‐specific idea is inconsistent with many empirical findings and the principles of learning, memory, and generalization that can account for these findings. At the same time, a somewhat modified version of this idea (i.e., <emph>just good enough</emph> memory) could be a starting point that enables both memory for some individual experiences and generalization. However, to reach firmer conclusions, researchers need to test these ideas by simulating memory and memory development data with models that capture these and alternative principles.</p> <hd id="AN0187278088-10">ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</hd> <p>The authors thank Layla Unger for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this article. The authors' research reported in this article was supported by the National Institutes of Health (grant R01HD078545 to Vladimir Sloutsky and grant R21HD098700 to Simona Ghetti), and by the National Science Foundation (CAREER grant 1847603 to Brandon Turner).</p> <p>GRAPH: Table S1.</p> <ref id="AN0187278088-11"> <title> REFERENCES </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref3" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Bauer, P. J. (2002). Long–term recall memory: Behavioral and neuro‐developmental changes in the first 2 years of life. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11 (4), 137 – 141. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467‐8721.00186</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref29" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Bauer, P. J. (2007). Recall in infancy: A neurodevelopmental account. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16, 142 – 146. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467‐8721.2007.00492.x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref13" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> Bauer, P. J. (2015). A complementary processes account of the development of childhood amnesia and a personal past. Psychological Review, 122, 204 – 231. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038939</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib4" idref="ref57" type="bt">4</bibl> <bibtext> Bauer, P. J., Cronin‐Golomb, L. M., Porter, B. M., Jaganjac, A., & Miller, H. E. (2020). Integration of memory content in adults and children: Developmental differences in task conditions and functional consequences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150 (7), 1259 – 1278. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000996</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib5" idref="ref32" type="bt">5</bibl> <bibtext> Bauer, P. J., Wenner, J. A., Dropik, P. L., & Wewerka, S. S. (2000). Parameters of remembering and forgetting in the transition from infancy to early childhood. Wiley‐Blackwell.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib6" idref="ref73" type="bt">6</bibl> <bibtext> Best, C. A., Yim, H., & Sloutsky, V. M. (2013). The cost of selective attention in category learning: Developmental differences between adults and infants. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 116 (2), 105 – 119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.05.002</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib7" idref="ref9" type="bt">7</bibl> <bibtext> Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (2002). Fuzzy‐trace theory and false memory. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 164 – 169. <ulink href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/20182800">http://www.jstor.org/stable/20182800</ulink></bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib8" idref="ref54" type="bt">8</bibl> <bibtext> Brainerd, C. J., Reyna, V. F., & Ceci, S. J. (2008). Developmental reversals in false memory: A review of data and theory. Psychological Bulletin, 134 (3), 343 – 382. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033‐2909.134.3.343</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib9" idref="ref37" type="bt">9</bibl> <bibtext> Carver, L. J., & Bauer, P. J. (1999). When the event is more than the sum of its parts: Long‐term recall of event sequences by 9‐month‐old infants. Memory, 7 (2), 147 – 174. https://doi.org/10.1080/741944070</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Carver, L. J., & Bauer, P. J. (2001). The dawning of a past: The emergence of long‐term explicit memory in infancy. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130 (4), 726 – 745. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096‐3445.130.4.726</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Darby, K. P., Sederberg, P. B., & Sloutsky, V. M. (2022). Intraobject and extraobject memory binding across early development. Developmental Psychology, 58 (7), 1237 – 1253. https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0001355</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Darby, K. P., & Sloutsky, V. M. (2015). The cost of learning: Interference effects in memory development. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144 (2), 410 – 431. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000051</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Deng, W. S., & Sloutsky, V. M. (2016). Selective attention, diffused attention, and the development of categorization. Cognitive Psychology, 91, 24 – 62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2016.09.002</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Donato, F., Alberini, C. M., Amso, D., Dragoi, G., Dranovsky, A., & Newcombe, N. S. (2021). The ontogeny of hippocampus‐dependent memories. The Journal of Neuroscience, 41 (5), 920 – 926. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1651‐20.2020</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Drummey, A. B., & Newcombe, N. S. (2002). Developmental changes in source memory. Developmental Science, 5 (4), 502 – 513. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467‐7687.00243</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Fisher, A. V., & Sloutsky, V. M. (2005). When induction meets memory: Evidence for gradual transition from similarity‐based to category‐based induction. Child Development, 76 (3), 583 – 597. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467‐8624.2005.00865.x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Galdo, M., Weichart, E. R., Sloutsky, V. M., & Turner, B. M. (2022). The quest for simplicity in human learning: Identifying the constraints on attention. Cognitive Psychology, 138, 101508. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101508</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ghetti, S., & Fandakova, Y. (2020). Neural development of memory and metamemory in childhood and adolescence: Toward an integrative model of the development of episodic recollection. Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, 2, 365 – 388. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev‐devpsych‐060320‐085634</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gómez, R. L., & Edgin, J. O. (2016). The extended trajectory of hippocampal development: Implications for early memory development and disorder. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 57 – 69. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2015.08.009</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Graham, S. A., Kilbreath, C. S., & Welder, A. N. (2004). Thirteen‐month‐olds rely on shared labels and shape similarity for inductive inferences. Child Development, 75 (2), 409 – 427. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467‐8624.2004.00683.x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Hayne, H. (2004). Infant memory development: Implications for childhood amnesia. Developmental Review, 24 (1), 33 – 73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2003.09.007</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Hayne, H., Boniface, J., & Barr, R. (2000). The development of declarative memory in human infants: Age‐related changes in deferred imitation. Behavioral Neuroscience, 114 (1), 77 – 83. https://doi.org/10.1037//0735‐7044.114.1.77</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Hintzman, D. L. (1986). "Schema abstraction" in a multiple‐trace memory model. Psychological Review, 93 (4), 411 – 428. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033‐295X.93.4.411</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Johnson, E. G., Mooney, L., Estes, K. G., Nordahl, C. W., & Ghetti, S. (2021). Activation for newly learned words in left medial‐temporal lobe during toddlers' sleep is associated with memory for words. Current Biology, 31 (24), 5429 – 5438. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2021.09.058</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Keresztes, A., Ngo, C. T., Lindenberger, U., Werkle‐Bergner, M., & Newcombe, N. S. (2018). Hippocampal maturation drives memory from generalization to specificity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 22 (8), P676 – P686. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.05.004</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Knowlton, B. J., & Squire, L. R. (1993). The learning of categories: Parallel brain systems for item memory and category knowledge. Science, 262 (5140), 1747 – 1749. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.8259522</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kumaran, D., Hassabis, D., & McClelland, J. L. (2016). What learning systems do intelligent agents need? Complementary learning systems theory updated. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20 (7), 512 – 534. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.05.004</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kumaran, D., & McClelland, J. L. (2012). Generalization through the recurrent interaction of episodic memories: A model of the hippocampal system. Psychological Review, 119 (3), 573 – 616. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028681</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lee, J. K., Fandakova, Y., Johnson, E. G., Cohen, N. J., Bunge, S. A., & Ghetti, S. (2020). Changes in anterior and posterior hippocampus differentially predict item‐space, item‐time, and item‐item memory improvement. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 41, 100741. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2019.100741</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Mareschal, D., & Quinn, P. C. (2001). Categorization in infancy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5 (10), 443 – 450. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364‐6613(00)01752‐6</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> McClelland, J. L., McNaughton, B. L., & O'Reilly, R. C. (1995). Why there are complementary learning systems in the hippocampus and neocortex: Insights from the successes and failures of connectionist models of learning and memory. Psychological Review, 102 (3), 419 – 457. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033‐295X.102.3.419</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Mooney, L. N., Johnson, E. G., Prabhakar, J., & Ghetti, S. (2021). Memory‐related hippocampal activation during sleep and temporal memory in toddlers. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 47, 100908. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2020.100908</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Nelson, C. A. (1995). The ontogeny of human memory: A cognitive neuroscience perspective. Developmental Psychology, 31 (5), 723 – 738. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012‐1649.31.5.723</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Newcombe, N. S., Lloyd, M. E., & Ratliff, K. R. (2007). Development of episodic and autobiographical memory: A cognitive neuroscience perspective. In R. V. Kail (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (pp. 35 – 85). Elsevier Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978‐0‐12‐009735‐7.50007‐4</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ngo, C. T., Benear, S. L., Popal, H., Olson, I. R., & Newcombe, N. S. (2021). Contingency of semantic generalization on episodic specificity varies across development. Current Biology, 31 (12), 2690 – 2697. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2021.03.088</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Nosofsky, R. M. (1986). Attention, similarity, and the identification‐categorization relationship. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 115 (1), 39 – 57. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096‐3445.115.1.39</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Plebanek, D. J., & Sloutsky, V. M. (2017). Costs of selective attention: When children notice what adults miss. Psychological Science, 28 (6), 723 – 732. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617693005</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Prabhakar, J., Johnson, E. G., Nordahl, C. W., & Ghetti, S. (2018). Memory‐related hippocampal activation in the sleeping toddler. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 115, 6500 – 6505. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1805572115</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ralston, R. W. (2023). ATHENA for memory‐based inference [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. The Ohio State University. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/b6j9n</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Savic, O., Unger, L., & Sloutsky, V. M. (2023). Experience and maturation: The contribution of co‐occurrence regularities in language to the development of semantic organization. Child Development, 94 (1), 142 – 158. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13844</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Schapiro, A. C., Turk‐Browne, N. B., Botvinick, M. M., & Norman, K. A. (2017). Complementary learning systems within the hippocampus: A neural network modelling approach to reconciling episodic memory with statistical learning. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 372 (1711), 20160049. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2016.0049</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Schlichting, M. L., Guarino, K. F., Roome, H. E., & Preston, A. R. (2021). Developmental differences in memory reactivation relate to encoding and inference in the human brain. Nature Human Behaviour, 6, 415 – 428. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562‐021‐01206‐5</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Schlichting, M. L., Guarino, K. F., Schapiro, A. C., Turk‐Browne, N. B., & Preston, A. R. (2017). Hippocampal structure predicts statistical learning and associative inference abilities during development. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 29 (1), 37 – 51. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01028</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Selmeczy, D., Fandakova, Y., Grimm, K. J., Bunge, S. A., & Ghetti, S. (2019). Longitudinal trajectories of hippocampal and prefrontal contributions to episodic retrieval: Effects of age and puberty. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 36, 100599. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2018.10.003</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Shepard, R. N. (1987). Toward a universal law of generalization for psychological science. Science, 237 (4820), 1317 – 1323. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3629243</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Simcock, G., & Hayne, H. (2002). Breaking the barrier: Children do not translate their preverbal memories into language. Psychological Science, 13 (3), 225 – 231. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467‐9280.00442</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A. V. (2004). When development and learning decrease memory. Psychological Science, 15 (8), 553 – 558. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956‐7976.2004.00718.x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Sloutsky, V. M., Yim, H., Yao, X., & Dennis, S. (2017). An associative account of the development of word learning. Cognitive Psychology, 97, 1 – 30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.06.001</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Sluzenski, J., Newcombe, N. S., & Kovacs, S. L. (2006). Binding, relational memory, and recall of naturalistic events: A developmental perspective. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32 (1), 89 – 100. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278‐7393.32.1.89</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Squire, L. R. (2004). Memory systems of the brain: A brief history and current perspective. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 82 (3), 171 – 177. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2004.06.005</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Tulving, E. (1985). How many memory systems are there? American Psychologist, 40 (4), 385 – 398. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003‐066X.40.4.385</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Turner, B. M. (2019). Toward a common representational framework for adaptation. Psychological Review, 126 (5), 660 – 692. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000148</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Unger, L., Savic, O., & Sloutsky, V. M. (2020). Statistical regularities shape semantic organization throughout development. Cognition, 198, 104190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104190</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Vlach, H. A. (2019). Learning to remember words: Memory constraints as double‐edged sword mechanisms of language development. Child Development Perspectives, 13 (3), 159 – 165. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12337</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Vlach, H. A., & Sandhofer, C. M. (2011). Developmental differences in children's context‐ dependent word learning. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 108 (2), 394 – 401. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2010.09.011</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Yim, H., Dennis, S. J., & Sloutsky, V. M. (2013). The development of episodic memory: Items, contexts, and relations. Psychological Science, 24 (11), 2163 – 2172. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613487385</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Yim, H., Osth, A. F., Sloutsky, V. M., & Dennis, S. J. (2022). Sources of interference in memory across development. Psychological Science, 33 (7), 1154 – 1171. https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976211073131</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By Vladimir M. Sloutsky; Robby Ralston; Brandon M. Turner and Simona Ghetti</p> <p>Reported by Author; Author; Author; Author</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib50" firstref="ref1"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib51" firstref="ref2"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib21" firstref="ref4"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib33" firstref="ref5"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib34" firstref="ref6"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib20" firstref="ref7"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib30" firstref="ref8"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib26" firstref="ref10"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib25" firstref="ref11"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl10" bibid="bib35" firstref="ref12"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl11" bibid="bib14" firstref="ref14"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl12" bibid="bib19" firstref="ref19"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl13" bibid="bib45" firstref="ref21"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl14" bibid="bib23" firstref="ref22"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl15" bibid="bib31" firstref="ref23"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl16" bibid="bib18" firstref="ref24"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl17" bibid="bib12" firstref="ref25"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl18" bibid="bib56" firstref="ref26"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl19" bibid="bib44" firstref="ref27"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl20" bibid="bib46" firstref="ref34"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl21" bibid="bib22" firstref="ref36"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl22" bibid="bib10" firstref="ref38"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl23" bibid="bib32" firstref="ref40"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl24" bibid="bib38" firstref="ref41"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl25" bibid="bib54" firstref="ref42"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl26" bibid="bib55" firstref="ref43"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl27" bibid="bib24" firstref="ref44"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl28" bibid="bib11" firstref="ref46"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl29" bibid="bib15" firstref="ref47"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl30" bibid="bib29" firstref="ref48"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl31" bibid="bib49" firstref="ref49"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl32" bibid="bib57" firstref="ref51"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl33" bibid="bib47" firstref="ref55"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl34" bibid="bib16" firstref="ref56"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl35" bibid="bib40" firstref="ref58"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl36" bibid="bib42" firstref="ref59"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl37" bibid="bib53" firstref="ref60"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl38" bibid="bib27" firstref="ref61"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl39" bibid="bib28" firstref="ref62"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl40" bibid="bib43" firstref="ref65"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl41" bibid="bib48" firstref="ref71"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl42" bibid="bib13" firstref="ref74"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl43" bibid="bib37" firstref="ref75"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl44" bibid="bib52" firstref="ref77"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl45" bibid="bib41" firstref="ref79"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl46" bibid="bib36" firstref="ref81"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl47" bibid="bib17" firstref="ref84"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl48" bibid="bib39" firstref="ref86"></nolink>
Header DbId: eric
DbLabel: ERIC
An: EJ1480091
AccessLevel: 3
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: A Little Imprecision Goes a Long Way in Launching Memory Development
– Name: Language
  Label: Language
  Group: Lang
  Data: English
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Vladimir+M%2E+Sloutsky%22">Vladimir M. Sloutsky</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4054-3360">0000-0003-4054-3360</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Robby+Ralston%22">Robby Ralston</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Brandon+M%2E+Turner%22">Brandon M. Turner</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Simona+Ghetti%22">Simona Ghetti</searchLink>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Child+Development+Perspectives%22"><i>Child Development Perspectives</i></searchLink>. 2025 19(3):139-145.
– Name: Avail
  Label: Availability
  Group: Avail
  Data: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 7
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2025
– Name: SourceSuprt
  Label: Sponsoring Agency
  Group: SrcSuprt
  Data: National Science Foundation (NSF), Division of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences (BCS)<br />Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) (DHHS/NIH)
– Name: NumberContract
  Label: Contract Number
  Group: NumCntrct
  Data: 1847603<br />R01HD078545
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Information Analyses
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Memory%22">Memory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cognitive+Development%22">Cognitive Development</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Mnemonics%22">Mnemonics</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Infants%22">Infants</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Young+Children%22">Young Children</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Adults%22">Adults</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Age+Differences%22">Age Differences</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Individual+Development%22">Individual Development</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1111/cdep.12536
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 1750-8592<br />1750-8606
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: From the earliest moments in their lives, infants begin to build memories about their past and accumulate knowledge about the world. In this article, we focus on the distinction between memory for "specific" events and memory for "general" information, and the ongoing debate about which type of memory provides the foundation for the development of the other. Some researchers argue that specific memory developmentally precedes general memory, whereas others support the opposite position. Our literature review suggests that the latter position is inconsistent with many empirical findings and theoretical principles of memory captured by computational models capable of accounting for these findings. We propose that just good enough mnemonic acuity could be a starting point for memory development, and that it can support both specific and generalized memories.
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2025
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1480091
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1480091
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1111/cdep.12536
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 7
        StartPage: 139
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Memory
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Cognitive Development
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Mnemonics
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Infants
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Young Children
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Adults
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Age Differences
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Individual Development
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: A Little Imprecision Goes a Long Way in Launching Memory Development
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Vladimir M. Sloutsky
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Robby Ralston
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Brandon M. Turner
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Simona Ghetti
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 09
              Type: published
              Y: 2025
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 1750-8592
            – Type: issn-electronic
              Value: 1750-8606
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 19
            – Type: issue
              Value: 3
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Child Development Perspectives
              Type: main
ResultId 1