Algorithms for Affirmative Action

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Algorithms for Affirmative Action
Language: English
Authors: Nick Arnosti (ORCID 0000-0002-6685-1428)
Source: INFORMS Transactions on Education. 2026 26(2):119-133.
Availability: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). 5521 Research Park Drive Suite 200, Catonsville, Maryland 21228. Tel: 800-446-3676; Tel: 443-757-3500; Fax: 443-757-3515; e-mail: informs@informs.org; Web site: https://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/ited
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 15
Publication Date: 2026
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Descriptive
Education Level: Higher Education
Postsecondary Education
Descriptors: Algorithms, Affirmative Action, Diversity, Instructional Materials, Foreign Countries, College Students, Instructional Effectiveness, College Admission, Competitive Selection, College Applicants, Foreign Students, Immigrants, Course Objectives, Housing
Geographic Terms: United States, Chile, India, Brazil, Israel
DOI: 10.1287/ited.2023.0039
ISSN: 1532-0545
Abstract: This paper illustrates how fundamental concepts from optimization--such as greedy algorithms, matroids, maximum weight matching, and NP-completeness--arise in domains where policymakers wish to select a set of applicants while ensuring representation for specific groups. Examples of such settings include visa lotteries in the United States, the election for Chile's constitutional assembly, affordable housing lotteries in New York City, selection for Indian civil service positions, and admission to Indian and Brazilian universities. By providing these examples alongside sample exercises, I aim to offer educators tools to make optimization theory accessible to students at all levels, while highlighting its policy relevance.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2026
Accession Number: EJ1495240
Database: ERIC
Full text is not displayed to guests.
Description
Abstract:This paper illustrates how fundamental concepts from optimization--such as greedy algorithms, matroids, maximum weight matching, and NP-completeness--arise in domains where policymakers wish to select a set of applicants while ensuring representation for specific groups. Examples of such settings include visa lotteries in the United States, the election for Chile's constitutional assembly, affordable housing lotteries in New York City, selection for Indian civil service positions, and admission to Indian and Brazilian universities. By providing these examples alongside sample exercises, I aim to offer educators tools to make optimization theory accessible to students at all levels, while highlighting its policy relevance.
ISSN:1532-0545
DOI:10.1287/ited.2023.0039