Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism : A New Reading of 'Representation and Reality'
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| Title: | Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism : A New Reading of 'Representation and Reality' |
|---|---|
| Description: | The first systematic examination of Hilary Putnam's arguments against computational functionalism challenges each of Putnam's main arguments.With mind-brain identity theories no longer dominant in philosophy of mind in the late 1950s, scientific materialists turned to functionalism, the view that the identity of any mental state depends on its function in the cognitive system of which it is a part. The philosopher Hilary Putnam was one of the primary architects of functionalism and was the first to propose computational functionalism, which views the human mind as a computer or an information processor. But, in the early 1970s, Putnam began to have doubts about functionalism, and in his masterwork Representation and Reality (MIT Press, 1988), he advanced four powerful arguments against his own doctrine of computational functionalism. In Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism, Jeff Buechner systematically examines Putnam's arguments against functionalism and contends that they are unsuccessful. Putnam's first argument uses Gödel's incompleteness theorem to refute the view that there is a computational description of human reasoning and rationality; his second, the “triviality argument,” demonstrates that any computational description can be attributed to any physical system; his third, the multirealization argument, shows that there are infinitely many computational realizations of an arbitrary intentional state; his fourth argument buttresses this assertion by showing that there cannot be local computational reductions because there is no computable partitioning of the infinity of computational realizations of an arbitrary intentional state into a single package or small set of packages (equivalence classes). Buechner analyzes these arguments and the important inferential connections among them—for example, the use of both the Gödel and triviality arguments in the argument against local computational reductions—and argues that none of Putnam's four arguments succeeds in refuting functionalism. Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism will inspire renewed discussion of Putnam's influential book and will confirm Representation and Reality as a major work by a major philosopher. |
| Authors: | Jeff Buechner |
| Resource Type: | eBook. |
| Subjects: | Mind-brain identity theory, Functionalism (Psychology), Realism, Computers, Electronic digital computers |
| Categories: | PHILOSOPHY / General |
| Database: | eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) |
| FullText | Links: – Type: ebook-pdf Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism : A New Reading of 'Representation and Reality' – Name: Abstract Label: Description Group: Ab Data: The first systematic examination of Hilary Putnam's arguments against computational functionalism challenges each of Putnam's main arguments.With mind-brain identity theories no longer dominant in philosophy of mind in the late 1950s, scientific materialists turned to functionalism, the view that the identity of any mental state depends on its function in the cognitive system of which it is a part. The philosopher Hilary Putnam was one of the primary architects of functionalism and was the first to propose computational functionalism, which views the human mind as a computer or an information processor. But, in the early 1970s, Putnam began to have doubts about functionalism, and in his masterwork Representation and Reality (MIT Press, 1988), he advanced four powerful arguments against his own doctrine of computational functionalism. In Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism, Jeff Buechner systematically examines Putnam's arguments against functionalism and contends that they are unsuccessful. Putnam's first argument uses Gödel's incompleteness theorem to refute the view that there is a computational description of human reasoning and rationality; his second, the “triviality argument,” demonstrates that any computational description can be attributed to any physical system; his third, the multirealization argument, shows that there are infinitely many computational realizations of an arbitrary intentional state; his fourth argument buttresses this assertion by showing that there cannot be local computational reductions because there is no computable partitioning of the infinity of computational realizations of an arbitrary intentional state into a single package or small set of packages (equivalence classes). Buechner analyzes these arguments and the important inferential connections among them—for example, the use of both the Gödel and triviality arguments in the argument against local computational reductions—and argues that none of Putnam's four arguments succeeds in refuting functionalism. Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism will inspire renewed discussion of Putnam's influential book and will confirm Representation and Reality as a major work by a major philosopher. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Jeff+Buechner%22">Jeff Buechner</searchLink> – Name: TypePub Label: Resource Type Group: TypPub Data: eBook. – Name: Subject Label: Subjects Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Mind-brain+identity+theory%22">Mind-brain identity theory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Functionalism+%28Psychology%29%22">Functionalism (Psychology)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Realism%22">Realism</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Computers%22">Computers</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Electronic+digital+computers%22">Electronic digital computers</searchLink> – Name: SubjectBISAC Label: Categories Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="ZK" term="%22PHILOSOPHY+%2F+General%22">PHILOSOPHY / General</searchLink> |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Classifications: – Code: 128.2 Scheme: ddc Type: prePub Languages: – Code: eng Text: English Subjects: – SubjectFull: Mind-brain identity theory Type: general – SubjectFull: Functionalism (Psychology) Type: general – SubjectFull: Realism Type: general – SubjectFull: Computers Type: general – SubjectFull: Electronic digital computers Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism : A New Reading of 'Representation and Reality' Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Jeff Buechner – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Jeff Buechner IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 01 Type: published Y: 2008 – D: 04 M: 02 Type: profile Y: 2014 Identifiers: – Type: isbn-print Value: 9780262026239 – Type: isbn-print Value: 9780262528184 – Type: isbn-electronic Value: 9780262269513 Titles: – TitleFull: Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism : A New Reading of 'Representation and Reality' Type: main |
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