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Self-knowledge in joint acceptance accounts.

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Title: Self-knowledge in joint acceptance accounts.
Authors: Schwengerer, Lukas (AUTHOR)
Source: Philosophical Psychology. Aug2025, Vol. 38 Issue 6, p2612-2636. 25p.
Subjects: Theory of self-knowledge, Collective consciousness, Theorists, Consensus (Social sciences), Attribution (Social psychology), Moral norms, Linguistic usage
Abstract: This paper closes a gap in joint acceptance accounts of the mental life of groups by presenting a theory of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework. I start out by presenting desiderata for a theory of group self-knowledge. Any such theory has to explain the linguistic practice of group avowals, and how self-knowledge can play a role in practical and moral considerations. I develop an account of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework that can explain these desiderata. I argue that a group has self-knowledge of its own attitude A if and only if (i) the operative members jointly accept that the group has attitude A; and (ii) that joint acceptance is non-deviantly caused by the operative group members' belief that the members jointly accepted attitude A; and (iii) the group has attitude A. Together (i) to (iii) give us conditions for a group having a justified, non-lucky, true belief about its own attitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: Self-knowledge in joint acceptance accounts.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Theory+of+self-knowledge%22">Theory of self-knowledge</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Collective+consciousness%22">Collective consciousness</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Theorists%22">Theorists</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Consensus+%28Social+sciences%29%22">Consensus (Social sciences)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Attribution+%28Social+psychology%29%22">Attribution (Social psychology)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Moral+norms%22">Moral norms</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Linguistic+usage%22">Linguistic usage</searchLink>
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  Data: This paper closes a gap in joint acceptance accounts of the mental life of groups by presenting a theory of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework. I start out by presenting desiderata for a theory of group self-knowledge. Any such theory has to explain the linguistic practice of group avowals, and how self-knowledge can play a role in practical and moral considerations. I develop an account of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework that can explain these desiderata. I argue that a group has self-knowledge of its own attitude A if and only if (i) the operative members jointly accept that the group has attitude A; and (ii) that joint acceptance is non-deviantly caused by the operative group members' belief that the members jointly accepted attitude A; and (iii) the group has attitude A. Together (i) to (iii) give us conditions for a group having a justified, non-lucky, true belief about its own attitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1080/09515089.2024.2346174
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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      – SubjectFull: Collective consciousness
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      – SubjectFull: Theorists
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      – SubjectFull: Consensus (Social sciences)
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      – SubjectFull: Attribution (Social psychology)
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      – SubjectFull: Moral norms
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              Text: Aug2025
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