Acts of Remembering: From a Radically Enactive Point of View.
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| Title: | Acts of Remembering: From a Radically Enactive Point of View. |
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| Authors: | Hutto, Daniel D. (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Psychoanalytic Inquiry. Jul2026, Vol. 46 Issue 7, p698-716. 19p. |
| Subjects: | Memory, Recollection (Psychology), Memorization, Cognitive psychology |
| Abstract: | Cognitivists and radically enactivists understand acts of remembering in fundamentally different ways. It is a hallmark of cognitivism to seek to identify some independent component that puts the memory – the what's remembered – into acts of remembering. Such a component is variably characterized as: a stored memory, a stored content, or stored information. Accordingly, and on this basis, cognitivists seek to distinguish memories from acts of remembering. This paper raises doubts about the very idea that we can make sense of the real, independent existence of stored memory contents or stored memory information and, in its place, motivates adoption of a radically enactivist approach to understanding various acts of remembering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection |
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