Reference Hijacking: Patching, Protecting and Analyzing on Unmodified and Non-Rooted Android Devices.

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Bibliographic Details
Title:	Reference Hijacking: Patching, Protecting and Analyzing on Unmodified and Non-Rooted Android Devices.
Authors:	Wei You^1,2 youwei@ruc.edu.cn, Bin Liang^1,2 liangb@ruc.edu.cn, Wenchang Shi^1,2 wenchang@ruc.edu.cn, Shuyang Zhu^1,2 zhushuyang@ruc.edu.cn, Peng Wang^1,2 pengwang@ruc.edu.cn, Sikefu Xie^1,2 decadall@ruc.edu.cn, Xiangyu Zhang³ xyzhang@cs.purdue.edu
Source:	ICSE: International Conference on Software Engineering. 5/14/2016, p959-970. 12p.
Subjects:	Software engineering, Mobile operating systems, Android (Operating system), Hijacking, Communication, Security systems
Abstract:	Many efforts have been paid to enhance the security of Android. However, less attention has been given to how to practically adopt the enhancements on off-the-shelf devices. In particular, securing Android devices often requires modifying their write-protected underlying system component files (especially the system libraries) by flashing or rooting devices, which is unacceptable in many realistic cases. In this paper, a novel technique, called reference hijacking, is presented to address the problem. By introducing a specially designed reset procedure, a new execution environment is constructed for the target application, in which the reference to the underlying system libraries will be redirected to the securityenhanced alternatives. The technique can be applicable to both the Dalvik and Android Runtime (ART) environments and to almost all mainstream Android versions (2.x to 5.x). To demonstrate the capability of reference hijacking, we develop three prototype systems, PatchMan, ControlMan, and TaintMan, to enforce specific security enhancements, involving patching vulnerabilities, protecting inter-component communications, and performing dynamic taint analysis for the target application. These three prototypes have been successfully deployed on a number of popular Android devices from different manufacturers, without modifying the underlying system. The evaluation results show that they are effective and do not introduce noticeable overhead. They strongly support that reference hijacking can substantially improve the practicability of many security enhancement efforts for Android. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database:	Engineering Source

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Abstract:	Many efforts have been paid to enhance the security of Android. However, less attention has been given to how to practically adopt the enhancements on off-the-shelf devices. In particular, securing Android devices often requires modifying their write-protected underlying system component files (especially the system libraries) by flashing or rooting devices, which is unacceptable in many realistic cases. In this paper, a novel technique, called reference hijacking, is presented to address the problem. By introducing a specially designed reset procedure, a new execution environment is constructed for the target application, in which the reference to the underlying system libraries will be redirected to the securityenhanced alternatives. The technique can be applicable to both the Dalvik and Android Runtime (ART) environments and to almost all mainstream Android versions (2.x to 5.x). To demonstrate the capability of reference hijacking, we develop three prototype systems, PatchMan, ControlMan, and TaintMan, to enforce specific security enhancements, involving patching vulnerabilities, protecting inter-component communications, and performing dynamic taint analysis for the target application. These three prototypes have been successfully deployed on a number of popular Android devices from different manufacturers, without modifying the underlying system. The evaluation results show that they are effective and do not introduce noticeable overhead. They strongly support that reference hijacking can substantially improve the practicability of many security enhancement efforts for Android. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
DOI:	10.1145/2884781.2884863