Preventive and Deterrent Controls for Software Piracy.

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Bibliographic Details
Title: Preventive and Deterrent Controls for Software Piracy.
Authors: Gopal, Ram D.1, Sanders, G. Lawrence2
Source: Journal of Management Information Systems. Spring97, Vol. 13 Issue 4, p29-47. 19p. 1 Diagram, 3 Charts.
Subjects: Intellectual property, Piracy prevention (Copyright), Copyright of software, Computer software, Markets, Computer software industry -- Security measures
Abstract: In an attempt to protect their intellectual property and compete effectively in an increasingly dynamic marketplace, software publishers have employed a number of preventive and deterrent controls to counter software piracy. Conventional wisdom suggests that reducing piracy will force consumers to acquire software legitimately, thus increasing firm profits. We develop an analytical model to test the implications of antipiracy measures on publisher profits. Our results suggest that preventive controls decrease profits and deterrent controls can potentially increase profits. Empirical results are also presented that support the proposition on the impact of deterrent controls on the extent of software piracy derived from the analytical model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database: Engineering Source
Description
Abstract:In an attempt to protect their intellectual property and compete effectively in an increasingly dynamic marketplace, software publishers have employed a number of preventive and deterrent controls to counter software piracy. Conventional wisdom suggests that reducing piracy will force consumers to acquire software legitimately, thus increasing firm profits. We develop an analytical model to test the implications of antipiracy measures on publisher profits. Our results suggest that preventive controls decrease profits and deterrent controls can potentially increase profits. Empirical results are also presented that support the proposition on the impact of deterrent controls on the extent of software piracy derived from the analytical model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:07421222
DOI:10.1080/07421222.1997.11518141