A Study on the Optimization of Organized Scientific Research Incentive Mechanisms in the Era of Big Science.

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Bibliographic Details
Title:	A Study on the Optimization of Organized Scientific Research Incentive Mechanisms in the Era of Big Science.
Authors:	WU Jingjing¹, WU Zehao², ZHOU Guanglic³
Source:	Frontiers of Education in China. Sep2025, Vol. 20 Issue 3, p263-284. 22p.
Subject Terms:	Game theory, Research management, Big Science, Mathematical optimization, Value orientations
Abstract:	In the big science era, incentive mechanisms that enable researchers to fully realize their potential, enhance collaboration, and improve the efficiency of organized research have remained a key issue in research governance. Based on game theory, this study compared the operational logic and incentive effects of different incentive mechanisms in organized research settings and theoretically summarizes the inherent logic of institutional optimization. By examining recent international practices in scientific authorship, this study found that traditional incentive systems, represented by authorship ranking and the first-author convention, are rigid in structure and fail to adapt to the complexity and dynamics of collaborative research, resulting in systemic underinvestment by individual researchers. However, establishing adaptive, dynamic, contribution-driven mechanisms and fostering competition within collaborative frameworks can effectively mitigate efficiency losses. Policy recommendations include learning from international experiences such as the Contributor Roles Taxonomy and promoting transparent, objective, and standard disclosure of individual contributions, thereby developing a contribution-oriented diversified talent evaluation system. It is imperative to adhere to a people-centered value orientation, promote the spirit of selfless dedication--"success does not need to be attributed to me"--and foster a collaborative innovation ecosystem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database:	Education Research Complete

Description
Abstract:	In the big science era, incentive mechanisms that enable researchers to fully realize their potential, enhance collaboration, and improve the efficiency of organized research have remained a key issue in research governance. Based on game theory, this study compared the operational logic and incentive effects of different incentive mechanisms in organized research settings and theoretically summarizes the inherent logic of institutional optimization. By examining recent international practices in scientific authorship, this study found that traditional incentive systems, represented by authorship ranking and the first-author convention, are rigid in structure and fail to adapt to the complexity and dynamics of collaborative research, resulting in systemic underinvestment by individual researchers. However, establishing adaptive, dynamic, contribution-driven mechanisms and fostering competition within collaborative frameworks can effectively mitigate efficiency losses. Policy recommendations include learning from international experiences such as the Contributor Roles Taxonomy and promoting transparent, objective, and standard disclosure of individual contributions, thereby developing a contribution-oriented diversified talent evaluation system. It is imperative to adhere to a people-centered value orientation, promote the spirit of selfless dedication--"success does not need to be attributed to me"--and foster a collaborative innovation ecosystem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:	1673341X
DOI:	10.3868/s110-020-025-0015-1