Public health emergency supplies pricing strategy for government—enterprise joint reserve under government subsidy.
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| Title: | Public health emergency supplies pricing strategy for government—enterprise joint reserve under government subsidy. |
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| Authors: | Zhao, Xuan1 (AUTHOR), Peng, Benhong2 (AUTHOR) 002426@nuist.edu.cn, Zheng, Chaoyu3 (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Environment, Development & Sustainability. May2026, Vol. 28 Issue 5, p12405-12431. 27p. |
| Subject Terms: | *Subsidies, *Buffer inventories, *Inventory control, *Corporate purchasing, *Cost accounting, *Public health, *Emergency management |
| Abstract: | The enterprise reserve mode of public health emergency materials can effectively solve the drawbacks of traditional government reserve mode. In order to establish a normal joint mechanism of material procurement and reserve, both government and enterprise should make reasonable decisions on the pricing, subsidy and reserve amount of materials procurement. Therefore, this paper studies this problem based on the quantitative flexible contract to build the cooperative relationship between government and enterprise under government subsidies. Considering the uncertainty of the occurrence of disaster events and the store capacity of enterprises, both government and enterprise can participate in the spot market at the same time, this paper presents the optimal decision of both government and enterprise in three reserve modes. Finally, a numerical experiment derived from the market data of public health emergency materials is used to compare the government reserve mode and government—enterprise joint reserve modes. Results show that the suitable government subsidy can increase the cooperative reserve amount of public health emergency materials and the overall cost is still lower than the government reserve mode. It significantly provides a theoretical basis for the public health emergency materials enterprises to formulate reserve amount and provides suggestion for the government in the designing pricing strategy and subsidies policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Database: | Energy & Power Source |
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| Abstract: | The enterprise reserve mode of public health emergency materials can effectively solve the drawbacks of traditional government reserve mode. In order to establish a normal joint mechanism of material procurement and reserve, both government and enterprise should make reasonable decisions on the pricing, subsidy and reserve amount of materials procurement. Therefore, this paper studies this problem based on the quantitative flexible contract to build the cooperative relationship between government and enterprise under government subsidies. Considering the uncertainty of the occurrence of disaster events and the store capacity of enterprises, both government and enterprise can participate in the spot market at the same time, this paper presents the optimal decision of both government and enterprise in three reserve modes. Finally, a numerical experiment derived from the market data of public health emergency materials is used to compare the government reserve mode and government—enterprise joint reserve modes. Results show that the suitable government subsidy can increase the cooperative reserve amount of public health emergency materials and the overall cost is still lower than the government reserve mode. It significantly provides a theoretical basis for the public health emergency materials enterprises to formulate reserve amount and provides suggestion for the government in the designing pricing strategy and subsidies policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 1387585X |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10668-024-05412-9 |
