Public Good Perceptions and Polarization: Evidence from Higher Education Appropriations. EdWorkingPaper No. 24-929
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| Title: | Public Good Perceptions and Polarization: Evidence from Higher Education Appropriations. EdWorkingPaper No. 24-929 |
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| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Reuben Hurst, Andrew Simon, Michael Ricks, Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University |
| Source: | Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University. 2024. |
| Availability: | Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University. Brown University Box 1985, Providence, RI 02912. Tel: 401-863-7990; Fax: 401-863-1290; e-mail: annenberg@brown.edu; Web site: https://annenberg.brown.edu/ |
| Peer Reviewed: | N |
| Page Count: | 62 |
| Publication Date: | 2024 |
| Sponsoring Agency: | University of Michigan Institute of Education Sciences (ED) |
| Contract Number: | R305B150012 |
| Document Type: | Reports - Research |
| Education Level: | Higher Education Postsecondary Education |
| Descriptors: | Educational Finance, Expenditures, Investment, Outcomes of Education, Federal Aid, Higher Education, Political Attitudes, Politics of Education, Educational Policy, Public Opinion, Ideology, Legislators, Letters (Correspondence) |
| Abstract: | To understand the causes and consequences of polarized demand for government expenditure, we conduct three field experiments in the context of public higher education. The first two experiments study polarization in taxpayer demand. We provide information to shape beliefs about social returns on investment. Our treatments narrow the political partisan gap in ideal policies--a reduction in ideological polarization--by up to 32%, with differences in partisan reasoning as a key mechanism. Providing information also affects how people communicate their ideal policies to elected officials, increasing their propensity to write a (positive) letter to an official of the other party--a reduction in affective polarization. In the third experiment, we send these letters to a randomized subset of elected officials to study how policymakers respond to constituent demand. We find that officials who receive their constituents' demands engage more with higher education issues in our correspondences. [This research was funded in part by grants from the University of Michigan, Department of Economics, Department of Political Science, Rackham Graduate School, and Brigham Young University. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| IES Funded: | Yes |
| Entry Date: | 2025 |
| Accession Number: | ED672501 |
| Database: | ERIC |
| Abstract: | To understand the causes and consequences of polarized demand for government expenditure, we conduct three field experiments in the context of public higher education. The first two experiments study polarization in taxpayer demand. We provide information to shape beliefs about social returns on investment. Our treatments narrow the political partisan gap in ideal policies--a reduction in ideological polarization--by up to 32%, with differences in partisan reasoning as a key mechanism. Providing information also affects how people communicate their ideal policies to elected officials, increasing their propensity to write a (positive) letter to an official of the other party--a reduction in affective polarization. In the third experiment, we send these letters to a randomized subset of elected officials to study how policymakers respond to constituent demand. We find that officials who receive their constituents' demands engage more with higher education issues in our correspondences. [This research was funded in part by grants from the University of Michigan, Department of Economics, Department of Political Science, Rackham Graduate School, and Brigham Young University. |
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