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The Algorithm Advantage: Ranked Application Systems Outperform Decentralized and Common Applications in Boston and Beyond. Working Paper 34207

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Bibliographic Details
Title: The Algorithm Advantage: Ranked Application Systems Outperform Decentralized and Common Applications in Boston and Beyond. Working Paper 34207
Language: English
Authors: Christopher Avery, Geoffrey Kocks, Parag A. Pathak, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research. 2025.
Availability: National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org
Peer Reviewed: N
Publication Date: 2025
Sponsoring Agency: National Science Foundation (NSF), Graduate Research Fellowship Program (GRFP)
Contract Number: 2141064
Document Type: Reports - Research
Descriptors: Charter Schools, School Choice, Algorithms, Preferences, Access to Education, Economic Factors, Admission (School), Student Placement
Geographic Terms: Massachusetts (Boston)
Abstract: School choice systems increasingly use common applications, where students can apply to multiple schools on a single form, though schools make admission decisions independently. We model three application systems: a common application, a decentralized system with costly separate applications, and a ranked-choice system using a matching algorithm. Our model shows that while a common application may expand access, it increases competition and may produce worse matches than a decentralized system where application costs encourage more selective applications. Ranked-choice systems combine reduced application costs with preference-based matching that reduce mismatches. We examine these predictions by analyzing how Boston's charter school sector was affected when it adopted an online common application. Counterfactual simulations suggest the common application performs no better than alternatives on several metrics and did little to increase access for disadvantaged groups. A ranked system consistently outperforms a common application across various levels of competition and assumptions on preference stability between application and enrollment stages.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2025
Access URL: https://www.nber.org/papers/w34207
Accession Number: ED676490
Database: ERIC
Description
Abstract:School choice systems increasingly use common applications, where students can apply to multiple schools on a single form, though schools make admission decisions independently. We model three application systems: a common application, a decentralized system with costly separate applications, and a ranked-choice system using a matching algorithm. Our model shows that while a common application may expand access, it increases competition and may produce worse matches than a decentralized system where application costs encourage more selective applications. Ranked-choice systems combine reduced application costs with preference-based matching that reduce mismatches. We examine these predictions by analyzing how Boston's charter school sector was affected when it adopted an online common application. Counterfactual simulations suggest the common application performs no better than alternatives on several metrics and did little to increase access for disadvantaged groups. A ranked system consistently outperforms a common application across various levels of competition and assumptions on preference stability between application and enrollment stages.