Teaching Vaccines Using Internal-to-the-Market Externalities
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| Title: | Teaching Vaccines Using Internal-to-the-Market Externalities |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Chen, Ziyue, Djalalova, Fatima, Rothschild, Casey (ORCID |
| Source: | Journal of Economic Education. 2023 54(3):289-300. |
| Availability: | Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Page Count: | 12 |
| Publication Date: | 2023 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Reports - Research |
| Education Level: | Higher Education Postsecondary Education |
| Descriptors: | Teaching Methods, Economics Education, Immunization Programs, Undergraduate Students, Comparative Analysis, Economic Factors, Textbooks, COVID-19, Pandemics, Costs, Well Being, Visual Aids, Correlation |
| DOI: | 10.1080/00220485.2023.2191597 |
| ISSN: | 0022-0485 2152-4068 |
| Abstract: | Textbook models of externalities tacitly assume that those externalities fall upon individuals "outside" of the market. In many contexts--including common undergraduate examples--externalities fall "inside" the market instead. Positive externalities associated with vaccination, for instance, accrue to other individuals who would potentially demand vaccines and affect their willingness to pay. The authors describe an undergraduate-accessible alternative diagrammatic approach to such internal-to-the-market externalities, using vaccines as their through-running example. They illustrate their approach by applying it in a study of binding mandates for 100-percent-effective vaccines and show how it can be used to depict a striking (known) result that, compared to laissez-faire, such a mandate will "always" lower social welfare. They also discuss important real-world caveats to this result. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Entry Date: | 2023 |
| Accession Number: | EJ1393174 |
| Database: | ERIC |
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| Abstract: | Textbook models of externalities tacitly assume that those externalities fall upon individuals "outside" of the market. In many contexts--including common undergraduate examples--externalities fall "inside" the market instead. Positive externalities associated with vaccination, for instance, accrue to other individuals who would potentially demand vaccines and affect their willingness to pay. The authors describe an undergraduate-accessible alternative diagrammatic approach to such internal-to-the-market externalities, using vaccines as their through-running example. They illustrate their approach by applying it in a study of binding mandates for 100-percent-effective vaccines and show how it can be used to depict a striking (known) result that, compared to laissez-faire, such a mandate will "always" lower social welfare. They also discuss important real-world caveats to this result. |
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| ISSN: | 0022-0485 2152-4068 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/00220485.2023.2191597 |
