The Meaning and Computation of Causal Power: Comment on Cheng (1997) and Novick and Cheng (2004)
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| Title: | The Meaning and Computation of Causal Power: Comment on Cheng (1997) and Novick and Cheng (2004) |
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| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Luhmann, Christian C., Ahn, Woo-kyoung |
| Source: | Psychological Review. Jul 2005 112(3):685-693. |
| Availability: | American Psychological Association. Journals Department, 750 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242. Tel: 800-374-2721; Tel: 202-336-5510; Fax: 202-336-5502; e-mail: order@apa.org; Web site: http://www.apa.org/publications. |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Page Count: | 9 |
| Publication Date: | 2005 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Opinion Papers |
| Descriptors: | Logical Thinking, Causal Models, Reader Response, Misconceptions, Error Correction, Computation, Epistemology |
| ISSN: | 0033-295X |
| Abstract: | D. Hume (1739/1987) argued that causality is not observable. P. W. Cheng claimed to present "a theoretical solution to the problem of causal induction first posed by Hume more than two and a half centuries ago" (p. 398) in the form of the power PC theory (L. R. Novick & P. W. Cheng). This theory claims that people's goal in causal induction is to estimate causal powers from observable covariation and outlines how this can be done in specific conditions. The authors first demonstrate that if the necessary assumptions were ever met, causal powers would be self-evident to a reasoner-they are either 0 or 1--making the theory unnecessary. The authors further argue that the assumptions the power PC theory requires to compute causal power are unobtainable in the real world and, furthermore, people are aware that requisite assumptions are violated. Therefore, the authors argue that people do not attempt to compute causal power. |
| Abstractor: | Author |
| Entry Date: | 2006 |
| Access URL: | https://content.apa.org/journals/rev/112/3 |
| Accession Number: | EJ735368 |
| Database: | ERIC |
| Abstract: | D. Hume (1739/1987) argued that causality is not observable. P. W. Cheng claimed to present "a theoretical solution to the problem of causal induction first posed by Hume more than two and a half centuries ago" (p. 398) in the form of the power PC theory (L. R. Novick & P. W. Cheng). This theory claims that people's goal in causal induction is to estimate causal powers from observable covariation and outlines how this can be done in specific conditions. The authors first demonstrate that if the necessary assumptions were ever met, causal powers would be self-evident to a reasoner-they are either 0 or 1--making the theory unnecessary. The authors further argue that the assumptions the power PC theory requires to compute causal power are unobtainable in the real world and, furthermore, people are aware that requisite assumptions are violated. Therefore, the authors argue that people do not attempt to compute causal power. |
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| ISSN: | 0033-295X |
