Blocked, Diluted, and Co-Opted: Interest Groups Wage War against Merit Pay
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| Title: | Blocked, Diluted, and Co-Opted: Interest Groups Wage War against Merit Pay |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Buck, Stuart, Greene, Jay P. |
| Source: | Education Next. Spr 2011 11(2):26-31. |
| Availability: | Hoover Institution. Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6010. Tel: 800-935-2882; Fax: 650-723-8626; e-mail: educationnext@hoover.stanford.edu; Web site: http://educationnext.org/journal/ |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Page Count: | 6 |
| Publication Date: | 2011 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Opinion Papers |
| Descriptors: | Teacher Salaries, Merit Pay, Teacher Effectiveness, Rewards, Public Support, Unions, Academic Achievement |
| Geographic Terms: | United States |
| ISSN: | 1539-9664 |
| Abstract: | According to the latest "Education Next" poll, public support for merit pay gained significant ground over the past year and now outdistances opposition by a 2:1 margin. Replacing the standardized salary schedule, where the only factors that determine teacher salaries are the number of years on the job and academic credentials, seems a worthwhile goal. In theory, pay-for-performance plans both provide a clear monetary incentive to teachers to find the best way to motivate and instruct their students and, over the longer term, attract and retain those more-effective teachers who wish to work in a field that rewards professionals for the quality of their efforts. But enacting high-quality performance pay plans in the United States is easier said than done. The authors argue that merit pay plans are more likely to be symbolic than substantive and more likely to be promised than delivered. They contend that a strong, well-designed merit-pay plan requires more than offering a bonus to high-performing teachers while paying the remainder according to the standard schedule. To be truly effective, pay for performance must mean in education what it does in other industries--salary increases for the successful, and salary reductions, even dismissals, for poor performers. |
| Abstractor: | ERIC |
| Entry Date: | 2011 |
| Access URL: | https://educationnext.org/files/ednext_20112_Buck.pdf |
| Accession Number: | EJ931433 |
| Database: | ERIC |
| Abstract: | According to the latest "Education Next" poll, public support for merit pay gained significant ground over the past year and now outdistances opposition by a 2:1 margin. Replacing the standardized salary schedule, where the only factors that determine teacher salaries are the number of years on the job and academic credentials, seems a worthwhile goal. In theory, pay-for-performance plans both provide a clear monetary incentive to teachers to find the best way to motivate and instruct their students and, over the longer term, attract and retain those more-effective teachers who wish to work in a field that rewards professionals for the quality of their efforts. But enacting high-quality performance pay plans in the United States is easier said than done. The authors argue that merit pay plans are more likely to be symbolic than substantive and more likely to be promised than delivered. They contend that a strong, well-designed merit-pay plan requires more than offering a bonus to high-performing teachers while paying the remainder according to the standard schedule. To be truly effective, pay for performance must mean in education what it does in other industries--salary increases for the successful, and salary reductions, even dismissals, for poor performers. |
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| ISSN: | 1539-9664 |
