The Influence of Corporate Lobbying on Federal Contracting.
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| Title: | The Influence of Corporate Lobbying on Federal Contracting. |
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| Authors: | Dusso, Aaron (AUTHOR), Holyoke, Thomas T. (AUTHOR), Schatzinger, Henrik (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell). Aug2019, Vol. 100 Issue 5, p1793-1809. 17p. 1 Chart, 1 Graph. |
| Subjects: | Public contracts, Lobbying, Corporate political activity, Political participation, Government agencies, Power (Social sciences) |
| Geographic Terms: | United States |
| Abstract: | Objective: Corporations spend significant resources lobbying for billions of dollars in federal procurement contracts, yet this important opportunity to assess the political influence of business has gone unstudied by scholars of business politics. We study it here. Methods: We approach it by analyzing the influence of direct lobbying of five federal departments, along with data on the lobbying of, and campaign contributions to, members of Congress on patterns of contract awards broken out by congressional districts. Results: Our analysis reveals that while there are many reasons to expect lobbying Congress to produce valuable contracts, we instead find that it is the direct lobbying of executive branch agencies that is most likely to bring big rewards. Conclusion: These results highlight the importance of studying corporate political power outside of the legislative branch, suggesting that it is the long‐term relationships that lobbyists build with bureaucrats that yield the most lucrative contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection |
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| Abstract: | Objective: Corporations spend significant resources lobbying for billions of dollars in federal procurement contracts, yet this important opportunity to assess the political influence of business has gone unstudied by scholars of business politics. We study it here. Methods: We approach it by analyzing the influence of direct lobbying of five federal departments, along with data on the lobbying of, and campaign contributions to, members of Congress on patterns of contract awards broken out by congressional districts. Results: Our analysis reveals that while there are many reasons to expect lobbying Congress to produce valuable contracts, we instead find that it is the direct lobbying of executive branch agencies that is most likely to bring big rewards. Conclusion: These results highlight the importance of studying corporate political power outside of the legislative branch, suggesting that it is the long‐term relationships that lobbyists build with bureaucrats that yield the most lucrative contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 00384941 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/ssqu.12665 |
