Moral judgment under uncertainty: A CNI model analysis.
Saved in:
| Title: | Moral judgment under uncertainty: A CNI model analysis. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Ng, Nyx L., Luke, Dillon M., Gawronski, Bertram |
| Source: | European Journal of Social Psychology. Oct2023, Vol. 53 Issue 6, p1055-1077. 23p. 1 Diagram, 9 Charts, 1 Graph. |
| Subjects: | Ethics, Judgment (Psychology), Meta-analysis, Ethical decision making, Uncertainty, Psychology, Cognition, Conceptual models, Government policy, Decision making, Descriptive statistics |
| Abstract: | Past research suggests that uncertainty reduces our preference for utilitarian over deontological responses in moral dilemmas. The objective of the current research was to disentangle the possible mechanisms through which uncertainty shapes moral‐dilemma responses. Using the CNI model of moral decision‐making, we examined if uncertainty influences moral‐dilemma responses via sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, or general action tendencies. Across four preregistered experiments (N = 1400), sensitivity to consequences was lower when the outcomes in moral dilemmas were uncertain than when they were certain. This effect emerged regardless of whether participants were asked to judge if they would perform the described actions or if they deem the described actions acceptable. The results are consistent with accounts suggesting that uncertain outcomes influence responses in moral dilemmas through discounting of cost‐benefit ratios. Implications for public policy and moral decisions in real‐world contexts are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of European Journal of Social Psychology is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection |
|
Full text is not displayed to guests.
Login for full access.
|
|
| Abstract: | Past research suggests that uncertainty reduces our preference for utilitarian over deontological responses in moral dilemmas. The objective of the current research was to disentangle the possible mechanisms through which uncertainty shapes moral‐dilemma responses. Using the CNI model of moral decision‐making, we examined if uncertainty influences moral‐dilemma responses via sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, or general action tendencies. Across four preregistered experiments (N = 1400), sensitivity to consequences was lower when the outcomes in moral dilemmas were uncertain than when they were certain. This effect emerged regardless of whether participants were asked to judge if they would perform the described actions or if they deem the described actions acceptable. The results are consistent with accounts suggesting that uncertain outcomes influence responses in moral dilemmas through discounting of cost‐benefit ratios. Implications for public policy and moral decisions in real‐world contexts are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 00462772 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/ejsp.2952 |
