Dialogicality and Conspiracy Theory: The Coexistence of Conspiracist and Non‐Conspiracist Beliefs.
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| Title: | Dialogicality and Conspiracy Theory: The Coexistence of Conspiracist and Non‐Conspiracist Beliefs. |
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| Authors: | Hall, Matthew S., Franks, Bradley, Bauer, Martin W. |
| Source: | European Journal of Social Psychology. Mar2025, Vol. 55 Issue 2, p311-326. 16p. |
| Subjects: | Social psychology, Research funding, Interviewing, Science, Social theory, Communities, Psychology, Thematic analysis, Cognitive dissonance, Communication, Research methodology, Religion, Theory, Practical politics, Self-perception |
| Abstract: | This study investigates how people who believe in conspiracy theory (CT) hold those beliefs. It considers whether believing a conspiracist explanation of an issue or event permits or precludes also believing a non‐conspiracist explanation—that is, the degree to which endorsing CTs can be dialogical. Dialogicality involves the coexistence of conspiracist and non‐conspiracist beliefs in advancing claims and contrasts with the view that all conspiracist belief endorsement is monological or 'closed' from other explanations. Thematic analysis of 39 semi‐structured interviews revealed five modalities of belief coexistence: cognitive dissonance between beliefs, analogical beliefs, target‐dependent beliefs, synthetic beliefs, and integrative beliefs. This spanned beliefs about the self, ingroup, outgroup, reality, action and the future, on topics concerning science, religion, and politics and society. These findings challenge the view that all CTs are monological belief systems: CT believers recruit both conspiracist and non‐conspiracist explanations in building their worldview. Several hypotheses for further research emerge from this challenge to the basic assumption of much research on CTs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of European Journal of Social Psychology is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection |
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| Abstract: | This study investigates how people who believe in conspiracy theory (CT) hold those beliefs. It considers whether believing a conspiracist explanation of an issue or event permits or precludes also believing a non‐conspiracist explanation—that is, the degree to which endorsing CTs can be dialogical. Dialogicality involves the coexistence of conspiracist and non‐conspiracist beliefs in advancing claims and contrasts with the view that all conspiracist belief endorsement is monological or 'closed' from other explanations. Thematic analysis of 39 semi‐structured interviews revealed five modalities of belief coexistence: cognitive dissonance between beliefs, analogical beliefs, target‐dependent beliefs, synthetic beliefs, and integrative beliefs. This spanned beliefs about the self, ingroup, outgroup, reality, action and the future, on topics concerning science, religion, and politics and society. These findings challenge the view that all CTs are monological belief systems: CT believers recruit both conspiracist and non‐conspiracist explanations in building their worldview. Several hypotheses for further research emerge from this challenge to the basic assumption of much research on CTs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 00462772 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/ejsp.3120 |
