The Knowledge Paradox: When Military Units Don’t Know What They Know.

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Bibliographic Details
Title:	The Knowledge Paradox: When Military Units Don’t Know What They Know.
Authors:	Ferris, Raymond M., Ferris, Stephen P.
Source:	Military Review. Mar/Apr2026, Vol. 106 Issue 2, p68-79. 12p.
Subjects:	Situational awareness, Military intelligence, Cognitive bias, Judgment (Psychology), Information technology, Military research
Geographic Terms:	Pearl Harbor (Hawaii)
Abstract:	The article focuses on the concept of "unknown knowns"—a category of knowledge identified as things military units know but fail to recognize, access, or apply—and its impact on military planning and operations. It explains that unknown knowns arise from organizational silos, cognitive biases, information management failures, and cultural or temporal factors, leading to analytical blind spots, poor decision-making, duplicated efforts, and impeded learning. The authors argue that addressing unknown knowns through improved knowledge management, organizational reforms, and artificial intelligence (AI) applications can enhance situational awareness, training efficiency, and risk mitigation at relatively modest costs. Historical military cases such as Pearl Harbor, the 9/11 attacks, and the Ukraine conflict illustrate how unknown knowns have repeatedly contributed to operational failures, underscoring the importance of systematic mitigation strategies to optimize existing knowledge assets for strategic advantage. [Extracted from the article]
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Database:	Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection

Description
Abstract:	The article focuses on the concept of "unknown knowns"—a category of knowledge identified as things military units know but fail to recognize, access, or apply—and its impact on military planning and operations. It explains that unknown knowns arise from organizational silos, cognitive biases, information management failures, and cultural or temporal factors, leading to analytical blind spots, poor decision-making, duplicated efforts, and impeded learning. The authors argue that addressing unknown knowns through improved knowledge management, organizational reforms, and artificial intelligence (AI) applications can enhance situational awareness, training efficiency, and risk mitigation at relatively modest costs. Historical military cases such as Pearl Harbor, the 9/11 attacks, and the Ukraine conflict illustrate how unknown knowns have repeatedly contributed to operational failures, underscoring the importance of systematic mitigation strategies to optimize existing knowledge assets for strategic advantage. [Extracted from the article]
ISSN:	00264148